• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.5
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• pp.302-307
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• 2004

As deregulation of power industry is becoming a reality, there has been an intense interest in the strategic bidding for suppliers to maximize their profits. The profit gained by a supplier is related not only to its energy-price bid curve but also to its submitted operational parameters such as generation capacity, etc. So suppliers are willing to use those strategic parameters that can be manipulated by themselves and are effective to their profit. This paper deals with the competition model with compound strategies: generation capacity and bidding curve. The parameter space is modeled by dividing into the two strategies, so the problem is made up of the four types of sub-game in a two player game. This paper analyzes the global Nash Equilibrium (NE) over the whole divisions by computing the sub-game NEs in some divisions and by deriving the best response curves which have discontinuities in other divisions. The global NE is shown to correspond to the Cournot NE where the quantity variable is realized by a constraints of a generation capacity.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.14 no.12
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• pp.1549-1558
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• 2011

In this paper, we address the problem of bandwidth sharing among multiple primary users and multiple secondary users in a cognitive radio network. In cognitive radio networks, effective spectrum assignment for primary and secondary users is a challenge due to the available broad range of radio frequency spectrum as well as the requisition of harmonious coexistence of both users. To handle this problem, firstly, Bertrand game model is used to analyze a spectrum pricing in which multiple primary users emulate with each other to acquire maximal profit. After that, we employ Cournot game to model the spectrum sharing of secondary users to obtain optimal profit for each user also. Simulation results show that our scheme obtains optimal solution at Nash equilibrium.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.347-353
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• 2003

In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.45-56
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• 1994

This paper the profit maximizing order quantity model to the symmetric oligopoly consisting of sellers of a homogeneous product who compete with each other for the same potential buyers. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal purchase quantity in response to the nonlinear quantity discount pricing schedule given by the sellers. Symmetric equilibrium and the economic quantities that sellers must determine are analysed in a Cournot framework, which explicitly depend on the number of sellers. Economic implications are obtianed from the optimality conditions based on themarket share paraments which are used to characterize the competitior's marketing strategy.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.46-58
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• 2019

Purpose - This paper analyzes how Research and Development (R&D) cartelization and Research Joint Ventures (RJV) affect firms that engage in Cournot competition in their product market using a model in which the Home and Foreign firm produce differentiated products and export their total output to a third country's market. Design/Methodology - In a two-stage game, research expenditures incurred in the first stage improve product quality and are subject to various degrees of spillovers. We consider four different scenarios. Findings - In a symmetric equilibrium we observe the following: (i) an RJV that cooperates in R&D decision yields the highest R&D expenditure. However, the scenario which yields the lowest expenditure depends on the extent of differentiation between the goods and the degree of spillovers; (ii) RJV cartelization yields the highest product quality, output, and consumer surplus in the third country; however, the lowest is produced by R&D competition if spillovers are strong and by R&D cartelization if spillovers are weak; and (iii) each firm's profit is at its minimum in R&D competition and its maximum in RJV cartelization. Furthermore, if spillovers are strong, the profit of each firm in R&D cartelization is greater than that in RJV competition, and vice versa. Originality/value - By analyzing product innovation in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between process R&D and product R&D in international markets.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

Traditionally, tariffs have been used to protect domestic industries. In particular, a country with more bargaining power makes a punitive threat to maintain a certain level of market share in the market of other country. In this paper, we study the effect of punitive tariffs on an irrelevant industry. In particular, when a country tries to achieve a market share or quantity target in an industry, we examine the effect of threats to impose tariffs on the major export of another industries which are irrelevant to the targeted industry. Using a simple duopoly model, we show that there is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium which supports that a country has an incentive to resolve a trade dispute voluntarily to protect its major export industry under the credible treat of punitive tariffs. This result is mainly due to the fact that the trade policy of a country concerns the aggregate benefits from trade over all its export industries. To obtain this result, this paper employs the linkage between the targeted and irrelevant industries by using the lobby of the irrelevant industry to curb the targeted industry. A lot of recent bilateral trade agreements can be applied to our results.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.10
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• pp.616-623
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.11
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• pp.668-674
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• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.58 no.8
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• pp.1496-1503
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• 2009

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. In order to fulfil the commitments of the countries in an economically efficient way, the UNFCCC adapted the emission trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol. If the UNFCCC's scheme is enforced in the country, considerable changes in electric power industry are expected due to the imposed greenhouse gas emission reduction. This paper proposes a game theoretic model of the case when generation companies participate in both competitive electricity market and emission market simultaneously. The model is designed such that generation companies select strategically between power quantity and greenhouse gas reduction to maximize their profits in both markets. Demand function and Environmental Welfare of emission trading market is proposed in this model. From the simulation results using the proposed model the impact of the emission trading on generation companies seems very severe in case that the emission prices are significantly high.