• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.38 no.3
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• pp.17-35
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• 2016

In many advanced countries, most outside directors are executives, active or retired, at other firms; in other words, executives from other companies make executive compensation decisions. This situation may hinder the board of directors (BOD) in their efforts to optimize executive compensation levels objectively. Using a panel data analysis of the S&P 1500 companies, we provide supplemental evidence of whether, and to what extent, the concurrent executive employment of outside directors distorts the executive pay decisions at a given company. An unbiased fixed-effect estimation confirms that a $1.00 increase in CEO pay at outside directors' primary companies results in an approximate increase of $0.22 in CEO pay at the given company. From a policy perspective, this added agency problem - caused by the BOD and not by management - is noted as difficult to control; although a firm may establish board independence, the inherent concurrent employment of directors on a board continues to exist.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.198-209
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• 2022

This study is an analytical study of changes in the perception of Covid-19 communities and surveyed residents aged 20 or older living in 00-gun, Gyeongsangbuk-do, to identify community awareness (anxiety, stability, economic problems, and director's intention) after COVID-19. As a result of analyzing community perception (anxiety about COVID-19, stability, economic problems, and intention to move) according to gender, age, and family specificity, the survey subjects showed the highest anxiety about COVID-19 among community perception with 4.94, followed by stability 3.92, director's intention 3.51, and economic problem 3.21. primarily aims to find ways to contribute so that residents can restore trust in the local community, rebuild healthy families, and settle down in their daily lives.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.12 no.8
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• pp.207-214
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• 2021

Existing studies have shown consistent results that a diversification discount phenomenon occurs, which means that the value of the company decreases as the degree of diversification of a company increases. Nevertheless, it is explained by the agency theory as a factor that continues to promote diversification by companies. And in order to solve the agency problem, it is important to form an effective governance structure. In order to solve these problems, this study aims to study how the directors' concurrent information affects the monitoring effect of the board of directors through this affects diversification.To this end, research was conducted on KOSPI companies for 6 years from 2011 to 2016.As a result of the analysis, in the case of the concurrent appointment of the CEO and the inside director, there was a positive (+) effect, but the significance could not be confirmed. In the case of adjunct appointments as outside directors, positive results were confirmed that were significant for diversification.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.365-373
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of concurrent appointment as a director on the quality of the internal accounting management system (IACS). For analysis, 9,343 KOSPI & KOSDAQ company-year data from 2014-2019, excluding the financial industry, were used. As a result of the analysis, it was confirmed that the quality of IACS decreased as the number of multiple positions in the director increased. Although there is a difference in the roles of inside and outside directors, it was found that the quality of IACS decreases equally as the number of board members. According to the business hypothesis, this can be said to be the result of the agency problem within the company because directors, who were more busy with concurrent positions as directors, did not put sufficient effort into their work. This study suggests that information on the concurrent position of directors can be a new indicator that reflects the characteristics of the board in evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance.