• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

• The Korean Journal of Nuclear Medicine Technology
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.26-29
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• 2011

Purpose: The general test method of the Korean Pharmacopeia specifies the test method on the clauses of quality control after manufacturing. According to KFDA Guidance for Medicines, standards of residual solvents regulates the maximum permissible dose of acetonitrile as 400 ppm, ethanol as 5,000 ppm, and acetic acid as 5,000 ppm. This study aims at identifying the type of resiual solvents in the final [F-18]FDG vial of an automatic synthesizer and measure its residual quantity. Materials and Methods: The center carried out residual solvents test of [F-18]FDG injection using Agilent Technologies 7890A with a Flame Ionization Detector. The column of Agilent Technologies 7890A used in measuring of residual solvents was CP WAX column ($30m{\times}0.53mm{\times}1.0{\mu}m$) and analysis condition was split mode 1:1 at the initial temperature $70^{\circ}C$ which was increased $20^{\circ}C/minute$ after two minutes and maintained at the final $140^{\circ}C$ for two minutes. The analysis method was as following: Firstly, ethanol-acetonitrile-acetic acid mixture was classified into four types of concentration (250-25-250 ppm, 1,000-100-1,000 ppm, 3,000-300-3,000 ppm, and 6,000-600-6,000 ppm), and $1.0{\mu}L$ of each type of concentration was injected into gas chromatography followed by an analysis of its peak domain. Then, a calibration-curve by the external standard method was drawn based on the analysis result. Results: While ethanol and acetonitrile were detected in TRACERlab MX, FASTlab had additional acetic acid. The residual quantity of the ethanol-acetonitrile-acetic acid mixture evaluated using the calibration-curve was average 72 ppm ethanol, 54 ppm acetonitrile, and 1030 ppm acetic acid for FASTlab, whereas average 439 ppm ethanol and 79 ppm acetonitrile for TRACERlab MX. This indicated that both of them were within the maximum permissible dose. Conclusion: Solvent residues in the [F-18]FDG injection were all within maximum permissible doses and proper to be used to examine a patient. The result indicated that types and quantities of solvent resides of radioactive pharmaceuticals vary depending on the automatic synthesizer.

• Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases
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• v.43 no.4
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• pp.590-599
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• 1996

Background : Bronchial artery embolization has been established as an effective means to control hemoptysis, especially in patients with decreased pulmonary function and those with advanced chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. We evaluated the effect of arterial embolization in immediate control of massive hemoptysis and investigated the clinical and angiographic characteristics and the course of patients with reccurrent hemoptysis after initial succeseful embolization. Another purpose of this study was to find predictive that cause rebleeding after bronchial artery embolization. Method : We reviewed 47 cases that underwent bronchial artery embolization for the management of massive hemoptysis, retrospectively. We analyzed angiographic findings in all cases before bronchial artery embolization and also reviewed the angiographic findings of patients that underwent additional bronchial artery embolization for the control of reccurrent hemoptysis to find the clauses of rebleeding. Results : 1) Underlying causes of hemoptysis were pulmonary tuberculosis(n=35), bronchiectasis(n=5), aspergilloma(n=2), lung cancer(n=2), pulmonary A-V malformation(n=1), and unknown cases(n=2). 2) Overal immediate success rate was 94%(n=44), an6 recurrence rate was 40%(n=19). 3) The prognostic factors such as bilaterality, systemic-pulmonary artery shunt, multiple feeding arteries and degree of neovascularity were not statistically correlated with rebleeding tendency (p value>0.05). 4) At additional bronchial artery embolization, Revealed recannalization of previous embolized arteries were 14/18cases(78%) and the presence of new deeding arteries was 8/18cases(44%). 5) The complications(31cases, 66%) such as fever, chest pain, cough, voiding difficulty, paralytic ileus, motor and sensory change of lower extremity, atelectasis and splenic infarction were occured. Conclusion : Recannalization of previous embolized arteries is the major cause of recurrence after bronchial artery embolization. Despite high recurrence rate of hemoptysis, bronchial artery embolization for management of massive hemoptysis is a effective and saute procedure in immediate bleeding control.

• Journal of Food Hygiene and Safety
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.82-88
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• 2011

The objective of this study was to investigate the extent of total sugar and sodium in 129 different kinds of bakery products, breads and cookies, sold at bakeshops in Seoul metropolitan area. The bakery products produced by bakeshops on a small scale were not applied by clauses of mandatory nutrition label for children's taste food. All types of free sugars -fructose, glucose, sucrose, lactose and maltose- were detected in breads, but only fructose and sucrose were detected in cookies. The average amount of sucrose per 100 g of breads was 6.24 g, of cookies was 30.03 g. Breads and cookies amounting to 100 g of sample contained total sugar of 11.19 g and 30.38 g, respectively. The average amounts of sodium in breads and cookies were 120.71 mg/100 g, 70.76 mg/100 g, respectively. When the contents of total sugar in breads and cookies per one serving size were compared to WHO guidelines, the percentages were 15.7% and 18.2% about recommended daily intake of total sugar of 50 g. When it come to sodium, the bakery products had range of 1.1-6.5% to 2000 mg of daily intake of sodium recommended by WHO.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.1-17
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• 2006

In the Bill of Lading of The Irbenskiy Proliv is not subject to the Hague-Visby Rules in accordance with paragraphs (A) and/or (E) of cl.1 or to the Hague Rules in accordance with paragraphs (B) and/or (D) of cl.1. The Irbenskiy Proliv is very rare case that is effective to exempt the carrier as literal words of Bill of Lading. The action concerns cargoes of perishable goods shipped from Brazil to Japan, under Bills of Lading each of which contained an extensive carrier's exemption clause. A preliminary issue was ordered to be determined on the question whether c1.4 is effective to exempt the ralliers from any potential liability for the claims in this case. The court held that there is no reason to reject c1.4 as part of each of the contracts contained in or evidenced by the bills of lading; and it protects the carrier where damage to the goods shipped results from such causes. It is therefore effective to exempt the carriers from any potential liability for those claims.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.101-118
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• 1993

Generally there is no law and liability system which applies particulary to commercial space ventures. There are several international treaties and national statutes which deal with space ventures, but their impact on the liability of commercial space ventures has not been significant. Every state law in the United States will impose both tort and contract liability on those responsible for injuries or losses caused by defective products or by services performed negligently. As with the providers of other products and services, those who participate in commercial space ventures have exposure to liability in both tort and contract which is limited to the extent of the resulting damage The manufacturer of a small and cheap component which caused a satellite to fail to reach orbit or to operate nominally has the same exposure to liability as the provider of launch vehicle or the manufacturer of satellite into which the component was incorporaded. Considering the enormity of losses which may result from launch failure or satellite failure, those participated in commercial space ventures will do their best to limit their exposure to liability by contract to the extent permitted by law. In most states of the United States, contracts which limit or disclaim the liability are enforceable with respect to claims for losses or damage to property if they are drafted in compliance with the requirements of the applicable law. In California an attempt to disclaim the liability for one's own negligence will be enforceable only if the contract states explicitly that the parties intend to have the disclaimer apply to negligence claims. Most state laws of the United States will refuse to enforce contracts which attempt to disclaim the liability for gross negligence on public policy grounds. However, the public policy which favoured disclaiming the liability as to gross negligence for providers of launch services was pronounced by the United States Congress in the 1988 Amendments to the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act. To extend the disclaimer of liability to remote purchasers, the contract of resale should state expressly that the disclaimer applies for the benefit of all contractors and subcontractors who participated in producing the product. This situation may occur when the purchaser of a satellite which has failed to reach orbit has not contracted directly with the provider of launch services. Contracts for launch services usually contain cross-waiver of liability clauses by which each participant in the launch agrees to be responsible for it's own loss and to waive any claims which it may have against other participants. The crosswaiver of liability clause may apply to the participants in the launch who are parties to the launch services agreement, but not apply to their subcontractors. The role of insurance in responding to many risks has been critical in assisting commercial space ventures grow. Today traditional property and liability insurance, such as pre-launch, launch and in-orbit insurance and third party liability insurance, have become mandatory parts of most space projects. The manufacture and pre-launch insurance covers direct physical loss or damage to the satellite, its apogee kick moter and including its related launch equipment from commencement of loading operations at the manufacture's plant until lift off. The launch and early orbit insurance covers the satellite for physical loss or damage from attachment of risk through to commissioning and for some period of initial operation between 180 days and 12 months after launch. The in-orbit insurance covers physical loss of or damage to the satellite occuring during or caused by an event during the policy period. The third party liability insurance covers the satellite owner' s liability exposure at the launch site and liability arising out of the launch and operation in orbit. In conclusion, the liability in commercial space ventures extends to any organization which participates in providing products and services used in the venture. Accordingly, it is essential for any organization participating in commercial space ventures to contractually disclaim its liability to the extent permitted by law. To achieve the effective disclaimers, it is necessary to determine the applicable law and to understand the requirements of the law which will govern the terms of the contract. A great deal of funds have been used in R&D for commercial space ventures to increase reliability, safety and success. However, the historical reliability of launches and success for commercial space ventures have proved to be slightly lower than we would have wished for. Space insurance has played an important role in reducing the high risks present in commercial space ventures.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.33-52
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• 2014

Although climate change is a global scale question, some concerns have been raised that principles of investment arbitration may not adequately address the domestic implementation of climate change measures. A recent ICSID investment arbitration of Vattenfall v. Germany with regard to the investor's alleged damages from the phase-out of nuclear plants is a salient climate change case. The 2005 Kyoto Protocol was made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and it provides a number of flexible mechanisms such as Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol allows dispute settlement through investor-state arbitration. Any initiation of stricter emission standards can violate the prohibition on expropriations in investment agreements, regardless of the measures created to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The effect-based expropriation doctrine can charge changes to existing emission standards as interference with the use of property that goes against the legitimate expectation of a foreign investor. In regulatory chill, threat of investor claims against the host state may preclude the strengthening of climate change measures. Stabilization clauses also have a freezing effect on the hosting state's regulation and a new law applicable to the investment. In the fair and equitable standard, basic expectations of investors when entering into earlier carbon-intensive operations can be affected by a regulation seeking to change into a low-carbon approach. As seen in the Methanex tribunal, a non-discriminatory and public purpose of environmental protection measures should be considered as non-expropriation in the arbitral tribunal unless its decision would intentionally impede a foreign investor's investment.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.96 no.3
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• pp.269-282
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• 2007

The purpose of this study is to investigate the causes of the dramatic process in forest policies from July of 1972 to June of 1973. In 1972, the core forest problem calling for an immediate solution was the severe forest degradation such as a low growing stock ($11m^3/ha$) and lots of non-tree forest land corresponding to 12% of total forest land. There could have been various approaches to solve the problem at that time. By the end of 1972, the Korean government was afoot to choose the management-oriented approach to carry out reforestation as a part of forest management. In order to implement this approach, the Korean government established the Forest Development Law enforcing establishment of the Forest Management Corporation as a public organization to carry out forest management in the special development land. However, the Korean government changed the management-oriented approach into the administration-oriented approach to carry out reforestation as a part of forest greening in order to rehabilitate severe degraded forests as soon as possible in early 1973. The Forestry Administration (refer to Forest Service) was transferred from the Department of Agriculture and Forestry to the Department of Interior for the efficient rehabilitation in advance, before the 1st 10-year National Greening Project. After the organization's transfer, the government established the 1 st 10-year National Greening Project aiming to reforest one million ha from 1973 to 1982 to use activities like the national greening campaign and the administrative organization mobilization including police force. Reforestation policy as a part of forest management lost effect due to the greening-oriented approach choice. Moreover, the Government struggled to provide 20 billion won for the establishment of the Forest Management Corporation. After all, on March 5th of 1973, the management-oriented approach dropped a curtain deleting the clauses defining the establishment of the Forest Management Corporation. Park, Chung-hee who was the then president of Korea might have felt the 'time restriction' to lose no time to habilitate degraded forests. Due to his awareness, the approach regarding reforestation was changed into administration-oriented activities. The president's awareness was considered as an invisible cause at that time.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.3-54
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• 2013

Nowadays, major advanced countries in aviation technology are putting their effort to develop commercial and civil Unmanned Aircraft System(UAS) due to its highly promising market demand in the future. The market scale of commercial and civil UAS is expected to increase up to approximately 8.8 billon U.S. dollars by the year 2020. The usage of commercial and civil UAS covers various areas such as remote sensing, relaying communications, pollution monitoring, fire detection, aerial reconnaissance and photography, coastline monitoring, traffic monitoring and control, disaster control, search and rescue, etc. With the introduction of UAS, changes need to be made on current Air Traffic Management Systems which are focused mainly manned aircrafts to support the operation of UAS. Accordingly, the legislation for the UAS operation should be followed. Currently, ICAO's Unmanned Aircraft System Study Group(UASSG) is leading the standardization process of legislation for UAS operation internationally. However, some advanced countries such as United States, United Kingdom, Australia have adopted its own legislation. Among these countries, United States is most forth going with President Obama signing a bill to integrate UAS into U.S. national airspace by 2015. In case of Korea, legislation for the unmanned aircraft system is just in the beginning stage. There are no regulations regarding the operation of unmanned aircraft in Korea's domestic aviation law except some clauses regarding definition and permission of the unmanned aircraft flight. However, the unmanned aircrafts are currently being used in military and under development for commercial use. In addition, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport has a ambitious plan to develop commercial and civil UAS as Korea's most competitive area in aircraft production and export. Thus, Korea is in need of the legislation for the UAS operation domestically. In this regards, I personally think that Korea's domestic legislation for UAS operation will be enacted focusing on following 12 areas : (1)use of airspace, (2)licenses of personnel, (3)certification of airworthiness, (4)definition, (5)classification, (6)equipments and documents, (7)communication, (8)rules of air, (9)training, (10)security, (11)insurance, (12)others. Im parallel with enacting domestic legislation, korea should contribute to the development of international standards for UAS operation by actively participating ICAO's UASSG.