• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.220-227
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• 2018

The cooperative game theory consists of a set of players and utility function that has positive values for a subset of players, called coalition, in the game. The purpose of cost allocation method is to allocate the relevant cost among game players in a fair and rational way. Therefore, cost allocation method based on cooperative game theory has been applied in many areas for fair and reasonable cost allocation. On the other hand, the desirable characteristics of the cost allocation method are Pareto optimality, rationality, and marginality. Pareto optimality means that costs are entirely paid by participating players. Rationality means that by joining the grand coalition, players do not pay more than they would if they chose to be part of any smaller coalition of players. Marginality means that players are charged at least enough to cover their marginal costs. If these characteristics are all met, the solution of cost allocation method exists in the core. In this study, proportional method is applied to EOQ inventory game and EPQ inventory game with shortage. Proportional method is a method that allocates costs proportionally to a certain allocator. This method has been applied to a variety of problems because of its convenience and simple calculations. However, depending on what the allocator is used for, the proportional method has a weakness that its solution may not exist in the core. Three allocators such as demand, marginal cost, and cost are considered. We prove that the solution of the proportional method to demand and the proportional method to marginal cost for EOQ game and EPQ game with shortage is in the core. The counterexample also shows that the solution of the proportional method to cost does not exist in the core.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.105-121
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• 2019

This study applies diverse game theories to the US-China Trade War. The US-China Trade War can be analyzed as a game situation because the strategic decision-making process to maximize one's profit while considering the reaction of the other party is a game situation. However, related research suffered from some mistakes in applying the US-China Trade War as it is to classic game theory, because while the prisoners dilemma is based on the situation of No Communication, No Trust, No Cooperation, the US-China Trade War has a precondition different from that of prisoners dilemma, since it mutually communicates information and negotiation is repeated several times in a cooperative situation. The result of the trade negotiation will likely end as 'cooperate-cooperate'. Further, considering trade volume, trade interdependence, bargaining power based on economy, and the scale of damage caused by the Trade War, the US-China Trade War is progressing with the bargaining power of the US being higher than that of China. Since the current US-China Trade War is in an asymmetrical situation under the dominant bargaining power of the US, it is likely to reach 'US defect-China cooperative' in the long run.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.266-276
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• 2011

In wireless networks, it is well-known that intermediate nodes can be used as cooperative relays to reduce the transmission energy required to reliably deliver a message to an intended destination. When the network is under a central authority, energy allocations and cooperative pairings can be assigned to optimize the overall energy efficiency of the network. In networks with autonomous selfish nodes, however, nodes may not be willing to expend energy to relay messages for others. This problem has been previously addressed through the development of extrinsic incentive mechanisms, e.g., virtual currency, or the insertion of altruistic nodes in the network to enforce cooperative behavior. This paper considers the problem of how selfish nodes can decide on an efficient energy allocation and endogenously form cooperative partnerships in wireless networks without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes. Using tools from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, the three main contributions of this paper are (i) the development of Pareto-efficient cooperative energy allocations that can be agreed upon by selfish nodes, based on axiomatic bargaining techniques, (ii) the development of necessary and sufficient conditions under which "natural" cooperation is possible in systems with fading and non-fading channels without extrinsic incentive mechanisms or altruistic nodes, and (iii) the development of techniques to endogenously form cooperative partnerships without central control. Numerical results with orthogonal amplify-and-forward cooperation are also provided to quantify the energy efficiency of a wireless network with sources selfishly allocating transmission/relaying energy and endogenously forming cooperative partnerships with respect to a network with centrally optimized energy allocations and pairing assignments.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.25-31
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• 2018

In this paper, we consider the game theoretic approach to investigate the transmit power optimization problem where D2D users share the uplink of the cellular system. Especially, we formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. In the user wide sense, each user may try to select its transmit power level so as to maximize its utility in a selfish way. In the system wide, the transmit power levels of all users eventually converge to the unique point, called Nash Equilibrium. We first formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. Next, we examine the existence of Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we present the numerical example that shows the convergence to the unique transmit power level.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.39B no.11
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• pp.771-778
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• 2014

We propose Femto-cell power control scheme in HeNet with Game Theory. The Femto-cell which provide high quality with low power is issued by many benefits, however there is a bunch of interferences when many Femto-cells use overlapped bandwidth with Macro-cell. We defined base station of cellular networks and mobile users as players of Game Theory, and configured interference effect among each other as power utility function. Futhermore, we showed enhanced overall system performance, lower power usage and interference decrease by using optimal power.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.24 no.7
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• pp.79-85
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• 2019

We investigate the D2D utility maximization in the cellular system. We focus on the non cooperative game theoretic approach to maximize the individual utility. Cellular system's perspective, interference from the D2D links must be limited to protect the cellular users. To accommodate this interference issue, utility function is first defined to control the individual D2D user's transmit power. More specifically, utility function includes the pricing which limits the individual D2D user's transmit power. Then, non cooperative power game is formulated to maximize the individual utility. Distributed algorithm is proposed to maximize the individual utility, while limiting the interference. Convergence of the proposed distributed algorithm is verified through computer simulation. Also the effect of pricing factor to SIR and interference is provided to show the performance of the proposed distributed algorithm.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.159-179
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• 2024

Based on the case of collaboration between large companies and startups, this study suggests the importance of establishing mutual cooperation and trust relationships for the success of open innovation strategy from the perspective of cooperative game theory. It also provides implications for how this can be implemented. Due to information asymmetry and differences in organizational culture and decision-making structures between large companies and startups, collaboration is likely to proceed in the form of non-cooperative games among players in general open innovation, leading to the paradox of open innovation, which lowers the degree of innovation. Accordingly, this study conducted a case study on collaboration between large company 'G' and startup 'S' based on the research question "How did we successfully promote open innovation through cooperative game-type collaboration?" The study found that successful open innovation requires (1) setting clear collaboration goals to solve the organizational problem between large companies and startups, (2) supporting human resources for qualitative growth of startups to solve reliability problems, (3) leading to strategic investment and joint promotion of new projects to solve the profit distribution problem. This study is significant in that it contributes to expanding the discussion of the success factors of open innovation to the importance of interaction and strategic judgment considering the organizational culture and decision-making structure among players, and empirically confirming the success conditions of open innovation from the perspective of cooperative game theory.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.18C no.2
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• pp.97-102
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• 2011

Since the game theory provides a theoretical ground to distribute a shared resource between demanding users in a fair and efficient manner, it has been used for the bandwidth allocation problem in a network. However, the bandwidth allocation schemes with different game theory assign different amount of bandwidth in the same operational environments. However, only the mathematical framework is adopted when a bandwidth allocation scheme is devised without quantitatively comparing the results when they applied to the bandwidth allocation problem. Thus, in this paper, we compare the characteristics of the bandwidth allocation schemes using the bankrupt game theory and the bargaining game theory when they applied to the situation where nodes are competing for the bandwidth in a network. Based on the numerical results, we suggest the future research direction.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• v.26 no.1_2
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• pp.337-347
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• 2008

Based on social welfare maximum theory, the optimal scale of power plants entering generation power market being is researched. A static non-cooperative game model for short-term optimization of power plants with different cost is presented. And the equilibrium solutions and the total social welfare are obtained. According to principle of maximum social welfare selection, the optimization model is solved, optimal number of power plants entering the market is determined. The optimization results can not only increase the customer surplus and improve power production efficiency, but also sustain normal profits of power plants and scale economy of power production, and the waste of resource can also be avoided. At last, case results show that the proposed model is efficient.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.44 no.2
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• pp.215-221
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• 2024

The government is encouraging the expansion of renewable energy facilities through national renewable energy policy. However, the installation of renewable energy generation facilities has led to local resident complaints due to landscape degradation, electromagnetic wave emission, real estate devaluation, and environmental pollution. This creates conflicts between power project developers and residents, making the progress of projects more difficult. This study applies non-cooperative game theory to analyze eight cases of renewable energy projects where conflicts between developers and residents were resolved through resident's investment participation. By accepting investments from local stakeholders, residents achieved returns ranging from a maximum of 25 % to a minimum of 4.1 %. It was found through game theory analysis that a dominant strategy involves residents agreeing to the development of the project and the developers sharing a portion of the profits with the residents. The analysis results show that the point where dominant strategy meet forms a Nash equilibrium, and at the same time becomes the Pareto optimal point, benefiting both power generation operators and residents.