• 한국기술혁신학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국기술혁신학회 2010년도 추계 학술대회 논문집
• /
• pp.203-212
• /
• 2010

Examining the relation between market structure and the value of innovation is important for competition and STI policy. If the value is large in a specific industry structure, government may lead the industry to take that form to enhance innovation. Our simple calibration in the case of linear demand and constant MC results in the conclusion that the incentive for R&D in the case of major and minor innovation in Cournot competition is less than that of merger and cooperative R&D. This emphasizes again "necessary evil" as a monopoly for innovation.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제8권4호
• /
• pp.675-685
• /
• 2013

Generation capacities and transmission line constraints in a competitive electricity market make it troublesome to compute Nash Equilibrium (NE) for analyzing participants' strategic generation quantities. The NE can cause a mixed strategy NE rather than a pure strategy NE resulting in a more complicated computation of NE, especially in a multiplayer game. A two-level hierarchical optimization problem is used to model competition among multiple participants. There are difficulties in using a mathematical programming approach to solve a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents heuristics applied to the mathematical programming method for dealing with the constraints on generation capacities and transmission line flows. A new formulation based on the heuristics is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the heuristics and the newly-formulated equations.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제53권5호
• /
• pp.302-307
• /
• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제53권6호
• /
• pp.350-357
• /
• 2004

In a deregulated electricity generation market, the sufficient capacity of transmission lines will promote the competition among generation companies (Gencos). In this paper, we show that Gencos' possession of rights to collect congestion rents may increase the competition effects of the transmission lines. In order for concrete analysis on this effect, a simple symmetric market model is introduced. In this framework, introducing the transmission right to the Gencos has the same strategic effects as increasing the line capacity of the transmission line. Moreover, the amount of effectively increased line capacity is equal to the amount of the line rights. We also show that the asymmetric share of the financial transmission rights may result in an asymmetric equilibrium even for symmetric firms and markets. We also demonstrate these aspects in equal line rights model and single firm line rights model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to show the basic idea of the proposed paper.

• 기술혁신학회지
• /
• 제14권2호
• /
• pp.246-259
• /
• 2011

시장구조와 혁신의 가치간 관계를 구명하는 것은 경쟁과 STI 정책수행에 중요하다. 만일 혁신의 가치가 특정 시장구조에서 상승된다면 정부는 해당 산업의 시장구조를 변화시킬 수 있다. 선형수요와 고정된 한계비용의 경우, 꾸르노 경쟁에서의 major와 minor 기술혁신에 대한 인센티브가 합병과 공동 연구개발의 경우보다 더 작다는 결과를 단순한 캘리브레이션을 통해 도출할 수 있다. 이는 또다시 독점이 필요악임을 시사한다.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
• /
• 제25권3호
• /
• pp.351-376
• /
• 2016

본 논문은 공기업과 사기업이 혼재된 혼합복점시장을 대상으로 환경오염을 고려한 최적 오염세와 후생효과를 분석하였다. 상품차별화된 시장에서 두 기업이 생산량 경쟁과 가격 경쟁을 동시 게임과 순차 게임으로 진행하는 경우를 각각 분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 생산량 경쟁이나 가격 경쟁 또는 동시 게임이나 순차 게임에 관계없이 최적 오염세는 항상 한계오염비용보다 작다. 둘째, 최적 오염세의 크기를 비교하면 생산량 경쟁에서는 사기업 선도모형에서 가장 높고, 가격 경쟁에서는 공기업 선도모형에서 가장 높다. 셋째, 동시 게임과 사기업 선도 모형에서 생산량 경쟁이 가격 경쟁보다 환경을 악화시키는 반면, 공기업 선도모형은 가격 경쟁이 생산량 경쟁보다 환경을 악화시킨다. 마지막으로 동시 게임이나 공기업 선도모형에서 가격 경쟁이 생산량 경쟁보다 후생을 높이는 반면, 사기업 선도모형은 생산량 경쟁이 가격 경쟁보다 후생을 높인다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
• /
• pp.775-777
• /
• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제52권6호
• /
• pp.347-353
• /
• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제52권10호
• /
• pp.616-623
• /
• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
• /
• 제52권11호
• /
• pp.668-674
• /
• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.