• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• 제21권8호
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• pp.1-12
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• 2021

An operation of an organization is currently using a digital environment which opens to potential cyber-attacks. These phenomena become worst as the cyberattack landscape is changing rapidly. The impact of cyber-attacks varies depending on the scope of the organization and the value of assets that need to be protected. It is difficult to assess the damage to an organization from cyberattacks due to a lack of understanding of tools, metrics, and knowledge on the type of attacks and their impacts. Hence, this paper aims to identify domains and sub-domains of cyber-attack taxonomy to facilitate the understanding of cyber-attacks. Four phases are carried in this research: identify existing cyber-attack taxonomy, determine and classify domains and sub-domains of cyber-attack, and construct the enhanced cyber-attack taxonomy. The existing cyber-attack taxonomies are analyzed, domains and sub-domains are selected based on the focus and objectives of the research, and the proposed taxonomy named AVOIDITALS Cyber-attack Taxonomy is constructed. AVOIDITALS consists of 8 domains, 105 sub-domains, 142 sub-sub-domains, and 90 other sub-sub-domains that act as a guideline to assist administrators in determining cyber-attacks through cyber-attacks pattern identification that commonly occurred on digital infrastructure and provide the best prevention method to minimize impact. This research can be further developed in line with the emergence of new types and categories of current cyberattacks and the future.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제52권5호
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• pp.995-1001
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• 2020

With the development of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) devices, cyber security at nuclear power plants (NPPs) has become a hot issue. The Stuxnet, which destroyed Iran's uranium enrichment facility in 2010, suggests that NPPs could even lead to an accident involving the release of radioactive materials cyber-attacks. However, cyber security research on industrial control systems (ICSs) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems is relatively inadequate compared to information technology (IT) and further it is difficult to study cyber-attack taxonomy for NPPs considering the characteristics of ICSs. The advanced research of cyber-attack taxonomy does not reflect the architectural and inherent characteristics of NPPs and lacks a systematic countermeasure strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to more systematically check the consistency of operators and regulators related to cyber security, as in regulatory guide 5.71 (RG.5.71) and regulatory standard 015 (RS.015). For this reason, this paper attempts to suggest a template for cyber-attack taxonomy based on the characteristics of NPPs and exemplifies a specific cyber-attack case in the template. In addition, this paper proposes a systematic countermeasure strategy by matching the countermeasure with critical digital assets (CDAs). The cyber-attack cases investigated using the proposed cyber-attack taxonomy can be used as data for evaluation and validation of cyber security conformance for digital devices to be applied, and as effective prevention and mitigation for cyber-attacks of NPPs.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• 제15권4호
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• pp.865-889
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• 2019

The need for cyber resilience is increasingly important in our technology-dependent society where computing devices and data have been, and will continue to be, the target of cyber-attackers, particularly advanced persistent threat (APT) and nation-state/sponsored actors. APT and nation-state/sponsored actors tend to be more sophisticated, having access to significantly more resources and time to facilitate their attacks, which in most cases are not financially driven (unlike typical cyber-criminals). For example, such threat actors often utilize a broad range of attack vectors, cyber and/or physical, and constantly evolve their attack tactics. Thus, having up-to-date and detailed information of APT's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) facilitates the design of effective defense strategies as the focus of this paper. Specifically, we posit the importance of taxonomies in categorizing cyber-attacks. Note, however, that existing information about APT attack campaigns is fragmented across practitioner, government (including intelligence/classified), and academic publications, and existing taxonomies generally have a narrow scope (e.g., to a limited number of APT campaigns). Therefore, in this paper, we leverage the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) model to "decompose" any complex attack and identify the relevant characteristics of such attacks. We then comprehensively analyze more than 40 APT campaigns disclosed before 2018 to build our taxonomy. Such taxonomy can facilitate incident response and cyber threat hunting by aiding in understanding of the potential attacks to organizations as well as which attacks may surface. In addition, the taxonomy can allow national security and intelligence agencies and businesses to share their analysis of ongoing, sensitive APT campaigns without the need to disclose detailed information about the campaigns. It can also notify future security policies and mitigation strategy formulation.

• 한국정보통신학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국정보통신학회 2015년도 춘계학술대회
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• pp.264-266
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• 2015

최근 원자력발전소를 대상으로 하는 사이버위협이 급증함에 따라 원자력사업자는 원자력시설의 컴퓨터 및 정보시스템이 사이버공격에 대해 적절히 보호됨을 보장하여야하며 특히 사이버공격에 노출될 경우 핵물질 불법이전 및 공공안전에 악영향을 끼칠 수 있는 필수 계통에 대한 보호가 필요하다. 본 논문에서는 이를 위해 원자력발전소를 대상으로 하는 사이버위협 현황을 조사하고, 원자력 시설의 필수 계통과 그에 포함된 필수디지털자산들을 식별 방법과 그에 따른 사이버보안 조치를 수행하는 국내 외의 국내 원자력 시설에 적합한 필수 계통 식별 및 보안조치 방법을 분석한다.

• 정보보호학회논문지
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.329-337
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• 2013

산업제어시스템의 사이버위협 특징은 의도하지 않았다고 하더라도 피해범위가 특정 시스템뿐만 아니라 네트워크의 서비스 제공을 위협하는 수준에 도달했다는 점이다. '보안'의 일부 범위는 단지 테러리스트나 사이버 해커의 고의적인 공격에 대한 시스템의 보호를 포함하지만, 종종 더 큰 피해는 의도적인 공격보다 부주의에 의한 설정 오류 또는 장비고장 등의 비고의적인 행위로 이루어 진다. 본 논문은 고의적 공격, 실수, 장비 고장 및 소프트웨어 문제를 포함한 ICS의 모든 비정상 행위에 대한 분류를 제안하였다. ICS의 비정상 행위 분류 기준은 고의적인 공격뿐만 아니라 부주의한 행동의 공통점과 중요한 특징을 강조하기 위해 선정되었다.

• 한국통신학회논문지
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• 제38B권8호
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• pp.641-653
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• 2013

최근 제어시스템을 대상으로 한 사이버공격이 점차 고도화 지능화됨에 따라 기존 시그니처(signature) 기반 탐지 기법은 한계에 봉착하였고, 이에 제어시스템 환경에 적합한 화이트리스트(whitelist) 기반 보안 기법이 새롭게 주목받고 있다. 그러나 최근 개발되고 있는 화이트리스트 기법들은 어플리케이션 레벨에서 한정적으로 사용되고 있으며, 무엇보다 블랙리스트(blacklist) 기반 보안 기법과 달리 이상 징후 유형에 대한 구체적 정보 제공이 불가능하다는 단점이 존재한다. 본 논문에서는 제어시스템에서 발생할 수 있는 이상 징후 유형들을 분류하고, 네트워크 레벨에서의 화이트리스트를 통해 이상 징후를 탐지할 수 있는 모델을 제시한다.