• 해양환경안전학회지
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• 제20권5호
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• pp.571-578
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• 2014

남 북한간 정전협정시 해양경계를 정하지 못했으며, 주변국과 관할해역 경계가 명확하지 않다. 유엔군사령부는 6.25전쟁 이후 정전협정 준수를 위해 북방한계선과 작전구역을 설정해 해 공군 세력의 활동을 통제했고, 우리나라는 작전구역 내에서 북한선박의 통항을 통제해 왔다. 작전구역 내에서 제3국 선박은 항해의 자유를 향유하지만, 북한선박은 교전국으로서 통항이 통제되는 특수한 해양 제도가 유지되고 있다. 그러나, 작전구역이 설정된 이후 유엔해양법협약 발효, 남 북한의 유엔 가입 등 변화가 지속되고 갈등요인이 있어 작전구역의 지리적 범위를 보완할 필요가 있다. 또한 해군의 기능적 역량 강화를 위해 해군함정에게 북한선박 통제를 법적으로 보장하는 조치가 요구된다. 본 논문에서는 6.25 전쟁 이후 한반도 주변해역에서 북한선박을 통제하여 온 실례와 북한선박 통항통제 제도에대한 개선방안을 살펴보았다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권46호
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• pp.29-56
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• 2020

Despite the deep concerns against the DPRK and the harsh sanctions imposed on it, the country renders the sanctions futile by facilitating various illegal trades such as the ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum or coal. Recently, the international community went into paying attention to solve this matter. Among the measures the community can take, "reinforcing the search and inspection of the DPRK related vessels transiting in the high and territorial seas" is the best policy approach to reduce the sanction evasion and provide the international community with considerable bargaining advantages. This measure requires the forceful action by legal enforcement agencies, also known as VBSS. (Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure) It would make the deals prohibited by the UNSCRs (United Nation Security Council Resolutions) less profitable by reducing the expected return on the deals and increasing the cost for them. So, it would make the illegal deals under the table less attractive. The DPRK has been able to render the sanctions futile by exploiting the limitations of the current maritime sanctions. The resolutions are short of being specific about law enforcement, and the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) is legally nonbinding. However, if the UNSCRs and the PSI are combined, they can generate a new source of power and exploit the weakness of the DPRK. Noting that the recent UNSCRs stipulated all the legal discussions in the resolutions are confined and applied only to the DPRK, the PSI can target the commercial trade as well as the WMD-related materials in the case of the DPRK's illegal maritime practices. Therefore, the PSI endorsing partners should go beyond mere commitments. They should discuss action plans to implement the maritime interdictions to the extent that they discourage the DPRK and its business partners continuing the illegal activities.