• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.44
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• pp.655-688
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• 2013

Most of all the transfer of undertakings in such a service provision business as labour-intensive operation creates uncertainty of employment, aggravates terms of employment and breaks a trade union. However there are no regulations in Korea to protect employees from these undesirable situations. On the other hand Great Britain has introduced the concept of a transfer of undertakings by service provision change in 2006. It was intended to remove or at least alleviate the uncertainties and difficulties created by the need under TUPE 1981 and EU Directive to establish a transfer of a stable economic identity which retained its identity in the hands of the alleged transferee. In contrast to the words used to define transfer in the 1981 Regulations 'service provision change' is a wholly new statutory concept and distinguished from the economic entity. The new provisions seems to be straightforwards and the circumstances in which service provision change is established are clearly set out in Regulations. In this context there is no need for a judicially prescribed multi-factorial approach, as advanced by European Court of Justice like Spijkers test. The new concept of service provision change apply even though there are some minor difference or differences between the nature of the tasks carried on after service provision change as compared with before it. A commonsense and pragmatic approach is required and It is enough only to ask whether the activities carried on by the alleged transferee are fundamentally or essentially the same as those carried out by the alleged transfer. TUPE 2006 of Great Britain far exceeding the scope of the Acquired Rights Directive is full of suggestions as a model of legislation to secure a stable employment itself and favorable and fair conditions of employment. More active efforts are needed for lawmaking to prohibit a dismissal and vary conditions of employment for the reason of the transfer of undertakings itself.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.203-234
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• 2019

The concept of denied boarding is defined in Article 2(j) of Regulation 261/2004 thus: "denied boarding means a refusal to carry passengers on a flight, although they have presented themselves for boarding under the conditions laid down in Article 3(2), except where there are reasonable grounds to deny them boarding, such as reasons of health, safety or security, or inadequate travel documentation." So far as relevant to this case, to be entitled to compensation, if denied boarding, Article 3(2) provides a passenger must first come within the scope of the protection of the Regulation, which applies under the following conditions: "${\cdots}$.that passengers (a) have a confirmed reservation on the flight concerned and, except in the case of cancellation referred to in Article 5, present themselves for check-in, as stipulated and at the time indicated in advance and in writing (including by electronic means) by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, or, if no time is indicated, not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time." This paper reviews the EU Cases such as Rodríguez Cachafeiro v. Iberia [2012] Case C-321/11; Finnair Oyj v. Timy Lassooy [2012] Case C-22/11; Caldwell v. easyJet Airline Co. Ltd. [2015] ScotSC 64. ECJ and Sheriff court of Scotland held that the concept of denied boarding, within the meaning of Articles 2(j) and 4 of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation No 295/91, must be interpreted as relating not only to cases where boarding is denied because of overbooking but also to those where boarding is denied on other grounds, such as operational reasons. Also, ECJ ruled that Articles 2(j) and 4(3) must be interpreted as meaning that the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances resulting in an air carrier rescheduling flights after those circumstances arose cannot give grounds for denying boarding on those later flights or for exempting that carrier from its obligation, under Article 4(3) of that regulation, to compensate a passenger to whom it denies boarding on such a flight.