• 제목/요약/키워드: Compliance and verification mechanism

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Compliance and Verification Mechanism of STCW'95 and Its Implementation in China

  • Hao, Yong
    • 한국항해항만학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 한국항해항만학회 2000년도 Proceeding of CIN-KIN Joint Symposium 2000 on M.E.T. Under STCW 78/95 and SINO-KOREA MARITIME CONTACT IN MID-CENTURIES
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    • pp.33-40
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    • 2000
  • To improve the compliance and verification mechanism is one of the important reasons to revise the STCW Convention. The mechanism includes the assessment of competence, control, precision of description of competence, quality standard system, communication of information and so on. Chinese seaman's education an training institute & the organization of evaluating and issuing certificates should enhance realizing the importance of compliance and verification mechanism and carry out it down to earth. The current work that should be reinforced is to control the qualified evaluation effectively.

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유니버설 디자인 관점에서 본 국내 시도 교육청의 웹 접근성 실태에 관한 연구 (A Study on Web Accessibility Status of Metropolitan and Provincial Offices of Education from the Universal Design View)

  • 서미라
    • 디지털융복합연구
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    • 제11권5호
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    • pp.405-410
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    • 2013
  • 2008년 장애인 차별금지 및 권리구제 등에 관한 법률의 시행으로 웹 접근성이 법적으로 의무화한 결과, 중앙행정기관이나 지방자치단체 등 공공부문을 대상으로 웹 접근성 준수 수준에 대해 실태 조사한 결과 매년 향상되고 있는 것으로 조사되었다. 하지만 이러한 법적 제도 장치는 장애인에 대한 편의성 증진에 초점이 맞춰져 있어, 모든 사용자를 만족하게 한다는 유니버설 디자인 개념에는 맞지 않는다. 이에 본 연구는 유니버설 디자인 개념을 도입한 웹 접근성 지침(UD-WCAG)을 통해 국내 17개 시도 교육청 홈페이지의 웹 접근성 실태를 조사하였다. 실태조사는 한국정보문화진흥원의 자가진단 도구를 통한 검증, 유니버설 디자인 개념을 도입한 웹 접근성 지침(UD-WCAG)을 통한 검증, 스크린리더를 사용한 검증 등 총 3단계로 진행되었으며, 자가진단 도구를 통한 검증에 비해 UD-WCAG을 통한 조사결과가 전반적으로 준수율이 낮은 것으로 조사되었다.

정보보안 정책 및 제재 인식이 공정성을 통해 준수 의도에 미치는 영향: 공정 민감성의 역할 (The Impact of IS Policy and Sanction Perceptions on Compliance Intention through Justice: The Role of Justice Sensitivity)

  • 황인호
    • 한국전자통신학회논문지
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    • 제18권2호
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    • pp.337-348
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    • 2023
  • 조직의 정보 자산에 대한 보호가 조직의 지속가능성에 영향을 주면서, 조직들은 체계적인 정보 자산관리 및 보호를 위한 정책, 규정, 그리고 기술 등에 대한 투자를 높이고 있다. 본 연구는 조직 내 도입된 정보보안 정책을 실제 업무에 적용하는 조직원의 관점에서 보안 준수에 미치는 영향을 확인한다. 특히, 본 연구는 억제 이론 확장의 관점에서 정보보안 정책 인식, 제재의 방식, 공정성, 그리고 정보보안 준수로 이어지는 메커니즘을 밝힌다. 본 연구는 정보보안 규정을 업무에 적용한 조직의 근로자를 대상으로 확보된 316개의 표본을 적용하였으며, AMOS 및 SPSS 패키지를 활용하여 메커니즘의 연관 관계를 확인하였다. 가설 검증 결과, 정보보안 정책 인식이 제재의 심각성과 명확성을 통해 조직 공정성 및 준수 의도를 높이는 것을 확인하였으며, 개인의 공정 민감성이 공정의 원인과 결과의 과정에 조절 효과를 가지는 것을 확인하였다. 본 연구에서 확인한 제재의 영향 메커니즘은 조직내부의 보안 행동 수준 강화를 추구하는 조직에서 조직원의 참여 증진을 위한 방법 마련에 도움을 줄 것으로 기대한다.

조직의 정보보안 목표 설정과 공정성이 보안정책 준수의도에 미치는 영향 (A Study on the Influence of Organizational Information Security Goal Setting and Justice on Security Policy Compliance Intention)

  • 황인호;김승욱
    • 디지털융복합연구
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    • 제16권2호
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    • pp.117-126
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    • 2018
  • 전 세계적인 정보보안 위협의 증대에 따라 조직들은 보다 전문화된 정보보안 정책 및 시스템을 도입 및 활용에 투자 비중을 높이고 있다. 정보보안은 보안 시스템 및 정책을 이행하는 조직원들의 참여가 무엇보다 필요하며, 조직 내부의 보안 수준을 높이기 위해서는 조직원들의 정보보안 준수의도 향상을 위한 조직의 체계적인 지원이 무엇보다 필요하다. 본 연구는 정보보안 분야에 공정성이론과 목표설정이론을 적용하여 조직원의 정보보안 준수의도를 높이기 위한 매커니즘을 찾는다. 즉, 보안정책 목표설정이 조직원들의 보안관련 공정성 인식수준에 긍정적인 영향을 미치고, 공정성은 준수의도에 긍정적인 영향을 미친다는 연구모델 기반 가설 검증을 실시한다. 연구대상은 정보보안 정책을 도입한 조직의 조직원들이며, 설문조사를 통하여 유효샘플 383개를 수집하였다. 연구가설 검증은 구조방정식 모델링을 실시하였다. 보안정책 목표 요인(목표 난이도, 목표 구체성)이 조직원의 보안관련 공정성 인식을 높이며, 보안관련 공정성(분배, 절차, 그리고 정보 공정성)이 준수의도에 긍정적 영향을 주는 것으로 나타났다. 결과는 조직의 보안 정책에 대한 조직원들의 준수의도 향상을 위한 전략적 접근 방향을 제시한다.

국내 하수처리시설에 인공지능기술 적용을 위한 사례 연구 (The Case Studies of Artificial Intelligence Technology for apply at The Sewage Treatment Plant)

  • 김태우;이호식
    • 한국물환경학회지
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    • 제35권4호
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    • pp.370-378
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    • 2019
  • In the recent years, various studies have presented stable and economic methods for increased regulations and compliance in sewage treatment plants. In some sewage treatment plants, the effluent concentration exceeded the regulations, or the effluent concentration was manipulated. This indicates that the process is currently inefficient to operate and control sewage treatment plants. The operation and control method of sewage treatment plant is mathematically dealing with a physical and chemical mechanism for the anticipated situation during operation. In addition, there are some limitations, such as situations that are different from the actual sewage treatment plant. Therefore, it is necessary to find a more stable and economical way to enhance the operational and control method. AI (Artificial Intelligence) technology is selected among various methods. There are very few cases of applying and utilizing AI technology in domestic sewage treatment plants. In addition, it failed to define specific definitions of applying AI technologies. The purpose of this study is to present the application of AI technology to domestic sewage treatment plants by comparing and analyzing various cases. This study presented the AI technology algorithm system, verification method, data collection, energy and operating costs as methods of applying AI technology.

TPS: TPM 및 파일 가상화를 통한 개인정보보호 자동화 시스템 디자인 및 구현 (Design and Implementation of an Automated Privacy Protection System over TPM and File Virtualization)

  • 정혜림;안성규;김문성;박기웅
    • 한국차세대컴퓨팅학회논문지
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    • 제13권2호
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    • pp.7-17
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    • 2017
  • 본 논문에서는 TPM(Trusted Platform Module) 기반의 개인정보보호 자동화 시스템, TPS(TPM-enhanced Privacy Protection System)를 제안한다. TPS는 클라이언트 내 저장된 문서 중 개인정보를 포함하는 문서를 주기적으로 탐지하고 개인정보가 탐지된 문서를 암호화하여 서버에서 이를 관리하도록 하는데, TPM 기반의 키 관리기법 및 클라이언트 시스템의 무결성 검증을 통해 비정상 상태의 클라이언트에 대한 개인정보 포함 문서의 열람을 제한하여 보안성을 높였다. 또한 개인정보가 포함된 문서가 암호화 되어 원격 서버에 저장이 되나, 사용자에게는 일반 문서 접근과 동일한 사용자 인터페이스를 제공하기 위한 VTF(Virtual Trusted File) 인터페이스를 제안하고 이를 구현하였다. 이를 통해 TPS는 개인정보 탐지, 암호화, 원격 서버로의 저장까지의 일련의 과정을 자동 수행하도록 하여 사용자 관점에서의 개입 없이 개인정보보호법을 준수를 자동화 하는 시스템을 구현하였다.

APPLICATION OF FUZZY SET THEORY IN SAFEGUARDS

  • Fattah, A.;Nishiwaki, Y.
    • 한국지능시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 한국퍼지및지능시스템학회 1993년도 Fifth International Fuzzy Systems Association World Congress 93
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    • pp.1051-1054
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    • 1993
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

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