• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.7 s.78
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• pp.99-106
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• 2004

This paper presents some comparisons between Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg game in bi-level program, composed of both upper level program and lower level one. The upper level can be formulated to optimize a specific objective function, while the lower formulated to express travelers' behavior patterns corresponding to the design parameter of upper level problem. This kind of hi-level program is to determine a design parameter, which leads the road network to an optimal state. Bi-level program includes traffic signal control, traffic information provision, congestion charge and new transportation mode introduction as well as road expansion. From the view point of game theory, many existing algorithms for bi-level program such as IOA (Iterative Optimization Assignment) or IEA (Iterative Estimation Assignment) belong to Cournot-Nash game. But sensitivity-based algorithms belongs to Stackelberg one because they consider the reaction of the lower level program. These two game models would be compared by using an example network and show some results that there is no superiority between the models in deterministic case, but in stochastic case Stackelberg approach is better than that of Cournot-Nash one as we expect.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.2
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• pp.79-87
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• 2005

At present Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in oligopoly market. But there exist several problems to apply this model to electricity market. The representative one is to obtain the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to accomplish maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears on the long-term basis through the statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.403-411
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• 2005

At present, the Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in an oligopoly type market. However, several problems exist in the successful application of this model to the electricity market. The representative one is obtaining the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In the Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to obtain maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect the real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears over the long-term through statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as the trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.896-898
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• 2005

게임이론에서의 기본적인 Cournot Model과 같은 형태는 실제 전력 시장에서의 복잡성을 모두 반영하지는 못한다. Pool 기반 전력시장에서의 송전과 가격 결정은 명백하게 전송 제약뿐만 아니라 ancillary service의 상호간의 최적화도 고려되어야하기 때문이다. 이 논문은 다중재화의 상호간 최적화를 다루는 다중시장의 Cournot Model을 확장시킨 모델의 해석과 사례연구를 논한다. 사례연구로는 제주도 전력 시장의 형태를 적용시켜 2개 발전사업자가 2개의 상품을 가지고 경쟁할 때의 최적화를 MATLAB을 이용하여 구현해본다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07d
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• pp.3108-3110
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• 2005

게임이론에서의 기본적인 Cournot Model과 같은 형태는 실제 전력 시장에서의 복잡성을 모두 반영하지는 못한다. Pool 기반 전력시장에서의 송전과 가격 결정은 명백하게 전송 제약뿐만 아니라 ancillary service의 상호간의 최적화도 고려되어야하기 때문이다. 이 논문은 다중재화의 상호간 최적화를 다루는 다중시장의 Cournot Model을 확장시킨 모델의 해석과 사례연구를 논한다. 사례연구로는 제주도 전력 시장의 형태를 적용시켜 2개 발전사업자가 2개의 상품을 가지고 경쟁할 때의 최적화를 MATLAB을 이용하여 구현해본다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07c
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• pp.2456-2458
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• 2005

게임이론에서의 기본적인 Cournot Model과 같은 형태는 실제 전력 시장에서의 복잡성을 모두 반영하지는 못한다. Pool 기반 전력시장에서의 송전과 가격결정은 명백하게 전송 제약뿐만 아니라 ancillary service의 상호간의 최적화도 고려되어야하기 때문이다. 이 논문은 다중재화의 상호간 최적화를 다루는 다중시장의 Cournot Model을 확장시킨 모델의 해석과 사례연구를 논한다. 사례연구로는 제주도 전력 시장의 형태를 적용시켜 2개 발전사업자가 2개의 상품을 가지고 경쟁할 때의 최적화를 MATLAB을 이용하여 구현해본다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07b
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• pp.1814-1816
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• 2005

게임이론에서의 기본적인 Cournot Model과 같은 형태는 실제 전력 시장에서의 복잡성을 모두 반영하지는 못한다. Pool 기반 전력시장에서의 송전과 가격결정은 명백하게 전송 제약뿐만 아니라 ancillary service의 상호간의 최적화도 고려되어야하기 때문이다. 이 논문은 다중재화의 상호간 최적화를 다루는 다중시장의 Cournot Model을 확장시킨 모델의 해석과 사례연구를 논한다. 사례연구로는 제주도 전력 시장의 형태를 적용시켜 2개 발전사업자가 2개의 상품을 가지고 경쟁할 때의 최적화를 MATLAB을 이용하여 구현해본다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.11b
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• pp.168-170
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• 2005

At present Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in oligopoly market. But there exist several problems to apply this model to electricity market. The representative one is to obtain the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to accomplish maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears on the long-term basis through the statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.379-384
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• 2014

This paper proposes a Cournot model that can be used to analyze the strategic behaviors of generation companies which try to maximize their profits in an imperfectly competitive electricity and carbon markets. The proposed model consists of two parts. First, the strategic behaviors of generation companies are modeled based on the Cournot theory. Second, the market operation is modeled based on the assumption that the market operator tries to maximize the total social welfare in consideration of environmental welfare. To find the Nash equilibrium of the proposed model, the two-level optimization technique is used. The proposed method has been applied to an illustrative example of oligopolistic markets. We found that the proposed method has strong potential to analyze the influence of the strategic biddings of the generation companies and the impact of renewable generator on markets where the competitiveness of the markets is not fully developed.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.1 no.3
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• pp.133-142
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• 2012

Cournot model is one of representative models among many game theoretic approaches available for analyzing competitive market models. Recent years have witnessed various kinds of attempts to model competitive electricity markets using the Cournot model. Cournot model is appropriate for oligopoly market which is one characteristic of electric power industry requiring huge amount of capital investment. When we use Cournot model for the application to electricity market, it is prerequisite to assume the downward sloping demand curve in the right direction. Generators in oligopoly market could try to maximize their profit by exercising the market power like physical or economic withholding. However advanced electricity markets also have demand side bidding which makes it possible for the demand to respond to the high market price by reducing their consumption. Considering this kind of demand reaction, Generators couldn't abuse their market power. Instead, they try to find out an equilibrium point which is optimal for both sides, generators and demand. This paper suggest a quantitative analysis between market variables based on econometrics for estimating demand responses in smart grid environment.