• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.143-151
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to provide the future development of the PRC Marine Corps by analyzing the changing functions via its historical development. The PRCMC is an elite regular military forces and was established by the Central Military Commission(China) in 1953 in order to project the national military power toward the enemy's territory by overcoming maritime obstacles such as seas and lakes. The PRCMC is relatively smaller personnel strength compared with the whole size of the PRC military forces. Thus its functions were limited in the areas of amphibious and land operations, island and land defense against Taiwan before the PRC pursues expanding policy toward outside. However, in the 2000s, China pursues its policy for obtaining absolute national interest so that its functions are rapidly enlarged into defense of the forward naval bases, and those for evolving its power toward outside according to not only the island territorial dispute with Japan, but also Xi Jinping's active expanding policy what we call 'the one belt and one road'. So its personnel strength is slowly increased. If the increasement of the PRC Navy and Marine Corps would develop into the level of which they can contain the status and influence of the US military power in Asia-Pacific area, it is possible that the security environment of the North-east Asia including the Korean peninsula will be fluctuated. Consequently, the ROK also needs to reevaluate the functions and the size of the joint strength of the ROK Navy and Marine Corps considering the transition of the changing security environment.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.273-310
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• 2020

This study aims at empirically analyzing the overall mechanism of the "Gray Zone Strategy", which has begun to be used as one of Chinese major maritime security strategies in maritime conflicts surrounding the South China Sea and East China Sea since early 2010, and comparing the resulting conflict patterns in those reg ions. To this end, I made the following two hypotheses about Chinese gray zone strategy. The hypotheses that I have argued in this study are the first, "The marine gray zone strategy used by China shows different structures of implementation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, which are major conflict areas.", the second, "Therefore, the patterns of disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea also show a difference." In order to examine this, I will classify Chinese gray zone strategy mechanisms multi-dimensionally in large order, 1) conflict trends and frequency of strategy execution, 2) types and strengths of strategy, 3) actors of strategy execution, and 4) response methods of counterparts. So, I tried to collect data related to this based on quantitative modeling to test these. After that, about 10 years of data pertaining to this topic were processed, and a research model was designed with a new categorization and operational definition of gray zone strategies. Based on this, I was able to successfully test all the hypotheses by successfully comparing the comprehensive mechanisms of the gray zone strategy used by China and the conflict patterns between the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In the conclusion, the verified results were rementioned with emphasizing the need to overcome the security vulnerabilities in East Asia that could be caused by China's marine gray zone strategy. This study, which has never been attempted so far, is of great significance in that it clarified the intrinsic structure in which China's gray zone strategy was implemented using empirical case studies, and the correlation between this and maritime conflict patterns was investigated.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.63-87
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• 2020

This article not only theoretically explores the necessity and effect of constructive minilateralism and subregionalism in Northeast Asia, but also delves into a series of practical solutions from viewpoint of seeking common ground while reserving differences in this region. The main contents are as follows: First, the various obstacles that hinder the formation of regionalism, subregionalism and minilateralism in the Northeast Asia are discussed. That is to say, geopolitical realism, My Country First ideology, exclusive nationalism in the socio-historical context, and North Korea's latest provocations, etc. Second, this article explores the philosophy and basic principles of realizing Northeast Asia regionalism and minilateralism. Third, in the 21st century, Northeast Asia becomes the center of the world. It examines the core points, controversial focus and platform for building sub regionalism in the region. Finally, based on the institutional platform such as minilateralism and sub regionalism, the various ideas and practical plans of cross-border cooperation among major countries in Northeast Asia were discussed. Because there are a lot of obstacles, so first of all it is more appropriate to promote economic or functional minilateralism or sub regionalism than multilateral cooperation. In order to promote the formation of regionalism and minilateralism in Northeast Asia, the issues to be considered are as follows: First, for the sake of leading regional solidarity and minilateral economic cooperation, it is advisable for China, as a regional economic power, to implement a stable and responsible diplomacy. Secondly, regional solidarity based on credible politics and security should be promoted for a long time beyond the level of economic cooperation. Third, the primary prerequisite for the realization of Northeast Asian regionalism is that in the process of denuclearization of North Korea, the stability and peace mechanism of the Korean Peninsula should be established. Fourth, with the continued hegemonic competition between the United States and China in Northeast Asia, under the circumstance that countries in the region are pushed into so-called "East Asian Paradox", it is profoundly important for them to consider transition from the hostile relationship as the "Thucydides trap" to the order of "coexistence" in which competition and cooperation run side by side, and the two countries should explore a conversion plan for the foreign policy line. This mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence of the US-China relationship will create a friendly atmosphere for the formation of regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the future, the cooperation of minilateralism in Northeast Asia will break the existing conflict between the maritime forces and the continental forces in order to promote peace. And along with the philosophy that "peace is economy", recent policies of common prosperity as the framework, such as China's "Belt and Road Initiative", North Korea's "Special Zone and Development Zone Policy", Russia's "New Eastern Policy", Japan's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and South Korea's The "Korean Peninsula New Economy Map" are organically linked and it should promote the so-called "networked regionalism".

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.22
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• pp.91-111
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• 2010

Around the middle of the ninth century the strict bone-rank system of Silla frustrated many people who had political ambition but lacked nobility. They had to seek other ways, including maritime trade. Such an undertaking reflected and also increased their economic and military power. Trade prospered with T'ang China and with Japan as well. The threat of piracy to Silla's thriving maritime trade caused to create a succession of garrisons at important coastal points. Chonghae Jin (Chonghae garrison) was regarded as the most important of these. It was established in 828 by Chang Pogo. Chonghae Jin was on Wando, an island just east of the southwestern tip of Korea and a key place at this time in the trade between China, Korea, and Japan. From this vantage point Chang Pogo became a merchant-prince with extensive holdings and commercial interests in China and with trade contacts with Japan. Although piracy was rampant in East Asia at that time, either the Chinese or Silla government was not able to control it due to inner political strife and lack of policing resources. Infuriated by the piracy and the government's inability to control it, Chang Pogo came back to Silla to fight against the pirates and to protect maritime trade. He persuaded the king of Silla and was permitted to control the private armed forces to sweep away the pirates. In 829 he was appointed Commissioner of Chonghae-Jin with the mission of curbing piracy in that region. Chang's forces were created to protect people from pirates, but also developed into traders among Silla Korea, T'ang China, and Japan in the 9th century. This was geographically possible because the Chonghae Garrison was situated at the midpoint of Korea, China, and Japan, and also because Chang's naval forces actually dominated the East Asia Sea while patrolling sea-lanes. Based on these advantages, Chang Pogo made a great fortune, which might be collected from a charge for protecting people from pirates and the trades with China and Japan. Chang's forces could be termed the first private security company in the Korean history, at least in terms of historical documents. Based on historical documents, the numbers of private soldiers might be estimated to exceed tens of thousands at least, since Chang's forces alone were recorded to be more than ten thousand. Because local powers and aristocratic elites were said to have thousands of armed forces respectively, the extent of private forces was assumed to be vast, although they were available only to the privileged class. In short, the domination of Chang's forces was attributable to the decline of central government and its losing control over local powers. In addition it was not possible without advanced technologies in shipbuilding and navigation.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.416-428
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• 2008

In the end of 2007, Korea Government promulgated the Rule of 'Basic Act of Logistics Policy' for improving international logistics forwarding business. The goals of these rules are to achieve the development of our nation's economics for providing the security and efficiency of logistics system and enforced competition of logistics enterprises. This is established the basic principles of the legal basis for expanding into the Logistics Hub Center of North-east Asia. However In May 1999 new licensing requirements for ocean freight forwarders and NVOCCs operating in the USA were established by the US Federal Maritime Commission(FMC). Due to these regulations, each ocean transportation service provider in the USA acting as ocean freight forwarder, NVOCCs, or NVOCC agent must obtain a license to operate as Ocean Transportation Intermediary(OTI) before it begins operations. Only licensed OTIs may act as US transportation agents or receiving agents of other NVOCCs, on both US exports and imports. In this context, I think this study will be contributes for the development of korean freight forwarding system by analysis and comparing with between the Rule of the Basic Act of Logistics Policy of Korea and OTI freight forwarder & NVOCCs of USA.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.149-173
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• 2020

While the United States and other Western states are in trouble with COVID-19 crisis, China is continuing its aggressive ocean expansion with its Gray-zone strategy. The Gray-zone strategy, which China uses around the South China Sea, refers to a strategy that promotes a change in international politics by creating an unclear state, neither war or peace. China, which is trying to expand its influence across East Asia, will also try to project a Gray zone strategy on the Korean Peninsula. The possible scenarios are as follows: 1) South Korea is accidentally involved in a dispute in the South China Sea, 2) Military conflicts between South Korea and China is caused by illegal fishing of Chinese boats in Yellow Sea, 3) China tries to interfere with Socotra Rock, 4) Unlikely, but possible in the future that China induce the military conflicts between Korea and Japan on the Dokdo issue. In order to cope with these scenarios, Korea should prepare the following measures from a long-term perspective: the creation of an Asian maritime safety fleet, the integ rated operation of the navy and the coast guard in the framework of the national fleet, and strengthening the conflict control system for China's provocations.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.323-351
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• 2018

Adopted in Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS) 2014, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea(CUES) has been the most valuable output of WPNS history. Written and suggested by Australian Navy in 1999, the goal of CUES is to decrease the possibility of the naval conflict by establishing the code among international navies in the Western Pacific region. Facing many oppositions and requirement of People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) in WPNS 2012 and 2013, but it finally adopted in WPNS 2014, with many changes in detailed provisions. From then, navies in the Western Pacific region have followed CUES to prevent maritime conflicts in the region, CUES, however, sometimes does not work correctly. Contents of CUES is the mixture of the parts of Multinational Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book(MTP) and International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972(CORLEGs). There are means of radio communications such as frequency and signals, instructions for maneuvering and so on. Thus, it is not a new document for the U.S. Navy and its allies, but it requires training to implicate at sea for navies other than U.S. allies, like PLAN. Lots of provisions in CUES were changed because of the opposition of PLAN, and CUES has many shortcomings and practical limitations. First, since CUES is non-legally binding, and there are no methods to force the naval assets on the sea to follow. Second, CUES is only applied to naval assets; naval ships - warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines - and naval aircraft. Third, the geographical scope in CUES is not clear. Fourth, there is no provision for submerged submarines. Finally, CUES has no time-based framework or roadmap for training. In this regard, there would be six recommendations for improvement. First, CUES should be reviewed by WPNS or other international institutions, while keeping non-binding status so that WPNS could send signals to the navies which do not answer CUES on the sea. Second, the participation of Maritime Law Enforcements(MLEs) such as coast guard is inevitable. Third, navies would use full text of MTP rather than current CUES, which extracts some parts of MTP. Fourth, CUES needs provisions with respect to submerged submarines, which recognizes as offensive weapons themselves. Fifth, the geographic scope of CUES should be clear. Since there are some countries in which claim that a rock with a concrete structure is their territory, CUES should be applied on every sea including EEZ and territorial seas. Finally, the detailed training plan is required to implicate CUES at sea. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a good exercise to train CUES, because almost all WPNS member countries except six countries are participating in RIMPAC. CUES is a meaningful document not only for navies but also for nation-states in the region. To prevent escalation of conflict in the region, potentially caused by an unplanned collision at sea, CUES should be applied more strictly. CUES will continue to be in subsequent WPNS and therefore continue to improve in the effectiveness as both an operational and diplomatic agreement.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.114-139
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• 2016

Korea and China are neighboring countries with close contacts in many areas from long time ago, and have shared interests in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in deepening economic relationship which has been mutually complementary in their nature. Therefore their bilateral relations has been developed at a remarkable pace to the extent that it can't be better than now. However, the differences in their responses to North Korean nuclear test and ensuing long-range ballistic missile test-fire and the Chinese strong concern on the possible deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) anti-missile system in Korea show that there are some weaknesses in their relations. For example, Korea is not still confident that China would fully implement the sanction measures contained in the UNSC resolution and I argue that Chinese proposal of parallel negotiation of the denuclearization and the replacement of Korean armistice with the Peace Agreement is not much persuasive. In THAAD issue, if Korea comes to conclusion in the future that THAAD is the most effective way to counter North Korean threats, Korea should make every efforts to assure China that Korea-US alliance is not targeting China, and the THAAD is a defensive system, not damaging Chinese security. In the longer-term, deepening strategic distrust and competition between the US and China in this part of East Asia, changing nature of economic cooperation between Korea and China, and the revival of 'great country mentality' by Chinese people together with the rising nationalism in both Korea and China would cast shadow on Korea-China relation in the years ahead, unless properly handled. In this regard, I suggest that the security communications between the two countries be further strengthened, and the tri-lateral dialogue channel be established among the three countries of Korea, the US and China, particularly on North Korean issues. I also suggest the new pattern of economic cooperation be sought, considering the changing economic environment in China, while strengthening the efforts to understand each other through more interactions between the two peoples.