• Title/Summary/Keyword: Cruise Missile

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The Analysis of the U.S. Navy Surface Forces Strategy and the implications to Republic of Korea Navy (미(美) 해군 수상함부대 전략 평가 및 한국 해군에게 주는 시사점)

  • Kim, Hyun-Seung
    • Strategy21
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    • s.41
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    • pp.52-84
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    • 2017
  • After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

Terrain Referenced Navigation Simulation using Area-based Matching Method and TERCOM (영역기반 정합 기법 및 TERCOM에 기반한 지형 참조 항법 시뮬레이션)

  • Lee, Bo-Mi;Kwon, Jay-Hyoun
    • Journal of the Korean Society of Surveying, Geodesy, Photogrammetry and Cartography
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    • v.28 no.1
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    • pp.73-82
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    • 2010
  • TERCOM(TERrain COntour Matching), which is the one of the Terrain Referenced Navigation and used in the cruise missile navigation system, is still under development. In this study, the TERCOM based on area-based matching algorithm and extended Kalman filter is analysed through simulation. In area-based matching, the mean square difference (MSD) and cross-correlation matching algorithms are applied. The simulation supposes that the barometric altimeter, radar altimeter and SRTM DTM loaded on board. Also, it navigates along the square track for 545 seconds with the velocity of 1000km per hour. The MSD and cross-correlation matching algorithms show the standard deviation of position error of 99.6m and 34.3m, respectively. The correlation matching algorithm is appeared to be less sensitive than the MSD algorithm to the topographic undulation and the position accuracy of the both algorithms is extremely depends on the terrain. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an algorithm that is more sensitive to less terrain undulation for reliable terrain referenced navigation. Furthermore, studies on the determination of proper matching window size in long-term flight and the determination of the best terrain database resolution needed by the flight velocity and area should be conducted.

A Review on the Change in Submarine Roles in Naval Warfare: Based on Warfare Paradigm (전쟁 패러다임의 전환에 따른 잠수함의 역할 변화에 대한 고찰)

  • Jang, Jun-Seop
    • Strategy21
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    • s.46
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    • pp.89-122
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    • 2020
  • The longing for submarine manufacture and the fear of her power had exited for a long time, but submarine that could submerge and attack was built from 20th century by science technology development. The question, 'Submarine can exercise her power in naval warfare?' had exited before World War I, but the effective value of submarine was shown in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare during World War I and World War II. Germany and the United States made the best use of submarines at that time. The submarines of these nations mounted fierce attack on the enemy's battleships and merchant ships and blocked the sea lanes for war material. These fierce attack on ships became impossible After World War II, and the major powers reduced and coordinated the defence budget, so they considered the role of submarine. However, submarine is still powerful weapon system because she can secretly navigate under the water, and one of the most important force in the navy. The aim of this thesis is analyzing submarine roles in each naval warfare and integrating maritime strategy and weapon system technology into her roles. First, the research about represent submarine roles like anti-surfaceship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, land attack, supporting special operation and mine landing warfare will be presented, then the major naval warfare where submarine participated(during ex-World War I, World War I, World War II, The Cold War Era and post Cold War) and the analyzing of submarine roles by time will be presented. Submarine was developed for anti-surfaceship warfare during ex-World War I but could not make remarkable military gain in naval warfare because her performance and weapon was inadequate. However, the effective value of submarine in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare was shown during World War I and World War II. The major powers put battleships into naval warfare undiscriminatingly to command the sea power and submarines did massive damage to enemy navy power, so put a restraint the maritime power of enemy, and blocked the sea lanes for war material. After World War II, the battlefield situation changed rapidly and the concept of preemption became difficult to apply in naval warfare. Therefore, the submarine was unable to concentrate on anti-surfaceship mission. Especially during the Cold War era, nuclear submarine came to appear and her weapon system developed rapidly. These development gave submarines special missions: anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering. At that time, United States and Soviet submarines tracked other nation's submarines loaded with nuclear weapons and departing from naval their base. The submarines also collected information on the volume of ships and a coastal missile launching site in company with this mission. After Cold War, the major powers despatched forces to major troubled regions to maintain world peace, their submarines approached the shores of these regions and attacked key enemy installations with cruise missiles. At that time, the United States eased the concept of preemption and made the concept of Bush doctrine because of possible 911 terrorism. The missiles fired from submarines and surface battleships accurately attacked key enemy installations. Many nations be strategically successful depending on what kind of mission a submarine is assigned. The patterns of future naval warfare that my country will provide against will be military power projection and coalition/joint operations. These suggest much more about what future missions we should assign to submarines.