Background : The importance of pro-inflammatory cytokines, especially tumor necrosis factor
As we considered in the main subjects, investigations on the theory of 'Doctrine on five elements' motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣學說)' through 'Wang Bing's Commentary(王氷 注本)' of 'The seven great chapters in The Yellow Emperor's Internal Classic Su Wen' ("黃帝內經素問 七篇大論") are as follows. (1) In The seven great chapters("七篇大論")' Wang Bing supplement theory and in the academic aspects as a interpreter, judging from 'forget(亡)' character. expressed in the 'The missing chapters("素問遺篇")', 'Bonbyung-ron("本病論")' and 'Jabeob-ron(刺法論)', 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")' must be supplementary work by Wang Bing. Besides, he quoted such forty books as medical books, taoist books, confucianist books, miscellaneous books, etc in the commentary and the contents quoted in the 'Su Wen(素問)' and 'Ling Shu("靈樞")' scripture nearly occupy in the book. As a method of interpreting scripiure as scripture, he edited the order of 'Internal Classic("內經")' ascended from the ancient time and when he compensated for commentary, with exhaustive scholarly mind and by observing the natural phenomena practically and writing the pathology and the methods of treatment. We knew that the book is combined with the study of 'Doctrine on five elements motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣學說)' (2) When we compare, analyze the similar phrase of 'The seven great chapters in The Yellow Emperor's Internal Classic Su Wen'("黃帝內經素問ㆍ七篇大論") through 'Wang Bing's Commentary(王氷 注本)', he tells abouts organized 'five elements(五行)' and 'heaven's regularly movement(天道運行)' rather than 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")' in 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")'. Also the 'Ohanunhangdae-ron("五運行大論")' because the repeated sentences with 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")' is long they are omitted. And in the 'Youkmijidae-ron("六微旨大論")', 'Cheonjin ideology(天眞四象)' based on the 'Sanggocheonjin- ron("上古天眞論")', 'Sagijosindae-ron("四氣調神大論")' is written and in the 'Gigoupyondae-ron("氣交變大論")', the syndrome and symptom are explained in detail rather than 'Janggibeobsi-ron("藏氣法時論")', 'Okgijinjang-ron ("玉機眞藏論")' and in the 'Osangieongdae-ron("五常政大論")', the concept of 'five element(五行)' of the 'Gemgwejineon-ron("金櫃眞言論")' is expanded to 'the five elements' motion concept(五運槪念)' and in the 'Youkwonjeonggidae-ron("六元正紀大論")', explanations of 'The five elements' motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣)' function are mentioned mainly and instead systematic pathology is not revealed rather than 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")'. And in the 'Jijinyodae-ron("至眞要大論")', explanations of the change of atmosphere which correspond to treatment principle by 'The three Yin and Yang(三陰三陽)' as a progressed concepts are revealed. Therefore there are much similarity between the phrase of 'Emyangengsangdae-ron("陰陽應象大論")' and 'chapters of addition(補缺之篇)'. Generally, the doctrine which 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")' are added by Wang Bing(王氷) is supported because there are more profound concepts rather than the other chapter in 'The seven great chapters("七篇大論")'. (3) When we study Wang Bing's(王氷) 'Pattern on five elements motion and six kinds of natural factors(運氣格局)' in 'The seven great chapter("七篇大論")', in the 'Cheonwongi-dae-ron("天元紀大論")', With 'Cheonjin ideology(天眞思想)' and the concepts of 'Owang(旺)'
Background : Residual pleural thickening (RPT) develops in about 50% of tuberculous pleurisy (
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
The current state of performance halls in South Korea is closely related to the performance art and culture of the nation as the culture of putting on and enjoying a performance is deeply rooted in public culture and arts halls representing each area at the local government level. Today, public culture and arts halls have multiple management purposes, and the subjects of their management are in the public domain including the central and local governments or investment and donation foundations in overwhelming cases. Public culture and arts halls thus have close correlations with the institutional aspect of cultural policies as the objects of culture and art policies at the central and local government level. The full-blown era of public culture and arts halls opened up in the 1980s~1990s, during which multi-purpose performance halls of a similar structure became universal around the nation. Public culture and arts halls of the uniform shape were distributed around the nation with no premise of genre characteristics or local environments for arts, and this was attributed to the cultural policies of the military regime. The Park Chung-hee regime proclaimed Yusin that was beyond the Constitution and enacted the Culture and Arts Promotion Act(September, 1972), which was the first culture and arts act in the nation. Based on the act, a five-year plan for the promotion of culture and arts(1973) was made and led to the construction of cultural facilities. "Public culture and arts" halls or "culture" halls were built to serve multiple purposes around the nation because the Culture and Arts Promotion Act, which is called the starting point of the nation's legal system for culture and arts, defined "culture and arts" as "matters regarding literature, art, music, entertainment, and publications." The definition became a ground for the current "multi-purpose" concept. The organization of Ministry of Culture and Public Information set up a culture and administration system to state its supervision of "culture and arts" and distinguish popular culture from the promotion of arts. During the period, former President Park exhibited his perception of "culture=arts=culture and arts" in his speeches. Arts belonged to the category of culture, but it was considered as "culture and arts." There was no department devoted to arts policies when the act was enacted with a broad scope of culture accepted. This ambiguity worked as a mechanism to mobilize arts in ideological utilizations as a policy. Against this backdrop, the Sejong Center for the Performing Arts, a multi-purpose performance hall, was established in 1978 based on the Culture and Arts Promotion Act under the supervision of Ministry of Culture and Public Information. There were, however, conflicts of value over the issue of accepting the popular music among the "culture and arts = multiple purposes" of the system, "culture ≠ arts" of the cultural organization that pushed forward its establishment, and "culture and arts = arts" perceived by the powerful class. The new military regime seized power after Coup d'état of December 12, 1979 and failed at its culture policy of bringing the resistance force within the system. It tried to differentiate itself from the Park regime by converting the perception into "expansion of opportunities for the people to enjoy culture" to gain people's supports both from the side of resistance and that of support. For the Chun Doo-hwan regime, differentiating itself from the previous regime was to secure legitimacy. Expansion of opportunities to enjoy culture was pushed forward at the level of national distribution. This approach thus failed to settle down as a long-term policy of arts development, and the military regime tried to secure its legitimacy through the symbolism of hardware. During the period, the institutional ground for public culture and arts halls was based on the definition of "culture and arts" in the Culture and Arts Promotion Act enacted under the Yusin system of the Park regime. The "multi-purpose" concept, which was the management goal of public performance halls, was born based on this. In this context of the times, proscenium performance halls of a similar structure and public culture and arts halls with a similar management goal were established around the nation, leading to today's performance art and culture in the nation.
Background : The p53 and retinoblastoma(Rb) tumor suppressor genes are associated with the pathogenesis of several types of human cancer. Substantial proportion of the primary lung cancers or cell lines have been reported to have the p53 and/or the Rb gene mutations. But, so far there is no report on the analysis of the Rb gene polymorphism as one of the genetic susceptibility marker. This study was undertaken to establish the gene frequencies of the polymorphic genotypes of the p53 and Rb genes in Koreans to evaluate the possible involvement of these genotypes as a risk factor of lung cancer. Methods : In this study 145 controls without previous and present tumor history and 128 lung cancer patients were subjected to analysis. The two intragenic polymorphisms of the p53 gene(exon 4/ AccII, intron 6/MspI) and one intron 17/XbaI polymorphism of the Rb gene were analysed by the method of polymersae chain reaction- restriction fragment length polymorphisms(PCR-RFLPs). The genotype of the intron 3/16 bp repeat polymorphism of p53 was determined by PCR and direct gel electrophoresis. Results : There were no significant differences in the genotype distributions of the p53 gene between lung cancer patients and controls. But heterozygotes(Arg/Pro) of the exon 4/AccII polymorphisms were slightly over-represented than controls, especially in the Kreyberg type I cancer, which was known to be associated with smoking. The intron 3/16 bp duplication and the intron 6/MspI polymorphisms were in complete linkage disequilibrium. About 95% of the individuals were homozygotes of the common alleles both in the 16 duplication and MspI polymorphisms, and no differences were deteced in the genotype distributions between lung cancer patients and controls. Overall genotype distributions of the Rb gene polymorphisms between lung cancer patients and controls were not significantly different However, the genotype distributions in the Kreyberg type I cancer were significantly different from those of controls(p = 0.0297) or adenocarcinomas(p = 0.0008). It was noticeable that 73.4% of the patients with adenocarcinomas were heterozygotes(r1/r2) whereas 39.2% of the Kreyberg type I cancer were heterozygous at this polymorphisms. In the lung cancer patients, significant differences were also noted between the high dose smokers and low dose smokers including non-smokers(p = 0.0258). The relative risk to Kreyberg type I cancer was significantly reduced in the individuals with the genotype of r1/r2(odds ratio = 0.46, 95% C.I. = 0.25-0.86, p = 0.0124). The combined genotype distribution of the exon 4 AccII of the p53 and the intron 17 Rb gene polymorphisms in Kreyberg type I cancers were significantly different from dose of controls or adenocarcinomas. The highest odds ratio were observed in the individuals with the genotypes of Arg/Pro and r2/r2(odds ratio = 1.97,95% C.I. = 0.84-4.59) and lowest one was in the patients with Arg/Arg, r1/r2 genotype(odds ratio = 0.54, 95% C.I. = 0.25-1.14). Conclusion : The p53 and the Rb gene polymorphisms modulate the risk of smoking induced lung cancer development in Koeans. However, the exact mechanism of risk modulation by these polymorphism remains to be determined. For more discrete clarification of associations between specific genotypes and lung cancer risk, the evaluations of these polymorphisms in other ethnics and more number of patients will be needed.