• 한국지열·수열에너지학회논문집
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.21-28
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• 2018

This paper presents two-step simulations to calculate the influence of blast-induced pressures on explosion-protection valves installed at the boundary between a protection facility and a tunnel entering the facility. The first step is to calculate the respective overpressure on the entrance and exit of the tunnel when an explosion occurs near the tunnel entrance and exit to approach the protection facility. Secondly, the blast pressures on the explosion-protection valves mounted to walls located near the tunnel inside approaching the protection facility are analyzed with a 0.1 ms time variation using the results obtained from the first-step calculations. The following conclusions could be derived as a results: (1) The analysis of the entrance tunnel scenario, P1, leads to the maximum overpressure of 47 kPa, approximately a half of the ambient pressure, at the inner entrance due to the effect of blast barrier. For the scenario, P2, the case not blocked by the barrier, the maximum overpressure is 628 kPa, which is relatively high, namely, 5.2 times the ambient pressure. (2) It is observed that the pressure for the entrance tunnel is effectively mitigated because the initial blast pressures are partially offset from each other according to the geometry of the entrance and a portion of the pressures is discharged to the outside.

• 한국재난정보학회 논문집
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.91-97
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• 2014

본 연구는 기존 설치된 주민대피시설의 실태조사를 통해 주민대피시설의 계획 및 설계에 필요한 기초자료로서의 활용을 목적으로 진행되었다. 그 결과, 첫째, 주민대피시설이 고폭탄 위주의 방호만을 고려하여 설계된 것으로 판단되나, 시설물의 출구방향, 주출입구 방호능력 등을 살펴보았을 때 실제 고폭탄에 대한 방호능력은 상당히 떨어지는 것으로 판단된다. 둘째, 전체 7개 시설은 외부에서 내부로 유입되는 공기에 대한 공기여과청정기가 설치되어 있지 않으며, 외부에 설치된 흡 배기구의 높이도 지상과 근접하게 위치하고 있어 공기보다 무거운 오염공기의 내부 유입을 발생 시킬 수 있다. 셋째, 일부시설은 방폭문이 설치되어 있으나 개구부, 방폭밸브의 역방향 등의 적절하지 못한 설치와 배관 배선의 관통부 마감상태로 인해 정상적인 방폭문의 기능유지 및 기밀성 확보는 어려울 것으로 판단된다.

• 한국안전학회지
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• 제30권6호
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• pp.48-55
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• 2015

A variety of safety issues were investigated for chemical reactors using a toluene solvent in case of a fire at small to middle scale chemical plants. The issues covered the operation of pressure-relieving valves and the subsequent discharges of the toluene to the atmosphere either directly or through an absorber, which represent the current practice at most small chemical plants. It was shown that the safety valve on the reactor may not operate within about twenty minutes after an external fire breaks out, but, once relieved, the toluene vapor released directly to the atmosphere may form a large explosion range on the ground. It was also shown that if the discharge is routed to an existing absorber used for the scrubbing of volatile organic compounds or dusts, the column may not operate normally due to excessive pressure drops or flooding, resulting in the hazardous release of toluene vapors. This study proposed two ways of alleviating these risks. The first is to ruduce the discharge itself from the safety valve by using adequate insulation and protection covers on the reactor and then introduce it into the circulation water at the bottom of the absorber through a dip linet pipe equipped with a ring-shaped sparger. This will enhance the condensation of toluene vapors with the reduced effluent vapors treated in the packing layers above. The second is to install a separate quench drum to condense the routed toluene vapors more effectively than the existing absorber.