• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.6
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• pp.259-264
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• 2006

This paper addresses the collusive bidding that functions as a potential obstacle to a fully competitive wholesale electricity market. Cooperative game is formulated and the equation of its Nash Equilibrium (NE) is derived on the basis of the supply function model. Gencos' willingness to selectively collude is expressed through a bargain theory. A Collusion Incentive Index(CII) for representing the willingness is defined through computing the Gencos' profits at NE. In order to keep the market non-cooperative, the market operator has to know the highest potentially collusive combination among the Gencos. Another index, which will be called the Collusion Monitoring Index(CMI), is suggested to detect the highest potential collusion and it is calculated using the marginal cost functions of the Gencos without any computation of NE. The effectiveness of CMI for detecting the highest potential collusion is verified through application on many test market cases.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.07a
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• pp.380-382
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• 2002

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithm. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2157-2165
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• 2017

This study deals with the design of the mechanism in which demand response (DR) resources are traded in the power generation market. In general, a DR aggregator (DRA), which extends DR resources and provides technical support, is central to this mechanism. In this study, power users, called DR customer (DRC), participate in load reduction and are also modeled to participate directly in DR-related bidding. The DRA provides incentives to the DRC, indirectly impacting the market, and the DRC use the bid parameters strategically. We present the conditions for finding Nash Equilibrium (NE) in game problems of various participants including market operators, and analyze the characteristics of DRA and DRC related models. It also analyzes the impact of the participants on the market according to various types of competition and coalitions between DRA and DRC.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.1 no.3
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• pp.133-142
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• 2012

Cournot model is one of representative models among many game theoretic approaches available for analyzing competitive market models. Recent years have witnessed various kinds of attempts to model competitive electricity markets using the Cournot model. Cournot model is appropriate for oligopoly market which is one characteristic of electric power industry requiring huge amount of capital investment. When we use Cournot model for the application to electricity market, it is prerequisite to assume the downward sloping demand curve in the right direction. Generators in oligopoly market could try to maximize their profit by exercising the market power like physical or economic withholding. However advanced electricity markets also have demand side bidding which makes it possible for the demand to respond to the high market price by reducing their consumption. Considering this kind of demand reaction, Generators couldn't abuse their market power. Instead, they try to find out an equilibrium point which is optimal for both sides, generators and demand. This paper suggest a quantitative analysis between market variables based on econometrics for estimating demand responses in smart grid environment.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.6
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• pp.350-357
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• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.66 no.8
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• pp.1172-1180
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• 2017

This study analyzed competition in peak load plants between CCGT and GT instead of competition between base and peak load plants like in previous studies. In common overseas power markets, CCGT and GT claim certain market shares as peak load plants with the latter boasting a high utilization rate as reserve plants. In South Korea, however, there has been no introduction of GT in the market that opened in 2001 with no analysis cases of GT's economy as a peak load plant. The current power market of South Korea is run on the cost-based pool, which allows for no price spikes. Since the capacity payment criteria for compensations for missing money are set based on GT generators, the power market uses GT generators as marginal plants. The purposes of this study were to analyze the competitive edge of GT generators as peak load plants in the domestic power market of South Korea and identify the causes of GT's failure in market entry, thus assessing the adequacy of market signals in the domestic power market.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.56 no.10
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• pp.1738-1743
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• 2007

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a pumped-storage hydro plant in an electricity market. Competitive bidding of pumping and generating of a pumped-storage plant is formulated in a game theoretic problem in accordance with the three different ownership of scheduling; Market Operator(MO), generating company(Genco), and combined type of MO and Genco. Optimal conditions for Nash Equilibrium are derived in the form of market prices during the scheduling periods. Simulation results show the different ownership models produce different schedules of pumping and generating, which correspond to the objective of the scheduling owner of a pumped-storage hydro plant.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.639-642
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• 2003

This paper presents a method for evaluating the mixed nash equilibria of the Cournot model for N-Gencos. in wholesale electricity market. In the wholesale electricity market, the strategies of N-Genco. can be applied to the game model under the conditions which the Gencos. determine their stratgies to maximize their benefit. Generally, the Lemke algorithm is evaluated the mixed nash equlibria in the two-player game model. However, the necessary condition for the mixed equlibria of N-player are modified as the necessary condition of N-1 player by analyzing the Lemke algorithms. Although reducing the necessary condition for N-player as the one of N-1 player, it is difficult to and the mixed nash equilibria participated two more players by using the mathmatical approaches since those have the nonlinear characteristics. To overcome the above problem, this paper presents the generalized necessary condition for N-player and proposed the object function to and the mixed nash equlibrium. Also, to evaluate the mixed equilibrium through the nonlinear objective function, the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) as one of the heuristic algorithm are proposed in this paper. To present the mixed equlibria for the strategy of N-Gencos. through the proposed necessry condition and the evaluation approach, this paper proposes the mixed equilibrium in the cournot game model for 3-players.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.11
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• pp.668-674
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• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.5
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• pp.302-307
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• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.