• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2001.05a
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• pp.523.2-523
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• 2001

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.47-52
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• 2003

This paper presents a schematic process based on the method of eliminating dominated strategies to obtain the optimal bidding strategy Pursuing the Nash equilibrium Point. The Proposed approach is demonstrated for a bidding game in a generation competitive market with 2-dimensional bidding strategy vectors constituting a price-quantity strategy curve.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.11b
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• pp.258-260
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• 2007

MAS based market simulator has attracted the attentions of people who are interested in using or developing electricity market simulator. MAS based approach makes it possible to model each market participant's strategic behaviors. Traditional market simulators have used optimization formulation to model market operation, which has been used since vertically integrated system. Optimization mainly uses cost minimization or welfare maximization of entire system. Therefore it is somehow difficult to model the independently strategic behaviors of market participants. MAS is one of AI technology based on distributed intelligence which makes it possible to model independently acting entities in competitive market. This paper proposes the method to model strategic participants in electricity market based on MAS.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.11b
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• pp.159-161
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• 2005

Transmission congestion is one of the key factors to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Financial transmission rights provide the financial protection to their holders by paying back the congestion cost. However, the market participants who have market power can exacerbate their market power. Due to the exacerbated market power, this paper analyzes the mitigation of local market power using Contingent transmission rights on the market price. Contingent transmission rights provide not only the financial protection but also regulative penalty. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF).

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.855-857
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• 2005

Transmission congestion is one of the Key factor to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Financial transmission rights provide the financial protection to their holders by paying back the congestion cost. However, the market participants who have market power can exacerbate their market power. This paper analyzes the effect of exercising local market power with the rights on the market price. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF). Case study is fulfilled by GAMS simulation. The simulation are condusted in case of Nodal Pricing.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.575-577
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• 2003

With the deregulation of the power industries in many countries, the trend is towards accommodating more freedom and choice to the market participants and encouraging competition as much as possible in the power market. In this regards, the necessity of market simulation is increasing in order to guarantee a secure and reliable operation of an electricity market. This paper presents the technique of market simulation considering constraints such as energy resource and transmission interface using commercial market simulator.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.47-49
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• 2003

At present, the Korean electricity industry is undergoing restructuring and the CBP market is being operated preparing for TWBP market open. As the circumstance of the traditional system is changed according to power system deregulation the unique market simulator is needed to analyze and study an electricity market. In this paper, we implement the main two modules of unique market simulator(PEXSIM) and introduce the characteristics of PEXSIM focused on the M-SIM and P-SIM.

• Transactions of the Korean hydrogen and new energy society
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.118-127
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• 2011

An IGCC was evaluated as one of the next generation technologies that would be able to substitute for coal-fired power plants. According to "The 4th Basic Plan of Long-term Electricity Supply & Demand" which is developed by the Electricity Business Acts, the first IGCC will be operated at 2015. Like other new and renewable energy such as solar PV, Fuel cell, The IGCC is considered as non-competitive generation technology because it is not maturity technology. Before the commercial operation of an IGCC in our electricity market, its economic feasibility under the Korean electricity market, which is cost-based trading system, is studied to find out institutional support system. The results of feasibility summarized that under the current electricity trading system, if the IGCC is considered like a conventional plant such as nuclear or coal-fired power plants, it will not be expected that its investment will be recouped within life-time. The reason is that the availability of an IGCC will plummet since 2016 when several nuclear and coal-fired power plants will be constructed additionally. To ensure the reasonable return on investment (NPV>0 IRR>Discount rate), the availability of IGCC should be higher than 77%. To do so, the current electricity trading system is amended that the IGCC generator must be considered as renewable generators to set up Price Setting Schedule and it should be considered as pick load generators, not Genco's coal fired-generators, in the Settlement Payment.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.2
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• pp.79-89
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• 2003

A research about finding a new electricity load model that is sensitive to the price of electricity is conducted. This new model i5 polynomial type price sensitive electricity consumption model, while former electricity consumption models have exponential terms or statistic terms. The pattern of electricity consumption of each electricity using devices were identified first, then the proportion of the devices at buses or nodes are investigated, finally weighted sum of electricity consumption and the proportion makes the load model or consumption model of electricity at one bus or node. This new model is easy to use in the simulations or calculations of the electricity consumption, because the arithmetic of functions with polynomial terms are easy compared to the functions with transcendental terms.