• Environmental engineer
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• v.18 s.190
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• pp.16-20
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• 2002

CEO는 일반적으로 최고경영자(Chief Executive Officer)를 뜻하는 말이지만 나는 Chief Environment Officer 라는 뜻으로 해석하고 우리 환경관리인 모두 경영자가 되어야 한다는 뜻으로 위와 같은 제목을 썼다. 전국의 많은 환경관리인들은 주어진 책무를 다하기 위해 오늘도 많은 수고를 아끼지 않고 있다. 그러나 대부분의 경우 환경관리인들은 열악한 여건 하에서 일을 해야 하기 때문에 많은 고생을 하고 있는 것이 현실이다. 최

• Environmental engineer
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• v.18 s.191
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• pp.20-24
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• 2002

CEO는 일반적으로 최고경영자(Chief Executive Officer)를 뜻하는 말이지만 나는 Chief Environment Officer 라는 뜻으로 해석하고 우리 환경관리인 모두 경영자가 되어야 한다는 뜻으로 위와 같은 제목을 썼다. 전국의 많은 환경관리인들은 주어진 책무를 다하기 위해 오늘도 많은 수고를 아끼지 않고 있다. 그러나 대부분의 경우 환경관리인들은 열악한 여건 하에서 일을 해야 하기 때문에 많은 고생을 하고 있는 것이 현실이다. 최

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.243-253
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• 2021

This study aims to examine (1) the association between the chief executive officer tenure and audit quality, (2) the relationship between chief executive officer duality and audit quality, (3) the association between board independence and audit quality, (4) the relationship between board size and audit quality, and (5) the role of controlling variables (client size, leverage debt, and business complexity) in controlling these relationships. The research sample includes 325 financial reports from manufacturing firms listed in Amman Stock exchange over the 2014-2018 period. The study relationships are tested by using logistic regression. The results revealed a negative relationship, but not significant between CEO tenure and independent directors with audit quality. In addition, the results showed there is a negative effect of CEO duality on audit quality; also the results revealed that there is a statistically significant effect on the board of directors (board size) on the AQ. In general, the coefficient estimates of controlling variables show that client size and leverage debt positively affect audit quality, and on the contrary, business complexity has an insignificant positive relationship with audit quality. The summary of the study findings play an active role to external auditor opinion on business practice in towered the corporate governance system.

• Environmental engineer
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• v.18 s.189
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• pp.16-19
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• 2002

CEO는 일반적으로 최고경영자(Chief Executive Officer)를 뜻하는 말이지만 나는 Chief Environment Officer 라는 뜻으로 해석하고 우리 환경관리인 모두 경영자가 되어야 한다는 뜻으로 위와 같은 제목을 썼다. 전국의 많은 환경관리인들은 주어진 책무를 다하기 위해 오늘도 많은 수고를 아끼지 않고 있다. 그러나 대부분의 경우 환경관리인들은 열악한 여건 하에서 일을 해야 하기 때문에 많은 고생을 하고 있는 것이 현실이다. 최

• Environmental engineer
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• v.18 s.192
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• pp.14-19
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• 2002

CEO는 일반적으로 최고경영자(Chief Executive Officer)를 뜻하는 말이지만 나는 Chief Environment Officer 라는 뜻으로 해석하고 우리 환경관리인 모두 경영자가 되어야 한다는 뜻으로 위와 같은 제목을 썼다. 전국의 많은 환경관리인들은 주어진 책무를 다하기 위해 오늘도 많은 수고를 아끼지 않고 있다. 그러나 대부분의 경우 환경관리인들은 열악한 여건 하에서 일을 해야 하기 때문에 많은 고생을 하고 있는 것이 현실이다. 최

• Environmental engineer
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• v.18 s.193
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• pp.14-18
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• 2002

CEO는 일반적으로 최고경영자(Chief Executive Officer)를 뜻하는 말이지만 나는 Chief Environment Officer 라는 뜻으로 해석하고 우리 환경관리인 모두 경영자가 되어야 한다는 뜻으로 위와 같은 제목을 썼다. 전국의 많은 환경관리인들은 주어진 책무를 다하기 위해 오늘도 많은 수고를 아끼지 않고 있다. 그러나 대부분의 경우 환경관리인들은 열악한 여건 하에서 일을 해야 하기 때문에 많은 고생을 하고 있는 것이 현실이다. 최

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.81-94
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• 2019

The corporate social responsibility has become an industry norm, and the majority of companies have adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities due to institutional pressure. This paper suggests that chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics and governance mechanisms such as CEOs hubris, outside directors, and foreign ownership can influence a managerial decision of following the norm in adopting CSR. This paper argues that a CEO with hubris carry out CSR considerably less or more than a CEO without hubris because a CEO with hubris are known to have a tendency to refuse to follow the norm from institutional pressure. On the contrary, corporate governance mechanisms can guide a CEO to follow the industrial norm related to CSR because governance mechanisms tend to control CEO to reduce managerial uncertainty. The results show that CEO with hubris has a positive relationship with the degree of CSR deviation while governance mechanisms have a negative relationship. In addition, governance mechanisms negatively moderate the relationship between CEO with hubris and with the degree of CSR deviation.

• Journal of Internet of Things and Convergence
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.11-20
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• 2022

Corporations operate within long term strategy. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) makes decisions and has responsibility for all executive activities which affects the corporate performance. If the CEO makes strategic choices through reasonable decision making, it could affect corporate performance and corporate's rise and fall. So the CEO's decision making is very important. As rapid change in the digital technology environment happened, through digital transition, corporations have been working on increasing corporate performance by practical and academic methods. However prior research was restricted to CEO's affect on organization, innovation or innovative activities and there is a lack of research linking CEO's characteristics to digital transition and corporate performance. As the digital age is coming, research on how CEO's characteristics affect digital transition and corporate performance is direly needed. From the case of domestic Big Data corporation RSN Co. ltd's digital transition success, understanding characteristics of CEO, digital transition and corporate performance through prior researches, and developing research model and research proposition was set. Research was performed on RSN co. ltd's case analysis, and how characteristics of CEO's matter on digital transformation and corporate performance. As a result of the proposition, when the CEO conjugates digital technology, the corporation was able to successfully complete digital transition and it also affects corporate performance. Also, this research's other point is that CEO's may have limits on thoughtful decision making. It is judged that it is necessary to try an empirical study in the future.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.24
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• pp.1-24
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• 2008

This paper examines the direct effects of board independence and also its interaction effects with CEO's firm specific experience on firm performance. The findings in an hierarchial regression analysis of multiyear sample of computer hardware companies indicate that independent, outsider directors are beneficial to firms' performance when CEO has high-level of firm specific experience whereas it is harmful when CEO has low-level of firm specific experience. However, separating the positions of board chair and chief executive officer that has been used as another means for increasing board independence does not influence to firms' performance. These findings imply that researchers in corporate governance should reconsider the relative weight placed on directors' monitoring and assistance role. Rather than focusing predominantly on directors' willingness or ability to control executives, in future research scholars should yield more productive results by focusing on the assistance directors provide in bringing valued resources to the CEOs and in serving as a source of advice and counsel especially for CEO's improvement of management technique. In addition, they should pay more attention on identifying intervening processes between board and firm performance in order to provide optimal governance mechanisms and configurations to practitioners.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.249-257
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• 2020

This paper focused on the level of managerial centralization on chief executive officer (CEO) as a factor to affect the shared growth activities of corporate. As service corporations are becoming active in shared growth activities recently, this paper thus used CEO. Pay Slice (CPS) information to measure the level of managerial centralization on CEO of service corporation and tested the influence of the level of managerial centralization on whether shared growth activities are executed and the level of such activities respectively. The result of test shows that companies with high managerial centralization on CEO are more passive toward shared growth activities than those without such centralization. This can be interpreted that a CEO with more powerful influence may consider shared growth activities as to be negative and take a passive attitude to them. On the other hand, such result was supported by additional analysis with companies committing shared growth activities as well. This paper is expected to contribute to bring about interest on shared growth activities as the gap between major companies and small and medium sized companies is currently expanding in terms of operating profit ratio and even salary of employees.