• Strategy21
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• 통권45호
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• pp.116-147
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• 2019

한국은 지형적으로 반도국가이며 국제정치적으로는 중견국의 위상을 갖고 있다. 이런 유리한 조건에도 불구하고 아직도 대륙지향적 사고에 갇혀 있으며 이는 정교한 해양전략의 탄생을 지체시키는 걸림돌로 작용하고 있다. 이를 극복하기 위해 '바다의 유형'과 '위상'이라는 두 가지 변수를 이용하여 '해양접근전략(the Maritime Access Strategy)'을 제시한다. 나아가 전략을 구성하는 3대 요소-목표, 방법, 수단-을 이용하여 해양접근전략의 정교화를 시도한다. 목표 차원에서는 국가적 차원의 목표를 지원하도록 동기화가 필요하다는 전제에 주목한다. 더불어 다양한 행위자와 상대해야 함을 고려하여 억지(Deterrence), 관여(Engagement), 견제(Check)라는 소목표를 제시한다. 방법 차원에서는 기능적 균형화 작전방안을, 수단 차원에서는 기능적 균형전력을 제시한다. 해양접근전략은 다양한 바다에서 접근강도의 유연성을 갖고 맞춤형으로 다가가는 역동적 메커니즘을 품고 있다.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.15-24
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• 2007

정보보안의 중요성에 관한 인식이 증가함에 따라 다양한 보안대책이 조직에 도입되고 있다. 하지만 대부분의 경우 이들 보안대책은 전략적으로 운영되지 않고 있다. 따라서 본 논문은 조직에서의 정보보안 전략은 무엇인가에 대해 개념적으로 연구한다. 이를 위하여 다양한 문헌에서 정보보안 전략이 어떻게 소개되었으며, 어떠한 전략이 제시되어 왔는지 연구한다. 본 논문은 조직의 정보보안에 있어서의 전략 자체에 초점을 맞추어, 개념을 정립하고, 지금까지 제시되어 온 다양한 전략을 식별하여 체계적으로 분류하였다는데 의의가 있다.

• 방사선산업학회지
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.451-456
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• 2023

The subject of this research is what is the most effective strategy of the nuclear sharing strategy of South Korea through the nuclear strategy that the U.S. is pursuing now. The U.S. Nuclear Strategy-related change can be found in a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report released by the U.S. The first NPR was announced in 1994 and after that, the U.S. has additionally announced a total of four NPRs along with administration changes. The change in the U.S. nuclear strategy and nuclear power are considered both deterrence and offset strategies. It can be summarized in two ways. First, by maintaining overwhelming nuclear power against the enemy, the U.S. is to lead nuclear advantage that is the core of the U.S. nuclear strategy. Second, the U.S. is to limit the competition of nuclear power with nations seeking to challenge the U.S. nuclear power advantage. Additionally, the U.S. is to actively sign an agreement with nations on the reduction and restriction of nuclear weapons. Through the NPR of the U.S., South Korea should know its unclear power and strategy and have an effective nuclear strategy of South Korea. Therefore, this research is to deal with the suitability of the nuclear sharing strategy with the U.S., which is one of the various nuclear strategies of South Korea.

• 산업진흥연구
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• 제5권3호
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• pp.123-134
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• 2020

본 연구는 탈냉전이후 역대 한국정부의 북핵전략내용들을 규명하고, 동일시기 한반도에 영향을 준 미국의 B. 클린턴과 G.W.부시 행정부의 대북핵정책과 북한의 핵전략 및 전술이 한국정부의 북핵전략에 어떠한 인과론적 결과를 파생하였는지 상호연계·분석하여 향후의 대응방안을 제시하는데 있다. 탈냉전직후인 1991년 12월 13일 남북한이 공동 합의한 '남북기본합의서'는 한국이 남북관계를 주도해 가는 토대를 마련해 주었고, 북핵해결의 기점이라 하는 '한반도비핵화선언'은 냉전종식에 대한 미국의 '해외전술핵무기폐기선언'과 직결되는 일련의 조치로, 냉전해체후 국제질서 재편과정의 파생물이자 북한의 교묘한 핵전략에 말려든 오판의 산물이었다. 이후 김영삼의 문민정부-->김대중정부의 햇볕정책-->노무현정부의 평화·번영정책--> 이명박 정부의 상생·공영정책과 비핵·개방·3000 전략은 남북관계발전을 정부정책의 제일기조로 삼고 제시한 정책적 모토이고 추진과정에서 방법상의 차이가 있었다. 그러나 북핵문제대응에 대한 공통적 측면은 북핵문제해결을 위한 주도적이고 적극적인 대응책 마련과 실행의 노력보다는 국제기구나 다자적국제체제 및 미국역할에대한 기대심리가 지대했음을 인지할 수 있었다. 본 연구에서는 이의 미흡한 점을 보강하기 위한 결론적 제안으로 일치단결된 국민의식으로 북핵폐기를 위한 단호한 대전략(大戰略)수립과, 북핵문제해결을 위한 다자협의체제와 국제레짐의 공조(共助)를 통한 보다 쇄신되고 강력한 미래의 역할주문과 한국의 역대정부에서 이룩한 남북한 5대합의문의 재보강을 통한 확대된 억지책(extended deterrence)강구를 제언하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• 해양안보
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• 제8권1호
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• pp.103-128
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• 2024

노르트스트림 폭발, 발트해와 홍해에서의 해저케이블 훼손 사건은 전 세계적으로 해저전에 관한 관심을 불러일으키고 각국은 대응방안을 준비하고 있다. 하지만 한국은 해저케이블에 네트워크 대부분을 의존하고 북한과 주변국의 위협에 취약한 상황이지만 해저전(Seabed Warfare)이라는 용어조차 익숙하지 않다. 본 논문은 해저전의 정의와 특징, 각국의 현황을 분석하고 대응방안을 제시하는 국내 최초의 연구물이다. 해저전 대응을 위해 국제적으로 규칙기반의 질서를 공유하는 국가 간 소다자주의에 의한 협력체계 구축, 국내 관계 기관 및 업체와의 거버넌스 구축, 거부적 억제와 보복적 억제에 기초한 군사적 대응방안을 제시한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• 해양안보
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.61-92
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• 2020

본 논문은 중국의 시기별 해군전략의 전략운용 목표, 범위, 방식을 살펴보고, 시진핑 시기 해군전략의 목표와 특징, 전략적 함의를 분석해 보는 데 그 목적이 있다. 신(新)중국 성립 이후 해군은 현재까지 총 네 번에 걸쳐 전략변화를 구사하였다. 현재 시진핑 시기 중국의 해군전략은 근해적극방어전략이 결합된 원해호위전략이다. 현재 중국의 해군전략은 공격성 무기체계로 인해 공격적 전략으로 전환되고 있고, 최신식 함정의 비중이 높아지고 있으며, 운용범위는 연안과 근해를 벗어나 전 세계 해양이 대상이 되었다. 중국의 해군전략이 전환됨에 따라 중국 해군은 해양주도권 확보를 전략적 목표로 설정하고 외부 세력의 개입과 침입에 적극 대응하기 위한 공세적 전략을 실행할 것이다. 이에 중국 해군은 원거리 지역 해상 분쟁지역에서 분쟁당사국들을 더욱 압박하기 위해 억제전력과 기동전력을 향상시킬 것이다. 또한 중국의 해군전략은 '차단'에서 '신속대응'이라는 운용 방식으로 점차 전환될 것으로 전망한다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권4호
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• pp.241-287
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• 2006

16th CPC National Party Congress established multi-polarization strategy as an external strategy, and 'The Great Reinvigoration of Chinese Nation' as the aim of The Great Strategy of China. It is required to maintain stabilized and peaceful surrounding circumstance in order to make it possible. The ideal surrounding circumstance that China is aiming for is to achieve multi-polarization of international society while maintaining strategic deterrence. Multi-polarization now in 'One super Multi powers' is that 'Multi powers' deter 'One super' to prevent predominance of USA and to decentralize the power. China wishes to realign international order as it accomplishes multi-polarization. China who wants 'Peace and Stabilization' emphasizes autonomy, peace and unification of Korean peninsula. Autonomy means the restraint intervention of foreign power, that is, American influence in Korean peninsula. Multi-polarization strategy of China will be used in Korean peninsula to solve nuclear issue of North Korea, to support neutral unification and to keep balance of power with USA, Japan and Russia as it renders economic advantages to South Korea and security engagement to North Korea, based on special geographical, cultural and historical relationship with two Koreas. The nuclear issue of North Korea will be a stage to test multi-polarization of China. When it deduces positive solution of nuclear issue due to successful six-party talks, and advances to security talks of Northeast Asia, it will contribute a lot to power and elevation of national stature of China in international society. Thus, the Chinese strategy will be an accommodative condition for the security of South Korea, and it requires wise decision of South Korea to make hay while the sun shine.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.