• Strategy21
• /
• s.36
• /
• pp.121-149
• /
• 2015

This paper will examine some past and current issues concerning the Republic of Korea's national strategy, focusing predominantly upon how the ROK should respond to the urgent maritime-oriented strategy highlighted by the recent developments and achievements of national prosperity achieved during last three decades and identify some of successful cases in East Asia. Some consideration will also be given to more general emergent issues of trends and developments of East Asian countries which might affect to define the ROK's future national strategy in the context of its national grand strategy to enhance national interests and prosperity. ROK is especially dependent upon open Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and its national security emphasizes the sea as the medium of geopolitical and geo-economic development, given the sea known as core geographic option remains that ROK is an important maritime power, ranking the world-level nation in term of GDP, sea-borne trade, container processing capability, shipbuilding capacity and so on. It should be apparent, therefore, that ROK's national strategic development depends upon the relationship between its peninsula geography and its national development based on sea-borne economic growth and its maritime-oriented future national strategy will be the best option to maintain its national development and economic prosperity.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.42
• /
• pp.318-346
• /
• 2017

Currently, security environmental instability is getting worse than ever in the East Asia including to Republic of Korea(ROK). Unlike several conventional issues such as maritime dispute -sometimes with islands- and competitions for getting natural resources, contemporary security dilemma issues followed by arms races among states deepens the power gap between strong and weak state within the region. It is notable that the arms races is the East Asia are mainly focused on naval power. As navy is the very possible force that influences neighboring states, submarine power is usually valued for its nature of stealth, mobile and aggression. Moreover, the submarine power is believed to be one of the highest valued weapon system since it shows actual effectiveness for influencing the other states while avoiding direct military conflicts compared to surface power. As a result, all states within the region are accelerating for getting such power these days. Japan, Most of all, is one of the leading state that aims to ensure self-survival and enlarge military influences under the US-Japan alliance by decisively supporting its power to the American containment strategy against China. In this regard, such movement surely sill influence on ROK both directly and indirectly as we sue the common field, the sea. Though, it has lots of restrictions for us to confront them with military forces as such confrontations within US-led alliances is not desirable upon considering current China and nK threats. As a result, ROK needs to limit the realm of alliance within the region while maintaining ROK-US alliance for getting national interests with both legal and justice superiority against Japan. This paper, as a result, is focused on suggesting the way to utilize submarines as a mean of naval power for both current security environments and the rising maritime threats in the East Asia. I concluded to participate ROK submarines in US-led military strategy against China by dispatching them into the East-China Sea and the North-East area of the Korean peninsula to protect both national interests and justice at the same tome. It should be one of the preemptive measure for confronting with neighboring states by utilizing strategic benefits of submarines while strengthening ROK-US alliances upon participating American Containment Strategy against China.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.30
• /
• pp.200-235
• /
• 2012

Over the past few years, due to the climate change of the earth, the Arctic's sea ice cover is undergoing a historic transformation - thinning, extent reduction in all seasons, and mitigation in the area of multi-year ice in the central Arctic Ocean. These changes allow for increases in maritime access throughout the Arctic Ocean and for potential longer seasons of navigation and possibly transarctic voyage in the summer. These changes also allow more exploration for oil, gas, and other minerals. The Arctic is now an archetype of the complex, multi-dimensional global problems of the twenty-first century. Military security, environmental security, and economic security interact. The potentially enormous economic stakes, sufficient to change the strategic balance among the states of the region, set off competitive pressures for national advantage. Korea, which is heavily dependent upon the sea lane in terms of transportation of its exports and imports, is very much interested in the Arctic sea routes. Korea believes that the Artic sea route, particularly the Northern Sea Route (NSR), could serve as a new useful sea lane, which will enable shorter times between East Asia and Europe, thus resulting in substantial cost saving for ship operators. In addition to shipping, Korea is interested in other Arctic-related maritime industries. Korea, as a leading shipbuilder in the global market, is interested in building ice breakers, drill ships, and other vessels which can contribute to safe operation in Arctic resource development and exploration. Korea, as one of the future stakeholders in Arctic maritime activities, should be ready to foster international cooperation in the region.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.108-152
• /
• 2017

This paper aims to analyze hegemonic competition and the role of naval power. To this end the paper is composed of four chapters titled introduction, the role of naval power in the hegemonic competition, the role of naval power in the East Asia, and the lessons and implications for the Korean Peninsula. Since the modern era, the hegemonic competition in the East Asian region has been the intrusion and struggle process between the world system and the East Asian regional system, and the ocean between these two systems has become the goal and means of supremacy(hegemony). Currently, the hegemonic competition between the US and China consists of systemic competition at the global level and marine competition at the regional level. When South Korea is forced to make strategic choices in the course of the US-China hegemonic competition, naval power will be the first factor to be considered. The ROK is asymmetrically maintaining a deep dependency relationship with the United States in terms of security and China in relation to the economy. And while the ROK's national economic power is acquired from the ocean, the ROK's military power is imbalanced because it is centered on the ground forces. These international relations and asymmetric-unbalanced resources distribution will not be able to effectively cope with the hegemonic competition between the US and China in the future, and will limit Korea's strategic choice. Since naval power and forces are the prerequisites for the hegemonic competition or the maintenance of supremacy we must construct balanced naval forces(naval power) that are not subordinate to the ground forces at the national strategic level for the future of the country.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.40
• /
• pp.5-36
• /
• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• Maritime Security
• /
• v.1 no.1
• /
• pp.119-148
• /
• 2020

The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of neighboring countries on the gray zone and to explore Korea's maritime strategy. The concept of gray zones appears in various ways from country to country. In international relations, the gray zone is a comprehensive space between war and peace. The gray zone in the ocean is an unstable space in which competition between the US and China is represented and proxy wars are possible, and the gray zone needs strategic management. This study summarizes the concept of gray zones in the maritime security field, examines the gray zone strategies of neighboring countries, and suggests Korea's gray zone strategies. In particular, the recognition of the gray zone itself is the core of the problem, and it is necessary to strengthen information sharing to clarify the problem about the gray zone and accurately recognize the gray zone situation. The CMG(Complex Maritime Geostrategy) framework attempted in this study is expected to be helpful in understanding the nature of various gray zone issues around Korea and preparing for a geostrategy based on the analysis.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.33
• /
• pp.37-64
• /
• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.33
• /
• pp.113-147
• /
• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
• /
• v.34
• /
• pp.109-131
• /
• 2007

This paper has focusing CheongHaeJin's maritime trading activities between Korea, China and Japan in the 9th century. In operation of CheongHaeJin which Chang BoGo was given a key role, CheongHaeJin creates three nation's wealth in triangular trade among Korea, China and Japan. And also, CheongHaeJin's contribution is considerable to the maritime trade development of Northeast Asia through establishing trading advance base in China and Japan, and organizing Shilla's people in China. Chang BoGo justified the control over small business groups of the west and south sea of Korea and the east and south sea of China by keeping pirates away His trade groups controlled foreign trade of three countries: Shilla, the Dang Dynasty of China and Japan. They connected Persia, India, Southeast Asia, and China. CheongHaeJin's key success factors of the maritime activities are summarized as follows; There is a possibility of searching that successful factor from the people of operator of CheongHaeJin. Based on oceanic adventurous spirit with character and progressive thinking could complete the rally of sea influence and composition of fleets. Secondly, the success factor is the excellent operational ability and leadership which learned in the Dang Dynasty of China. Thirdly, In 9th century, International political context was suitable for CheongHaeJin's construction and operation. Such political circumstances had given to CheongHaeJin remunerative position. Finally, Although central government could not maintain the sea traffic securities, Chang BoGo's ocean trading fleets guaranteed the safe fishing industry of people and security of sea traffic.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.34
• /
• pp.149-177
• /
• 2014

Today distant oceans around the world are regarded as a major 'global commons' for international trade and transportation. Korea is not an exception, because Korea hugely depends on sea lines of communication (SLOC) for supplying vital commodities such as food and energy resource. As a result, assuring a free and safe use of distant ocean beyond territory is also an important agenda for Korea's maritime security. However there are a number of challenges for Korea to enjoy a free and safe use of distant ocean; dangers of regional maritime conflict in East Asia, naval arms race of China and Japan, and concerns on possible decline of U.S naval presence and power projection capabilities. These factors provide a reasonable basis for Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) to pursue capabilities for major naval operations at distant ocean in a long-term perspective toward the year 2030. The introduction of aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine is a key requirement for achieving this goal. ROKN needs to acquire a 'multi-role strategic landing platform' type of light aircraft carrier, which takes a role to escort naval task force by providing air superiority at distant ocean. Additionally nuclear-powered submarine will offer ROKN a formidable power to carry out offensive missions effectively at distant ocean.