• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• Journal of Science and Technology Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.1-40
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• 2019

Built upon ethnographic method such as participant observation and in-depth interview, this study analyzes the material culture of electronic flower auctions at Yangjae Flower Market. From the viewpoint of Actor-Network Theory(ANT), this research examines how human actors like dealers and auctioneers interact with nonhuman actors such as market devices and these interactions form networks called "agencement." This research is focused on three main objectives: first, to study how the performance of auctions - i.e. the interactions between auctioneers and dealers - change in the wake of new market devices in the auctions; secondly, to look into what changes artifacts bring to the social relationships between auctioneers and dealers; lastly, to analyze the influence of new market devices on auction price in the market. The results of this research are as follows. First, the appearance of new market devices generates changes in the performance of auctions, which means the change of 'agencement' of flower auctions. Direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers turned into indirect interactions through new market devices. Moreover, the changes in the agencement brought changes to the identity of auctioneers and dealers. Secondly, the new agencement caused by the inflow of new market devices formed the trust between the devices and human actors, which gave rise to the trust in electronic auction and in counterpart actors as well. In addition, new market devices lowered direct interactions between auctioneers and dealers and thus made more equal relationships between the two than before. Lastly, market devices like trading screen reduced the leverage of auctioneers by providing dealers with bidding information previously possessed by auctioneers much openly and dealers were able to decide auction prices in more reasonable and dispassionate manner. Economic agency, power, trust, price, and information in the market is material and sensory.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.678-686
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• 2004

This paper presents a new method to securely conduct online sealed-bid auctions with a single auctioneer server The sealed-bid auctions have several vulnerable security problems when they are performed on the Internet. One of such problems is the trust establishment between an auctioneer and bidders who participate in an auction. Several online sealed-bid auction methods have been developed to address this trust problem. The proposed method solves the security problems that would happen in the sealed-bid auction using a blind signature scheme and a contract signature protocol. It prevents the auctioneer from illegally manipulating the bidders' bidding information, repudiating the reception of some bid, manipulating the auction period, and illegally adding or deleting bids. In addition, it keeps the bidders from modifying the bidding information after issuing their bid and doing intentional mistake to invalidate their own bid. The method can be easily implemented using the multiagent architecture.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.135-158
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• 2000

In recent years, many retail businesses jumped on the Internet auction bandwagon and paid substantially high fees to learn and develop proper business strategies for this new environment. Unlike what most businesses in the real world presume, this research shows that discriminatory-price ascending-bid auctions in a digital economy might be not very beneficial for the sellers on the Internet, if sellers sell the identical digital products through both a typical posted-price market and an auction. Using an extensive technology infrastructure along with suitable incentives and rules for market agents, we found that a discriminatory-price ascending-bid auction, which is the most popular auction mechanism on the Internet, serves consumers better than it does the sellers or producers in the digital economy. That is, the average prices for digital goods in these auctions are substantially lower than the prices in a posted-price market. This shows that it is not so wise for sellers to jump on the bandwagon of Internet auctions, if there is a market place with posted-price mechanisms which sells comparable items, or if a seller does not have special advantages or strategies in this new market institution. Electronic market mechanisms provide powerful means of understanding and measuring consumer characteristics including willingness-to-pay and other demographics for sellers or producers. Many concern that sellers may extract the entire surplus from the market by using customization on the Internet, thus consumers will be worse off in this digital economy. We found that these sellers who can customize their products and prices fail to capture the whole consumers surplus and cannot exercise a monopoly. One major explanation for this phenomenon is that the competition among the sellers prohibits them from charging prices according to customers demand for each product, where switching from one seller to another is not so difficult for the customers, and reselling products among the buyers are prohibited.

• Journal of KIISE:Computer Systems and Theory
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• v.30 no.9
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• pp.477-486
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• 2003

In combinatorial auctions buyers nay bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. But determining the winners of combinatorial auctions who maximize the profit of a seller is known to be NP-complete. A branch-and-bound method can be one of practical algorithm for winner determination. However, bid selection heuristics play a very important role in the efficiency of a branch-and-bound method. In this paper, we designed and implemented an algorithm which used a branch-and-bound method and Linear Programming for winner determination in combinatorial auctions. We propose new bid selection heuristics which consider a branching bid and conflicting bids simultaneously to select a branching bid in the algorithm. In addition, upper bounds are reused to reduce the running time in specific cases. We evaluated the performance of the algorithm by experiments with five data distributions and compared our method with others. The algorithm using heuristics showed a superior efficiency in two data distributions and a similar efficiency in three distributions.

• Journal of KIISE:Software and Applications
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• v.32 no.11
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• pp.1099-1110
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• 2005

As auctions become popular, developing good agent bidding strategies has been an important focus in agent-based electronic commerce research. Especially for the continuous double auctions where no single dominant strategy is known, the agent bidding strategy has practical significance. This paper introduces an adaptive agent strategy for the countinuous double auction. The central idea is to let the agent figure out at run time when the sophisticated strategy (called the p-strategy) is beneficial and when a simpler strategy is better. Balance between exploration and exploitation is achieved by using a heuristic exploration function that trades off the expected profits and the number of tries of each strategy. We have experimentally evaluated the performance of the adaptive strategy in a wide variety of environments. The experiment results indicate that the adaptive strategy outperforms the plain p-strategy when the p-strategy performs poorly, while it performs similar to the p-strategy when the p-strategy dominates the other simple strategies.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.32-43
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• 2015

This study suggests an electronic brokerage system that has the capability of efficiently matching dispatching delivery tasks with trucks. In the brokerage system, individual truck drivers and shippers are allowed to participate in the dispatching process through the internet or wireless communication. An auction-based dispatching method for the electronic brokerage system is suggested. The basic rationale of the auction-based dispatching method-which is a distributed decision-making process-is discussed. The performance of the suggested algorithms is evaluated by a simulation study.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.165-175
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• 2006

Electronic commerce has many advantages compared to the traditional way of doing business such as up to date information and rich service for less cost. There is a growing number of electronic commerce applications on the Internet. Using software agent technology, the market framework offers timesaving automation of auctions and flexibility through negotiations among the agents. In this research, we attempt to evaluate the performance of a negotiation decision function that considers the potential competitors in competitive market environment as well as that of a negotiation decision function that does not. For this evaluation, this study adopts the electronic marketplace as an application domain in which many sellers and buyers compete for limited resources in the marketplace.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.11
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• pp.5625-5641
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• 2017

Certificateless public key cryptography resolves the certificate management problem in traditional public key cryptography and the key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography. In recent years, some good results have been achieved in speeding up the computation of bilinear pairing. However, the computation cost of the pairing is much higher than that of the scalar multiplication over the elliptic curve group. Therefore, it is still significant to design cryptosystem without pairing operations. A multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme allows a set of signers to cooperatively generate a public verifiable signature, the signature holder then can propose a new signature such that only the designated set of verifiers can verify it. Multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signatures are suitable in many different practical applications such as electronic tenders, electronic voting and electronic auctions. In this paper, we propose a certificateless multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme and prove the security in the random oracle model. Our scheme does not use pairing operation. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first certificateless multi-signer universal designated multi-verifier signature scheme.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.21-36
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• 2020

E-commerce represents the acquisition and sale, or the transmission of funds or data through an electronic platform. E-commerce is a paradigm shift that influences marketers and customers to improve current market processes. The significant challenges in e-commerce are the accuracy and performance factors during a business transaction, which has been substantially enhanced using Cloud Computing Techniques (CCT). The growth of e-commerce management has been increased due to massive internet penetration, and particularly small and emerging companies are increasingly using this alternative as a differentiated business model. E-commerce has significant environmental impacts and highly utilized in today's market scenario. Further, the replacement has not been thoroughly explored. Current research has been carried out to describe the e-commerce scenario to analyze market trends. This study further discusses the essential variables to the performance of market models for e-commerce. For example, e-procurement of products/services, electronic supply chain management, e-distribution and selling support (supplier connections, e-fulfilment) and online e-auctions (transactional) can represent important e-commerce capabilities, which can contribute to marketing strategy implementation effectiveness, resulting in higher export performance.