• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.87-107
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• 2005

Land Remote Sensing' is defined as the science (and to some extent, art) of acquiring information about the Earth's surface without actually being in contact with it. Narrowly speaking, this is done by sensing and recording reflected or emitted energy and processing, analyzing, and applying that information. Remote sensing technology was initially developed with certain purposes in mind ie. military and environmental observation. However, after 1970s, as these high-technologies were taught to private industries, remote sensing began to be more commercialized. Recently, we are witnessing a 0.61-meter high-resolution satellite image on a free market. While privatization of land remote sensing has enabled one to use this information for disaster prevention, map creation, resource exploration and more, it can also create serious threat to a sensed nation's national security, if such high resolution images fall into a hostile group ie. terrorists. The United States, a leading nation for land remote sensing technology, has been preparing and developing legislative control measures against the remote sensing industry, and has successfully created various policies to do so. Through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's authority under the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, the US can restrict sensing and recording of resolution of 0.5 meter or better, and prohibit distributing/circulating any images for the first 24 hours. In 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 23 ordered a 'Shutter Control' policy that details heightened level of restriction from sensing to commercializing such sensitive data. The Directive 23 was even more strengthened in 2003 when the Congress passed US Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. These policies allow Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to set up guidelines in authorizing land remote sensing, and to limit sensing and distributing satellite images in the name of the national security - US government can use the civilian remote sensing systems when needed for the national security purpose. The fact that the world's leading aerospace technology country acknowledged the magnitude of land remote sensing in the context of national security, and it has made and is making much effort to create necessary legislative measures to control the powerful technology gives much suggestions to our divided Korean peninsula. We, too, must continue working on the Korea National Space Development Act and laws to develop the necessary policies to ensure not only the development of space industry, but also to ensure the national security.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.99-109
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• 2018

Tampering involves illegally removing technologies from a protected system through reverse engineering or developing a system without proper authorization. As tampering of a weapon system is a threat to national security, anti-tampering measures are required. Precedent studies on anti-tampering have discussed the necessity, related trends, application cases, and recent cybersecurity-based or other protection methods. In a domestic situation, the Defense Technology Protection Act focuses on how to prevent technology leakage occurring in related organizations through personnel, facilities and information systems. Anti-tampering design needs to determine which technologies are protected while considering the effects of development cost and schedule. The objective of our study is to develop methods of how to select target technologies and determine counter-measures to protect these technologies. Specifically, an evaluation matrix was derived based on the risk analysis concept to select the protection of target technologies. Also, based on the concept of risk mitigation, the classification of anti-tampering techniques was performed according to its applicability and determination of application levels. Results of the case study revealed that the methods proposed can be systematically applied for anti-tampering in weapon system development.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.241-271
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• 2020

The military technology currently receiving the most attention is the hypersonic missile. hypersonic is faster than the speed of sound or Mach 5+. The vast majority of the ballistic missiles that it inspired achieved hypersonic speeds as they fell from the sky. Rather than speed, today's renewed attention to hypersonic weapons owes to developments that enable controlled flight. These new systems have two sub-varieties: hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability, and low altitude of flight. The fundamental question of this study is: 'What effect will the hypersonic missile have on the maritime strategy?' It is quite prudent to analyze and predict the impact of technology in the development stage on strategy in advance. However, strategy is essential because it affect future force construction. hypersonic missiles act as a limiting factor in securing sea control. The high speed and powerful destructive power of the hypersonic missile are not only difficult to intercept, but it also causes massive ship damage at a single shot. As a result, it is analyzed that the Securing sea control will be as difficult as the capacity of sea denial will be improved geographically and qualitatively. In addition, the concept of Fortress Fleet, which was criticized for its passive strategy in the past, could be reborn in a modern era. There are maritime power projection/defence, SLOC attack/defence in exploiting sea control. The effects of hypersonic missiles on exploiting sea control could be seen as both limiting and opportunity factors.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.349-384
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• 2013

The Sputnik 1 launching in 1957 made the world recognize the necessity of international regulations on space development and activities in outer space. The United Nations established COPUOS the very next year, and adopted the mandate to examine legal issues concerning the peaceful uses of outer space. At the time, the military sector of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were in charge of the space development and they were not welcomed to discuss the prohibition of the military uses of outer space at the legal section in the COPUOS. Although both countries had common interests in securing the freedom of military uses in outer space. As the social and economic benefits derived from space activities have become more apparent, civil expenditures on space activities have continued to increase in several countries. Virtually all new spacefaring states explicitly place a priority on space-based applications to support social and economic development. Such space applications as satellite navigation and Earth imaging are core elements of almost every existing civil space program. Likewise, Moon exploration continues to be a priority for such established spacefaring states as China, Russia, India, and Japan. Recently, Companies that manufacture satellites and ground equipment have also seen significant growth. On 25 February 2012 China successfully launched the eleventh satellite for its indigenous global navigation and positioning satellite system, Beidou. Civil space activities began to grow in China when they were allocated to the China Great Wall Industry Corporation in 1986. China Aerospace Corporation was established in 1993, followed by the development of the China National Space Administration. In Japan civil space was initially coordinated by the National Space Activities Council formed in 1960. Most of the work was performed by the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the University of Tokyo, the National Aerospace Laboratory, and, most importantly, the National Space Development Agency. In 2003 all this work was assumed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency(JAXA). Japan eases restrictions on military space development. On 20 June 2012 Japan passed the Partial Revision of the Cabinet Establishment Act, which restructured the authority to regulate Japanese space policy and budget, including the governance of the JAXA. Under this legislation, the Space Activities Commission of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, which was responsible for the development of Japanese space program, will be abolished. Regulation of space policy and budget will be handed over to the Space Strategy Headquarter formed under the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Space Strategy will be supported by a Consultative Policy Commission as an academics and independent observers. By revoking Article 4 (Objectives of the Agency) of a law that previously governed JAXA and mandated the development of space programs for "peaceful purposes only," the new legislation demonstrates consistency with Article 2 of the 2008 Basic Space Law. In conformity with the principles laid down in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty JAXA is now free to pursue the non-aggressive military use of space. New legislation is the culmination of a decade-long process that sought ways to "leverage Japan's space development programs and technologies for security purposes, to bolster the nation's defenses in the face of increased tensions in East Asia." In this connection it would also be very important and necessary to create an Asian Space Agency(ASA) for strengthening cooperation within the Asian space community towards joint undertakings.