• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.73-83
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• 2014

This study estimated quantitatively the loss of the fisheries due to China's illegal fishing that prevailed in the EEZ of the country in recent and has been an object to present a basic data in the implementation of government policy as to strengthen the enforcement capacity, setting up the direction of the crackdown of Chinese through to figure out an objective loss according to that. The analyzed result of this study setting a reasonable scenario, fisheries resources reduction is estimated about 67.5 million ton and the estimated amount of the loss is about 1.3 trillion won. This is 21.2% of about 318.3 ten thousand tons of the total fishery production of the country and accounts for 61.9% compared to coastal and offshore fisheries production. Therefore it is a very serious problem due to China's illegal fishing in Korea fisheries sector. It is significant to the point that estimating the qualitative and quantitative losses that can achieve a realistic and effective policy.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.45 no.3
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• pp.19-37
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• 2014

This study is to focus on the status of implementation of bilateral-fishery order based on the Korea-China fisheries agreement and aims to improve fisheries relationship between two countries. Korea-China Fisheries Agreement entered into force in 2001, and serves as a basic framework of the bilateral fisheries order. However, the fishing order between Korea and China has the following limitations. First, it is standstill of joint response for a practical resource management. Second, there are still gaps between the quotas of mutual accord fishing and fishing operation work performance. Third, China's illegal fishing is taking place consistently. Fourth, the effective cooperation between two countries in fisheries is not carried out. Finally, the Korea has faced difficult situations to adhere to a balanced position in the fishery negotiations due to conflicting positions on China and Japan. In order to solve these problems, the fishing order between Korea and China will be able to maintain the competitiveness of Korean fishery sector by reinforcing Korea's fishing sovereignty, Korea and China, based on trust and cooperation, will make efforts to improve bilateral fisheries relations to maximize mutual benefit in fishery sector. Specifically, first, the two countries should strengthen the resources management based on the scientific research and the improvement of imbalance of the mutual agreed fishing in EEZ. Second, Korea has to achieve our targeted performance of fishing operation and establish a joint resources management system between two countries in the provisional measure zone. Third, Korea should implement to collect fisheries information about China fishing vessels which are operating in the EEZ of Korea. Finally, Korea and China should be building up effective governance framework for the establishment of fishing order.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.178-201
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• 2014

China National People's Congress has passed the bill to combine the Marine Law Enforcement into "State Oceanic Administration People's Republic of China". This bill was intended to resolve the overlapping jurisdiction and disputes caused in ocean territory in nearby countries. The purpose of reorganizing the administration was to combine the dispersed organization into one group. This new big administration was basically organized to increase the power of China marine state on the long-term. The reorganization plan is to group General Administration of Customs, China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and Border Control Department into one State Oceanic Administration. The new state Oceanic Administration carries the authority to protect rights and enforce the marine law supported by Public Security Bureau. Korea Coast Guard has been cooperating with China Marine Surveillance since 1998 when the first pact was made. The next step expanded to General Administration of Customs. Currently working with Regional Maritime Law Enforcement organizations dealing mostly with illegal Chinese fishing boats and IEODO conflict. In order to solve the problems we face today is to observe the process of the New China Coast Guard administration, analysing the effects that could be caused by the change and to keep close cooperation between the new administrations.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.149-173
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• 2020

While the United States and other Western states are in trouble with COVID-19 crisis, China is continuing its aggressive ocean expansion with its Gray-zone strategy. The Gray-zone strategy, which China uses around the South China Sea, refers to a strategy that promotes a change in international politics by creating an unclear state, neither war or peace. China, which is trying to expand its influence across East Asia, will also try to project a Gray zone strategy on the Korean Peninsula. The possible scenarios are as follows: 1) South Korea is accidentally involved in a dispute in the South China Sea, 2) Military conflicts between South Korea and China is caused by illegal fishing of Chinese boats in Yellow Sea, 3) China tries to interfere with Socotra Rock, 4) Unlikely, but possible in the future that China induce the military conflicts between Korea and Japan on the Dokdo issue. In order to cope with these scenarios, Korea should prepare the following measures from a long-term perspective: the creation of an Asian maritime safety fleet, the integ rated operation of the navy and the coast guard in the framework of the national fleet, and strengthening the conflict control system for China's provocations.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.91-115
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• 2004

The main purpose of this study is to analyze the cooperative squid fisheries problems surrounding the $E128^{\circ}$, established by the 1965 Korea - Japan Fisheries Agreement which banned Korean large trawlers' fishing east to the $E128^{\circ}$ In fact, the moratorium was put on by Japans request. However, such issue did not occur until the filefish stock in the southern Korean sea, which was a major target fish species of the large trawl fisheries, The filefish stock collapsed completely around 1991 and at the same time most of bottom fish stocks in the East China Sea began to show a symptom of over - exploitation. Thus, the off - shore large trawlers learned to have a little opportunity of finding out alternative fish stocks as well as fishing grounds. Fortunately, at that time squid resource stock and consumption were on the increasing trend. The large trawl fisheries were able to economically exploit squid stock east to the $E128^{\circ}$ through cooperative fishing with squid angling light boats in the East and East - South Sea, even though such cooperative fishing activities violate the existing fishery laws apparently. Some important reasons that the large trawlers have continued the cooperative fishing seem to be because (ⅰ) squid resource stock has been on the increasing state over time, (ⅱ) the trawl fisheries have made a significant contribution to meeting domestic and export demands and stabilizing squid prices, and (ⅲ) they have kept domestic squid market from foreign competition. However, the new Korea - Japan fisheries agreement in 1998 provided a momentum of questioning the effectiveness of the $E128^{\circ}$ by the squid - related fisheries other than the squid angling. Serious conflicts between squid - related fisheries began to emerge and to be much intensified. Squid angling industries in the East opposed to large trawlers's efforts to formalize such illegal cooperative squid fishing activities. Their main argument was that such formalizing would definitely make the East coast squid prices lower and in turn their business performance would be worse off. The results of quantitative analysis suggest that the trawlers' massive landing may have a significant influence on lowering the east coast squid prices. Now, an important issue that the squid - related fisheries and the government are facing is to solve such complex squid fishing problems through a multi - participatory negotiation process, including price stabilization, total allowable catch level and its operation schemes, $E128^{\circ}$ rearrangement, and so on.

• Journal of architectural history
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.7-20
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• 2023

The compositions of ethnic groups in Macau vary with time. Prior to the opening of the port, the majority of the residents in Macau were Chinese people, including those living on land and at sea. After the port was opened, with the increase of Portugal businessmen and missionaries, the population was divided into Chinese people and foreigners (so-called 'Yiren' or 夷人 in Chinese). Chinese people living on land were mainly of Hakka, Fujian, and Cantonese descent. Those living at sea were referred to as 'Tanka People' (named 'Danmin' or 蜑民in Chinese). They lived on floating boats for their entire lives and were similar to the 'drifters' in Japan. Since modern times, many refugees from mainland China and Southeast Asia flooded into Macau due to warfare. The development of industrialization required a larger number of laborers, and some 'coolies' entered Macau in legal or illegal ways, making it a multi-ethnic city. However, the Tanka people were not considered a minority ethnic group under the national ethnic policy of 56 ethnic groups since they did not have an exclusive language and shared dialects in different regions. As the ports inhabited by Tanka people gradually restored foreign trade, the boats and stilt houses used by Tanka people were dismantled to expand the infrastructure area of the ports. Many Tanka people began to live on land and marry people on land, leading to the disappearance of the Tanka group in Macau. The fishing boats and stilt houses used by Tanka people have also disappeared, with only a few remaining in areas such as Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong. This paper examines the natural and social environment of Tanka people in Macau from the Ming and Qing dynasties to the Republic of China, as well as the adaptive changes they adopted for the aforementioned environment in terms of living space and architectural type, on the basis of summarizing the historical activities of Tanka people. Finally, this study provides a layout plan and interior structure of the most commonly used boat for Tanka people from the Ming and Qing dynasties to the Republic of China, with the use of CAD and other technical software, along with reference to written historical documentation, and provides a case study for further research on the architectural history of Macau's inner harbor cities, from anthropological and folklore perspectives.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.44
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• pp.85-116
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• 2015

Found in 23 Dec 1953 to cope with illegal fishing of foreign ships and coastal guard duty, Korea Coast Guard was re-organized as an office under Ministry of Public Safety since the outbreak of sinking of passenger ship "Sewolho". In the course of re-organization, intelligence and investigation duty were transferred to Police Department except "Cases happened on the sea". But the definition of intelligence duty is vague and there are lots of disputes over the jurisdiction and range of activities. With this situation in consideration, the object of this study is to analyse legal and institutional characteristic of KCG Intelligence, to compare them to that of Police Department, foreign agencies like Japan Coast Guard and US Coast Guard, to expose the limit and to suggest solution. To summarize the conclusion, firstly, in the legal side, there is no legal basis on intelligence in [The Government Organization Act], no regulation for mission, weak basis in application act. Secondly, in the institutional side, stated in the minor chapter of [The Government Organization Act], 'the cases happened on sea' is a quite vague definition, while guard, safety, maritime pollution duty falls under 'on the sea' category, intelligence fell to 'Cases happened on the sea' causing coast guard duty and intelligence have different range. In addition, reduced organization and it's manpower led to ineffective intelligence activities. In the case of Police Department, there is definite lines on 'administration concerning public security' in [The Government Organization Act], specified the range of intelligence activities as 'collect, make and distribute information concerning public security' which made the range of main duty and intelligence identical. Japanese and US coast guards also have intelligence branch and performing activities appropriate for the main missions of the organizations. To have superiority in the regional sea, neighboring countries Japan and China are strengthening on maritime power, China has launched new coast guard bureau, Japan has given the coast guard officers to have police authority in the regional islands, and to support the objectives, specialized intelligence is organized and under development. To secure maritime sovereignty and enhance mission capability in maritime safety duty, it is strongly recommended that the KCG intelligence should have concrete legal basis, strengthen the organization and mission, reinforce manpower, and ensure specialized training administrative system.