• Korean Journal of Comparative Education
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.1-24
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• 2012

This comparative study attempts to explore in what politico-social context 'Education Welfare Invest Priority Zone Plan' has been developed and to find politico-social implications of Korean EWIPZP through critically comparing the cases of UK and France. Korean financial crisis brought up the importance of 'Education Welfare' turning into a concrete system, 'EWIPZP' in 2003. This educational welfare policy has expanded since 2005 up to now by the changed name of 'Education Welfare Priority Plan' in 2008, that is structurally different from the original framework which was to support schools in educationally disadvantaged areas. Even the cases of EAZ in UK and ZEP in France started by progressive political parties and established on the ground of 'equity' philosophy, turned into the excellence-based equality policy confronting with the harsh condition of neo-liberalistic global economy under the conservative regime. So does Korea under the critics against this tendency. Comparing Korean case with the cases in UK and France, the current Education Welfare Priority Policy in Korea should be back to the original principle of educational equity and transform into the bottom-up bilateral cooperation model from the top-down model by the authorized party itself in order not to be manipulated politically.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
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• v.43 no.1
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• pp.108-119
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• 2015

Recently, the ways in which individual communities own and manage parks have been both discussed and realized in America and England. Some benefits of these asset transfers are that local governments can reduce the financial cost of management as well as improve the service of the parks. In addition, communities can develop these parks as unique assets. Ultimately, this is a new understanding of parks as community commons. This study examines the policy of park asset transfers to communities in England. These transfers, which involve reallocating land and building management and/or ownership from the public sector to a community group, are part of a policy agenda known as "Big Society", which aims to create a "small government" within a "big society". The agenda is pursued by both the English Conservative and Unionist Party governments. Eight case studies of community park asset transfers in England were examined in this study, under three categories-transfer process, partnership among stakeholders, and financial structure-and synthesized along three issues-financial contribution, level of public transparency, and closeness of the relationship between park and community. In some cases, new community groups were created specifically to receive park assets, while in other communities, existing groups became the park trustees. For most parks, community groups raise park maintenance funding through diverse methods; however, these groups are often not entirely financially independent from local government. Thus, many park trustees have already created, or are planning to create, other assets from which parks can benefit. Second, some efforts for public transparency include trusts that are registered as charities, of which their public nature is admitted officially. These trusts resolve important decisions through boards of trustees, in an effort to promote income-generating business while not excluding users. Ultimately, a close relationship between park and community empowers the community to participate in managing and maintaining the park; in turn, the park's capacities are improved. Current struggles include the many limits involved in communities accepting ownership and management of a park, and a lack of local government experience regarding public-private management and maintenance of a public asset. This study, however, details interesting policy implications for Korean community involvement as well as diverse financial methods to facilitate park management.

• Land and Housing Review
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.51-65
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• 2021

There were strong criticisms against the joint development method: the redevelopment corporation and developers would achieve the whole development profit. The existing tenants who lost their housing in the site argued their right to reside in the site after the development was completed. There was also strong political pressure that the Roh Tae-woo governing administration should resolve the social inequality caused by the situation. In such circumstances, it was introduced that a certain proportion of public rental housing should be built in the redevelopment site; then the government took over the dwellings at a price of construction and allocated them to the existing tenants. The aims of this paper are to understand the rationale behind the inclusion of the public rental housing in the redevelopment sites; and to investigate to what extent the legislation was implemented appropriately. Although the legislation was introduced in Seoul from August 1989, it was not until May 2005 when it was implemented nationwide. At the beginning, there was an ambiguous rule that the number of public housing to be included should be limited to the number of households who would want to remain in the redeveloped site. In 2005 the Seoul metropolitan authority introduced a mandatory proportion; 17% of the total housing delivered in the site should be public rental homes. Since then the proportion. The proportion has been fluctuated by the political agenda of each ruling party: the conservative tended to reduce the proportion, whilst the opposition parties increased the proportion. Currently the proportion is 20% of the total stock to be built. Initially the size of the public housing was exceptionally small- less than 40 m² but it has increased up to 60 m² since 2010. The rental price was reasonably lower than market rent. The competition toward redevelopment rental housing that are vacant due to move or death of tenants was very high; it was given to one household out of nine eligible households in 2020.