The Journal of Economics, Marketing and Management
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v.4
no.4
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pp.17-24
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2016
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the relationship between Management bonuses and earnings stability of the listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The population includes 94 firms selected through systematic sampling. The data is collected from the audited financial statements of the firms provided by TSE's website from 2009 to 2016. The results of multiple linear regression analysis show that there is a significant relationship between Management bonuses and earnings stability. The aim of this study primarily investigating the relationship between earnings stability and management bonus. In the case of this target, the next goal of this research is to develop a proposal for legislation in the domain of capital market, students and faculty as well as accounting information users provide research interests. Observations show many companies despite the decline in profitability, bonus managers to continually pay. Increase in listed companies Stock Exchange as well as the importance of communication between earnings quality and bonus managers in Financial Accounting the authors created an incentive to research about this relationship do. The results of this research could be the development of literature done in the past. Thus, more knowledge about the issue of sustainability and its relation to bonus managers the users of accounting information, accounting courses provide students and faculty.
Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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v.40
no.4
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pp.221-229
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2017
In the international businesses human resource elements acquired in different countries might have different values in varied industries due to the different quality of education and experiences in the original countries. Using selection models to evaluate expected values in earnings equation of human resource elements such as education and experiences etc. acquired in sending countries, system equations are expanded to examine also the values of science and engineering degrees in technology jobs with selectivity bias correction. This paper used the US census survey data of 2015 on earnings, academic degrees, occupations etc. The US has long maintained the policy of accepting more STEM workers than any other countries and helped maintaining own technological leadership. Assuming per capita GDP gap between the sending country and the US downgrades immigrant human resource quality, it rarely affects occupational selection but depresses earnings on average by two or more years' worth of education. Immigrant quality index in the sense of GDP gap appears to be a valid tool to assess the expected earnings of the worker with. Engineering degrees increase significantly the probability of selecting not only engineering jobs but also general management jobs, as well as increasing the expected earning additionally over nine years'worth of education. Getting a technology job is additionally worth about four years of education. Economics and business degrees are worth additionally almost six years of education but humanities degrees depress expected earnings. Since years after immigration does not very fast enhance earnings capacity, education level and English language ability might be more useful criteria to expect better future earnings by.
Purpose: This study looks at the relevance between discretionary revenue and book-tax differences (hereafter BTDs). While the study of earnings management, which focused on discretionary accruals and real earnings management, has largely made, it has not yet been actively researched on discretionary revenues. Therefore, it was believed that discretionary revenue would expand the preceding study by looking at its relevance to BTD, known as financial reporting quality and measures of tax avoidance. In general, prior research suggested that earnings management make BTDs larger. Thus, the relationship between discretionary revenue and the amount of BTD is predicted positive. Research design, data and methodology: To this end, the method of discretionary revenues was used and BTDs measured in four ways. First, Earnings before income tax - estimated taxable income divided by total asset (BTD). Second is fractional rank variable of BTDs (FBTD). Third is Indicator variable equals 1 if the firm-year has a positive BTD, 0 otherwise (PBTD). Fourth is that Indicator variable equals 1 if the firm-year has a BTDs in top(bottom) quartile, 0 otherwise (LPBTD, LNBTD). 4,251 samples were analyzed in the Korean Security market (KOSPI) from 2003 to 2014. Results Empirical analysis shows that BTDs increases as discretionary revenue increases. These results were equally observed when BTDs was measured as a ranking variable or as a indicating variable. These results indicate that earnings management through the revenue of managers exacerbate the quality of financial reporting. Conclusions: In sum, discretionary revenues can be used as an indicator of making BTDs larger and meaningful as the first study of the Korean capital market where discretionary revenues affect accounting information quality. Investors need to increase interest in discretionary revenues because intervention in financial reporting through revenue accounts by managers can increase information asymmetry and agency costs. This means that studies on discretionary revenues that have been relatively small should be expanded. The results also provide important implications for the relevant authorities and investors. Despite these benefits, however, measurement error problems with estimates still appear as limited points, and prudent interpretations are required, and additional follow-up studies are needed in that variables that are not yet considered in this study may affect our findings.
The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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v.8
no.3
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pp.1073-1081
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2021
When firms have higher environmental performance, they can provide sustainable business that allows firms to build the value of credibility and ethics, higher reputation, higher productivity, and lower costs. The advantages of environmental responsibilities help firms to maintain their earnings level over a long-term period. This research aims to examine the effect of environmental performance on earnings persistence. Research samples include 413 manufacturing firms-years listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange and the PROPER evaluation in 2013-2019. Environmental performance is measured by PROPER evaluation rating. The result shows that environmental performance has a positive effect on earnings persistence. The advantage of environmental responsibilities allows firms to enjoy performance sustainability and persistence in a long-term period, not only periodically. Also, the positive effect of environmental performance on earnings persistence occurs more in the environmentally sensitive industry than non-sensitive ones. Since an environmentally-sensitive industry brings more environmental damage, higher environmental performance is more valuable to provide sustainability. This research has limitations to use all the Indonesian Stock Exchange-listed firms since not all firms participate in the PROPER evaluation. This research implies firms' management should maintain earnings persistence and sustainability by implementing higher-quality environmental responsibility, especially for firms in an environmentally-sensitive industry.
The objective of our study is to examine the Earnings Quality of Win-Win Growth Corporate. The level of Win-Win Growth Corporate is measured by Win-Win Index of korea commission for corporate partnership. Earnings Quality is proxied by Accounting Conservatism that is measured by the method of Givoly and Hayn(2000). The samples of this study selected from listed corporate, consist of 3,608 observations can be collected from 2011 to 2017 at TS-2000. The result of this study can be summerized in the following. the Win-Win Growth has a significant positive relevance on Accounting Conservatism is the proxy of internal Earnings Quality. This means that Win-Win Growth corporate has a higher the Earnings Quality relatively. These results were supported by additional analysis that used the sample that is made up the Win-Win Growth Corporate completely. According to our study, we can expect that the Earnings Quality of Win-Win Growth corporate is true as steel. But this study have some limitation. Especially we can't explain the reason why the Win-Win Growth has a significant positive relevance on Earnings Quality. And, despite additional analysis, there are the limitation of controlling for endogeneity. We hope that our paper can help investor making a economic decision on investment and officials making a effective policy on the Win-Win Growth.
This study first examines whether the matching principle reduces information asymmetry and verifies the effect on earnings sustainability and information asymmetry. In the presence of information asymmetry between managers and information users, managers can reduce information asymmetry by increasing the quality of earnings. Information asymmetry is measured by the financial analysts' earnings forecast variance. When we look at the results of previous studies, verify whether information asymmetry decreases as the response to the revenue cost increases and whether negative relationship between profit persistence and information asymmetry appears when the response to the revenue cost is high. As a result, firms with high revenue cost response showed a decrease in information asymmetry. The persistence of the earningss from the high earnings-cost response shows that the analysts' earnings forecast dispersion decreases. This means that the better the response to the revenue cost, the better the quality of the earnings and the less the information risk about the uncertainty of the enterprise. This study is different from the previous studies in that it analyzed whether the persistence of the earnings that responded to the high revenue cost reduces the information asymmetry. The results of this study suggest that managers can reduce the information asymmetry by carrying out appropriate revenue - cost responses, which provides important implications for stakeholders who use accounting earnings information.
Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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v.18
no.1
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pp.173-188
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2023
This paper analyzed the Earnings management of firms selected as preliminary Unicorn. If a manager is selected as a preliminary unicorn firm, he can receive financial support of up to 20 billion won, creating a factor in managing the manager's earnings. The motive for management's earnings management is related to the capital market. Accounting information is used by investors and financial analysts, and corporate profits affect corporate value. Therefore, if the accounting earning is adjusted upward, the corporate value will be raised and investment conditions will be favorable. In this paper, earnings quality was measured by the modified Jones model of Dechow et al.(1995) by the ROA control model of Kothari et al.(2005) among the discretionary accruals estimated using an alternative accrual prediction model. Competing similar companies in the same market as the selected companies were formed, and the discretionary accruals were mutually compared to verify the research hypotheses, and only the selected companies were analyzed for the audit year and after the audit year. As a result of the analysis, it was found that the companies selected as preliminary unicorns had higher earnings management compared to the corresponding companies in question, which had a negative impact on the quality of accounting profits. It was found that the companies selected as preliminary unicorns continued to receive incentives for management's earnings management even after being selected. These results indicate that the companies selected as prospective unicorns are recognized for their value in the market through external growth rather than internal growth, and thus, incentives for management's earnings management to attract investment from external investors under favorable conditions are continuing. In the future preliminary unicorn selection evaluation, it was possible to present what needs to be reviewed on the quality of accounting earning. The implication of this paper is that the factors of management's earnings management eventually hinder investors and creditors from judging the reliability of accounting information. It was suggested that a policy alternative for the K-Unicorn Project, which enhances reliability were presented by reflecting the evaluation of earnings quality through discretionary accruals.
TRAN, Thinh Quoc;LY, Anh Hoang;NGUYEN, Dung Khanh Ngoc
The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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v.7
no.9
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pp.401-407
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2020
Earnings management behavior is the use of accounting procedures, through accounting policies, to intentionally purposeful control in the provision of information to users. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between ownership structure factors and earnings management behavior of 30 Vietnamese commercial banks. The paper uses the ordinary least square method to examine this relationship and employs time series data of 15 years from 2005 to 2019. The study also uses agency theory an asymmetric information theory. The authors examined six independent variables related to the ownership structure and these variables are typical of Vietnamese commercial banks. The results of the study show that the foreign ownership ratio is an opposite effect, while the ownership concentration variable has a positive effect on earnings management behavior of Vietnamese commercial banks. Based on that, the article proposes a number of policy suggestions for the State bank of Vietnam and Board of directors of commercial banks as well as investors to identify and to limit the earnings management behaviors of Vietnamese commercial banks. This contributes to ensuring information transparency as well as improving the quality of accounting information of Vietnamese commercial banks in the coming years.
This study investigates whether and how a firm's cost of equity capital is influenced by the extent of a firm's real earnings management (REM). Using a large sample of Hong Kong and Chinese firms over the 9-year period 2009-2017, we find that our implied cost of equity estimates are positively associated with both the extent of REM and the extent of accrual-based earnings management (AEM), but the positive association is stronger for REM than for AEM. We also provide evidence suggesting that the effect of AEM and REM on the cost of equity is more pronounced for Hong Kong firms than Chinese firms, and within Chinese firms, it is less pronounced for the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Collectively, our results suggest that while both REM and AEM exacerbate the quality of earnings used by outside investors, REM does so to a greater extent than AEM, and thus the market demands a higher risk premium for REM activities than for AEM activities and that this cost of capital-increase effect is more prominent in a developed market like Hong Kong and mitigated by state ownership in China because of investors' expectations for a lower level of detriments to firm fundamentals by REM due to government's protection in a less developed market like China.
The informativeness of accounting earnings to investors may be used as a measure of the quality of accounting information. The ownership structure is considered to be related to both of two variables, the reliability of earnings reflecting the economic performance of the enterprise and the existence of alternative information sources. Earnings manipulation may mitigate the correlation between accounting earnings and the economic performance and alternative information sources decrease the value of accounting earnings as an information. Thus ownership structure could influence the informativeness of accounting earnings. This paper classifies ownership into three categories, management or inside ownership, institutional investors and large outside blockholders, and diffuse outside ownership and examines theoretically the difference of information effectiveness under each ownership structure. The earnings manipulation hypothesis supports the assertion that the separation of ownership from control motivates earnings manipulation. And differential information hypothesis suggests that more non-accounting information of firms with institutional or concentrated outside ownership is provided. Outside blockholders have alternative information sources that make accounting manipulation ineffective. While most previous studies have examined the effect of ownership on the informativeness of earnings from earnings manipulation hypothesis, this study is motivated by both earnings manipulation hypothesis and differential information hypothesis.
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