• Structural Engineering and Mechanics
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• v.90 no.4
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• pp.371-390
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• 2024

Investigating the impact of openings on the structural behavior of ferrocement I-beams with two distinct types of reinforcing metallic and non-metallic meshes is the primary goal of the current study. Up until failure, eight 250x200x2200 mm reinforced concrete I-beams were tested under flexural loadings. Depending on the kind of meshes used for reinforcement, the beams are split into two series. A control I-beam with no openings and three beams with one, two, and three openings, respectively, are found in each series. The two series are reinforced with three layers of welded steel meshes and two layers of tensar meshes, respectively, in order to maintain a constant reinforcement ratio. Structural parameters of investigated beams, including first crack, ultimate load, deflection, ductility index, energy absorption, strain characteristics, crack pattern, and failure mode were reported. The number of mesh layers, the volume fraction of reinforcement, and the kind of reinforcing materials are the primary factors that vary. This article presents the outcomes of a study that examined the experimental and numerical performance of ferrocement reinforced concrete I-beams with and without openings reinforced with welded steel mesh and tensar mesh separately. Utilizing ANSYS-16.0 software, nonlinear finite element analysis (NLFEA) was applied to illustrate how composite RC I-beams with openings behaved. In addition, a parametric study is conducted to explore the variables that can most significantly impact the mechanical behavior of the proposed model, such as the number of openings. The FE simulations produced an acceptable degree of experimental value estimation, as demonstrated by the obtained experimental and numerical results. It is also noteworthy to demonstrate that the strength gained by specimens without openings reinforced with tensar meshes was, on average, 22% less than that of specimens reinforced with welded steel meshes. For specimens with openings, this value is become on average 10%.

• Tunnel and Underground Space
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• v.28 no.5
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• pp.400-425
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• 2018

This study presents the research results and current status of the DECOVALEX-2019 project Task B. Task B named 'Fault slip modelling' is aiming at developing a numerical method to simulate the coupled hydro-mechanical behavior of fault, including slip or reactivation, induced by water injection. The first research step of Task B is a benchmark simulation which is designed for the modelling teams to familiarize themselves with the problem and to set up their own codes to reproduce the hydro-mechanical coupling between the fault hydraulic transmissivity and the mechanically-induced displacement. We reproduced the coupled hydro-mechanical process of fault slip using TOUGH-FLAC simulator. The fluid flow along a fault was modelled with solid elements and governed by Darcy's law with the cubic law in TOUGH2, whereas the mechanical behavior of a single fault was represented by creating interface elements between two separating rock blocks in FLAC3D. A methodology to formulate the hydro-mechanical coupling relations of two different hydraulic aperture models and link the solid element of TOUGH2 and the interface element of FLAC3D was suggested. In addition, we developed a coupling module to update the changes in geometric features (mesh) and hydrological properties of fault caused by water injection at every calculation step for TOUGH-FLAC simulator. Then, the transient responses of the fault, including elastic deformation, reactivation, progressive evolutions of pathway, pressure distribution and water injection rate, to stepwise pressurization were examined during the simulations. The results of the simulations suggest that the developed model can provide a reasonable prediction of the hydro-mechanical behavior related to fault reactivation. The numerical model will be enhanced by continuing collaboration and interaction with other research teams of DECOLVAEX-2019 Task B and validated using the field data from fault activation experiments in a further study.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.109-121
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• 2010

The bioleaching experiment under $42^{\circ}C$ was effectively carried out to leach the more valuable element ions from the pyrite in the Gangyang mine waste. Bacteria can survive at this temperature, as indigenous acidophilic bacteria were collected in the Hatchobaru acidic hot spring, in Japan. To enhance the bacterial activity, yeast extract was added to the pyrite-leaching medium. The indigenous acidophilic bacteria appeared to be rod-shaped in the growth-medium which contained elemental sulfur and yeast extract. The rod-shaped bacteria ($0.7\times2.6\;{\mu}m$, $0.6\times7\;{\mu}m$, $0.8\times5\;{\mu}m$ and $0.7\times8.4\;{\mu}m$) were attached to the pyrite surface. The colonies of the rod-shaped bacteria were selectively attached to the surroundings of a hexagonal cavity and the inner wall of the hexagonal cavity, which developed on a pyrite surface. Filament-shaped bacteria ranging from $4.92\;{\mu}m$ to $10.0\;{\mu}m$ in length were subsequently attached to the surrounding cracks and inner wall of the cracks on the pyrite surface. In the XRD analysis, the intensity of (111), (311), (222) and (320) plane on the bacteria pyrite sample relatively decreased in plane on the control pyrite sample, whereas the intensity of (200), (210) and (211) increased in these samples. The microbiological leaching content of Fe ions was found to be 3.4 times higher than that of the chemical leaching content. As for the Zn, microbiological leaching content, it was 2 times higher than the chemical leaching content. The results of XRD analysis for the bioleaching of pyrite indicated that the indigenous acidophilic bacteria are selectively attacked on the pyrite specific plane. It is expected that the more valuable element ions can be leached out from the mine waste, if the temperature is increased in future bioleaching experiments.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.117-131
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• 2006

A coupled T-H-M(Thermo-Hydro-Mechanical) analysis was carried out for KENTEX (KAERI Engineering-scale T-H-M Experiment for Engineered Barrier System), which is a facility for validating the coupled T-H-M behavior in the engineered barrier system of the Korean reference HLW(high-level waste) disposal system. The changes of temperature, water saturation, and stress were estimated based on the coupled T-H-M analysis, and the influence of the types of mechanical constitutive material laws was investigated by using elastic model, poroelastic model, and poroelastic-plastic model. The analysis was done using ABAQUS, which is a commercial finite element code for general purposes. From the analysis, it was observed that the temperature in the bentonite increased sharply for a couple of days after heating the heater and then slowly increased to a constant value. The temperatures at all locations were nearly at a steady state after about 37.5 days. In the steady state, the temperature was maintained at $90^{\circ}C$ at the interface between the heater and the bentonite and at about $70^{\circ}C$ at the interface between the bentonite and the confining cylinder. The variation of the water saturation with time in bentonite was almost same independent of the material laws used in the coupled T-H-M processes. By comparing the saturation change of T-H-M and that of H-M(Hydro-Mechanical) processes using elastic and poroelastic material mod31 respectively, it was found that the degree of saturation near the heater from T-H-M calculation was higher than that from the coupled H-M calculation mainly because of the thermal flux, which seemed to speed up the saturation. The stresses in three cases with different material laws were increased with time. By comparing the stress change in H-M calculation using poroelasetic and poroelasetic-plastic model, it was possible to conclude that the influence of saturation on the stress change is higher than the influence of temperature. It is, therefore, recommended to use a material law, which can model the elastic-plastic behavior of buffer, since the coupled T-H-M processes in buffer is affected by the variation of void ratio, thermal expansion, as well as swelling pressure.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.217-224
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• 2008

In deep geological disposal system, the integrity of a disposal canister having spent fuels is very important factor to assure the safety of the repository system. This disposal canister is one element of the engineered barriers to isolate and to delay the radioactivity release from human beings and the environment for a long time so that the toxicity does not affect the environment. The main requirement in designing the deep geological disposal system is to keep the buffer temperature below 100$^{\circ}C$ by the decay heat from the spent fuels in the canister in order to maintain the integrity of the buffer material. Also, the disposal canister can endure the hydraulic pressure in the depth of 500 m and the swelling pressure of the bentonite as a buffer. In this study, new concept of the disposal canister for the CANDU spent fuels which were considered to be disposed without any treatment was developed and the thermal stability and the structural integrity of the canister were analysed. The result of the thermal analysis showed that the temperature of the buffer was 88.9$^{\circ}C$ when 37 years have passed after emplacement of the canister and the spacings of the disposal tunnel and the deposition holes were 40 m and 3 m, respectively. In the case of structural analysis, the result showed that the safety factors of the normal and the extreme environment were 2.9 and 1.33, respectively. So, these results reveal that the canister meets the thermal and the structural requirements in the deep geological disposal system.

• Korean Journal of Mineralogy and Petrology
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.41-51
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• 2020

The purpose of this study was to investigate the possibility of eco-friendly/efficient recovery of valuable resources, such as Au from mine tailings, which are environmental pollutants in the Mongolian mine sector. For this purpose, this study selected 4 place of mine tailings of the Mongolian mines sector and carried out mineralogy evaluation of the valuable resources in the tailings. In this study, flotation was performed to separate and concentrate valuable resources in the tailings. Microwave nitric acid leaching was used to leach the valuable resources contained in the sample and to improve the Au grade. Chloride leaching attempted to leach Au from the leaching residues. XRD analysis of the tailings samples showed that most of the samples consisted of silicate minerals. As a result of confirming the content of the element through XRF analysis, the SiO₂ content was very high, the Fe₂O₃ content was 2.32-4.23%, and the content of PbO, CuO and ZnO components were all within 2%. As a result of flotation for the tailings samples, the recovery of Au was the highest in Bayanairag sample (95.38%). As a result of microwave nitric solution experiment on Au concentrate sample obtained by flotation, the content of Au in the microwave nitrate leaching residue increased by 12.15% from 192.72 g/ton to 216.14g/ton in Khamo sample, the highest increase was 57.58% in Bayanairag sample. TCLP tests on tailings generated after flotation showed dissolution characteristics within EPA. Chloride leaching test was performed to recover Au from solid residues. The leaching rate was 87.43-89.35% within 10 minutes. For Khamo sample, 100% Au was leached after 60 minutes of leaching time. Therefore, in order to process the tailings continuously generated in Mongolia, applying the same process as the present study is expected to effectively recover the valuable resources contained in the tailings.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.63-70
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• 2021

Radiographic contrast agents are used for diagnostic purposes and are one of the factors affecting measured values in bone density tests. They are absorbed into tissues and have an effect of increasing the measured values of bone density, so they are avoided as much as possible before performing a bone density test. MRI contrast agents, which have different physical properties and mechanisms of action than radiographic contrast agents, are based on gadolinium, a metal element. They have radiopacity characteristics, so MRI are generally performed prior to examination using radiation. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of MRI contrast agents on bone mineral density examination using dual energy X-ray absorption. Two types of gadolinium based MRI contrast agents were injected into an acrylic water tank for each volume, and the humanoid spine phantom was inserted and the BMD and T-score from (L1-L4) were analyzed by scanning a total of 30 times, 5 times for each injection type. The average value of the measured total (L1-L4) bone density for each of the two contrast agents was 0.952±0.052, 0.957±0.050, and 0.956±0.05g/㎠, respectively, for the Gadoterate Meglumine component 0mL, 7.5mL and 15mL, when the gadobutrol components were 0mL, 5mL, and 10mL, there was no statistically significant difference at all sites at 0.953±0.001, 0.954±0.001, and 0.945±0.001g/㎠, respectively(p>0.05). The average value of total T-score was -0.46±0.05, -0.4±0, -0.42±0.04 when the Gadoterate Meglumine component was 0mL, 7.5mL and 15mL, respectively. When the Gadobutrol ingredients were 0mL, 5mL and 10mL, there was no statistically significant difference in all areas, with -0.46±0.05, -0.46±0.05, and 0.5±0.00, respectively. In this experiment, the MRI contrast agent was found to have no effect on bone density tests, using the dual-energy X-ray absorption method. There is a limitation in that physical conditions such as kidney and health conditions etc. were not taken into consideration, so further clinical research is expected to be conducted in the future.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.40 no.6
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• pp.727-738
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• 2007

The present study investigation the geochemical characteristics of the stream sediments in the Unbong area was conducted to enable a understanding the natural background and a prediction the prospects of geochemical disaster as a result of that bed rocks(mylonitic granites, Kim et al., 1992). We systematically collected seventy three stream sediments samples by wet sieving along the primary channels. Major, trace and rare earth element(REE) concentrations, combined with mineralogical characteristics, were determined by XRD, XRF, ICP-AES and NAA analysis methods. Major element concentrations for the stream sediments in the Unbong area were $SiO_2\;36.94{\sim}65.39wt.%,\;Al_2O_3\;10.15{\sim}21.77wt.%,\;Fe_2O_3\;3.17{\sim}10.90wt.%,\;CaO\;0.55{\sim}5.27wt.%,\;MgO\;0.52{\sim}4.94wt.%,\;K_2O\;1.38{\sim}4.54wt.%,\;Na_2O\;0.49{\sim}3.36wt.%,\;TiO_2\;0.39{\sim}1.27wt.%,\;MnO\;0.04{\sim}0.22wt.%,\;P_2O_5\;0.08{\sim}0.54wt.%$. Trace and REE concentrations for the stream sediments were $Cu\;4.8{\sim}134ppm,\;Pb\;24.2{\sim}82.5ppm,\;Sr\;95.9{\sim}739ppm,\;V\;19.9{\sim}124ppm,\;Zr\;52.9{\sim}145ppm,\;Li\;25.2{\sim}3.3ppm,\;Co\;3.87{\sim}50.0ppm,\;Cr\;17.4{\sim}234ppm,\;Hf\;3.93{\sim}25.2ppm,\;Sc\;4.60{\sim}20.6ppm,\;Th\;3.82{\sim}36.9ppm,\;Ce\;45.7{\sim}243ppm,\;Eu\;0.89{\sim}2.69ppm,\;Yb\;1.42{\sim}5.18ppm$. According to the comparison of average major element concentrations, CaO, $Na_2O\;and\;K_2O$ contents are higher in stream sediments than in bed rocks(mylonitic granites, Kim et al., 1992) $Al_2O_3\;and\;SiO_2$ contents show good correlation both stream sediments and bed rocks(mylonitic granites, Kim et al., 1992). Yb and Eu in the stream sediments show a positive correlation with $SiO_2$. In contrast, the stream sediments display a negative correlation.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.50 no.2
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• pp.117-128
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• 2017

Occurrence characteristics and existing forms of U-Th containing minerals in KURT (KAERI Underground Research Tunnel) granite are investigated to understand long-term behavior of radionuclides in granite considered as a candidate rock for the geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste. KURT granite primarily consists of quartz, feldspar and mica. zircon, REE(Rare Earth Element)-containing monazite and bastnaesite are also identified. Besides, secondary minerals such as sericite, microcline and chlorite including quartz vein and calcite vein are observed. These minerals are presumed to be accompanied by a post-hydrothermal process. U-Th containing minerals are mainly observed at the boundaries of quartz, feldspar and mica, mostly less than $30{\mu}m$ in size. Quantitative analysis results using EPMA (Electron Probe Micro-Analyzer) show that 74.2 ~ 96.5% of the U-Th containing minerals consist of $UO_2$ (3.39 ~ 33.19 wt.%), $ThO_2$ (41.61 ~ 50.24 wt.%) and $SiO_2$ (15.43 ~ 18.60 wt.%). Chemical structure of the minerals calculated using EPMA quantitative analysis shows that the U-Th minerals are silicate minerals determined as thorite and uranothorite. The U-Th containing silicate minerals are formed by a magmatic and hydrothermal process. Therefore, KURT granite formed by a magmatic differentiation is accompanied by an alteration and replacement owing to a hydrothermal process. U-Th containing silicate minerals in KURT granite are estimated to be recrystallized by geochemical factors and parameters such as temperature, pressure and pH owing to the hydrothermal process. By repeated dissolution/precipitation during the recrystallization process, U-Th containing silicate minerals such as thorite and uranothorite are formed according to the variation in the concentrated amount of U and Th.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.