• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.49-91
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• 2022

Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in Africa and public diplomacy has emerged as the vital tool being used to cultivate these relations. China has been leading in pursuing stronger economic partnership with Africa while middle powers such as Korea are also intensifying engagement with the continent. While previous studies have analyzed the implications of China's activities in Africa on advanced powers, none has examined them from the paradigm of middle powers. This study fills this gap by assessing China's activities in Africa, their economic engagement and implications for Korea's interest in Africa. The analysis is qualitative based on secondary data from various sources and literature. The study shows that China's public diplomacy strategy involves a high degree of innovation and has evolved to encompass new tools and audiences. China has institutionalized a cooperative model that permeates many aspects of governance institutions in Africa, enabling it to strengthen their relations. This could also be helping China to adjust faster leadership transitions in Africa. Whereas the US is still the most influential country in Africa, China is influential in economic policies and has outstripped the US in infrastructure diplomacy. This could be because African policy makers align more with China's economic model than the US' mainstream economics. Chinese aid to Africa has been diversified to social sectors that are more responsive to the needs of Africa. Trade and investment relations between China and Africa have deepened, but so does trade imbalance since 2010. China mainly imports natural resources and raw materials from Africa. But this product portfolio is not different from Korea and the US. China's energetic insertion in Africa using various strategies has significant implications for countries with ambitions in Africa. Korea can achieve its ambitions in Africa by focusing resources in areas it can leverage its core strengths-such as education and vocational training, environmental policy and development cooperation.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.107-133
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• 2009

International relations in the 21st century is featured by boundless competition among nations to secure sufficient energy resources for achieving economic development. Resource diplomacy, therefore, is competitive in its nature, which is derived from the fact that resources of the globe are limited. Chinese recent economic growth has been possible mainly due to its success in resource diplomacy. The Chinese resource diplomacy has shown two different patterns according to target regions. On the one hand, China has pursued multilateral approach to Central Asia region, by which China aimed to secure energy with joint exploration method in the region. Chinese resource diplomacy toward Africa, on the other hand, has been based on bilateral approach combined with unit-centered economic aid to African nations. This difference in Chinese foreign policy pattern seems to be derived from three factors: namely, Chinese strategic considerations on geopolitical condition, regional security sensitivity, and legacies of Chinese long-time non-alignment diplomacy since the 1950s. Whether China is able to maintain the current pattern of resource diplomacy will be depended on how wisely China pursue its relations with two other global powers: Russia in the Central Asia and the U.S. in Africa. In this regard, the Chinese resource diplomacy is expected to work as determining factor of shaping a pattern of tri-lateral strategic relations among the U.S., Russia, and China. Chinese resource diplomacy thus will determine the future direction of the global politics in terms of strategic arrangement.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.7
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• pp.169-184
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• 2020

This paper analyzes the implications of the change in the way China conducts public diplomacy, through an in-depth study of international education programs promoted under China's public diplomacy strategy. The leadership of Xi Jinping is now trying for China to become the top power in the world, not just a G2 country, based on China's economic growth over the past 40 years. Also, as a vision for the goal, the leadership is presenting the dream of the great revival of the Chinese nation. Currently, the international education program promoted at the level of public diplomacy in China is operated in an active, mid- to long-term manner within the national strategy, away from the past passive and responsive method. In other words, while China's past international education program was a passive model for dispelling the "Chinese Threat Theory," China's current international education program is evolving into an active model that can promote the "Chinese" order in the world.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.27-45
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• 2012

Among political scientists, Japan's free trade agreements (FTA) with member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been considered to be a political tool that can compete against China for regional leadership in East Asia. However, this paper demonstrates that Japan's so-called FTA diplomacy towards ASEAN nations serves the broad interests of Japanese actors in both the political and economic sectors. Given the attention to Japanese domestic political issues, it is argued that diplomacy primarily facilitates a need for free trade with ASEAN and ASEAN markets for Japanese corporations to compete in the global economy and for the government to nurture Japan's stagnant economy by assisting these corporations. This work also contends that the unclear function of FTA as an economic good is due to the lack of the government capacity to effectively manage FTA diplomacy. This partly results from the conventional view with regard to Sino-Japanese rivalry.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.26 no.8
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• pp.37-57
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• 2022

Purpose -International diplomacy is key for the cohesive economic growth of countries around the world. This study aims to identify the major topics discussed and make sense of word pairs used in sentences by Chinese senior leaders during their diplomatic visits. It also compares the differences between key topics addressed during diplomatic visits to developed and developing countries. Design/methodology - We employed three methods: word frequency, co-word, and semantic network analysis. Text data are crawling state and official visit news released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China regarding diplomatic visits undertaken from 2015-2019. Findings - The results show economic and diplomatic relations most prominently during state and official visits. The discussion topics were classified according to nine centrality keywords most central to the structure and had the maximum influence in China. Moreover, the results showed that China's diplomatic issues and strategies differ between developed and developing countries. The topics mentioned in developing countries were more diverse. Originality/value - Our study proposes an effective approach to identify key topics in Chinese diplomatic talks with other countries. Moreover, it shows that discussion topics differ for developed and developing countries. The findings of this research can help researchers conduct empirical studies on diplomacy relationships and extend our method to other countries. Additionally, it can significantly help key policymakers gain insights into negotiations and establish a good diplomatic relationship with China.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.93-135
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• 2017

Due to their geographic proximity to Beijing, the Southeast Asian states under the fallout of the China's growing power are struggling to seek the art of diplomacy to promote their national interests. This study explores why Cambodia previously taking a pro-US strategy after the end of the Cold War has switched to a pro-China one in the context of the rise of G-2 system, the ASEAN regionalism, the country's national interest and Hun Sen's regime legitimation. Theoretically, this study takes a realist constructivist approach and tries to find how realist interests and norms have affected the Hun Sen's regime legitimation. The relationship between China and Cambodia has been deepened by mutual economic interdependence and increasingly stronger Chinese power. Especially, the Chinese massive economic aids and investment have enormously supported the regime legitimation of Hun Sen. On the other hand, The US value diplomacy promoting democracy and human rights has undermined the Hun Sen's legitimacy and strained the two nations' relationship. However, the Hun Sen's pro-China strategy is not to check and balance against US strategic interests and not to recognize the Chinese hegemonic position in Southeast Asia. It is a hedging against the US value diplomacy while maximizing economic and other gains from China. ASEAN has been playing a coordinating role to limit the scope of power politics among big powers and to mitigate its ramifications. Yet, since the US and Chinese interests are so keenly criss-crossing, Cambodia may continue to react to the G-2 system through bilateral relations with them.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.5-36
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• 2014

This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.275-288
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• 2004

The rising of east-north economic bloc is notable in world economy due to the rapidly growth of china economy. The China's economic standing is gradually higher and higher because the joining of the WTO at 2001, development of the exterior open-door policy and the expansion of the trade between chain and several nations. Since Korea and China normalized diplomatic ties in 1992, the two have made remarkable progress in bilateral relations in the fields of economy and diplomacy in particular. The amount of Korea's trade with China has increased by over 20% a year on the average because of the development of the economic cooperation of Korea and China. That is to say, China was sixth trade partner by the end of 1993, based on the amount of trade. But China became third partner at 1993, second partner at 2003 and first partner at the first half of 2004, based on the amount of trade. Korea can not trade with China from the Korea's port opening period to Cold War period after second world war. But historically, the two countries have shared a active and long history of trade relations from the ancient times up to now. This is because two countries get near geographically and two countries have a implication of history and culture. Not only had Korea trade with China at prehistoric age, but also at BC 7. We knew that Korea had traded with China very actively at ancient times through the Paekje(Korea's ancient country) people's village at Santung province and Changbogo's trade works. Korea-china trade relation has played an important role for the development of world economy. Therefor, based on reviewing the korea-china trade, I study the historical meaning of the trade at the region of east-north asia.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.