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A Political-Economic Study on Fisheries Resource Rent and Rent-Seeking Behaviors  

Park, Seong-Kwae (Faculty of Marine Business and Economics, Pukyong National University)
Publication Information
Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education / v.17, no.3, 2005 , pp. 340-360 More about this Journal
Abstract
Fishery resource rents(i.e. windfall gains or excess profit), which tend to lead a variety of important economic, social, political problems, have been a fundamental cause of unbalance between fishery resource use and management. Thus, there may exist several sorts of optimal level of resource utilization such as economic maximum sustainable yield, biological maximum sustainable yield, social optimum production, socio-political optimum yield, etc. The fishery resource use level seems to a large extent to be determined by the characteristics of fishermen's rent seeking structure. As well known, fishery resources as common properties have a characteristic of being difficult to establish private property rights. Therefore, their use rights are controlled by the permit and/or the license system. As a result, absolute or differential rents are formed by the changes in institutional arrangements. Rent problems are often transformed into serious socio-political issues when the rent in a given industry is much higher to a socially unacceptable extent than the average of other industries. However, individual fishermen or fishermen's groups tend to behave aggressively to change the existing fishery institutions towards maximizing fishery rents. These rent-seeking behaviors often tend to nullify fishery management schemes. The larger is the relative rent difference between fisheries and other industries, the more aggressive tend to be the rent-seeking behaviors in fisheries.
Keywords
Fisheries rent; Rent-seeking behavior; Common property; Property right;
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