• Journal of Society of Preventive Korean Medicine
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.17-28
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• 2003

We met results like the followings through the literatures and questionnaires about the tasks and solutions about the insurance fee of packed medical herbs. 1) It's turned out that 74.8% of herb doctors agrees to the insurance fee of packed medical herbs. However, in comparison with the same survey of the herb doctor association the percentage of general approval went somewhat lower, and especially the percentage of 'positive approval' became notably lower$(43.7%{\rightarrow}26.5%)$ and the percentage of 'active objection' raised about 2 times$(6.8%{\rightarrow}12.9%)$. Inquiring into the approval reasons on the insurance fee application of packed medical herbs some heads such as 'development toward treatment medical science' and 'decrease of publics burden' were higher than the one of 'management income and expenditure.' 2) As a result of the research, 36.0% of the patients and 42.8% of the residents recognized that the pay range of Chinese herb health insurance is narrow. They recognized that less people have the experiences of Chinese medical hospital use and internal application of the packed medical herbs as they are older, men rather than women. 85.4% of the patients and 74.9% of the residents agreed on the insurance pay of packed medical herbs. It's shown that they agree on the Chinese medical hospital use more as the economic standard is lower, on the insurance pay as they have ever taken the packed medical herbs. In the aspect of increase of insurance fee, 66.7% of the patients and 44.3% of the residents agreed on the insurance pay of packed medical herbs, and 18.1% and 36.1% disagreed on the insurance pay of packed medical herbs. The main objective reason why they disagree on the insurance pay of packed medical herbs was 'because the insurance fee goes up higher,' which answered 95.2% of the patients and 78.8% of the residents. 7.22% of the patients and 1.80% of the residents answered that they can pay more insurance fee in case of the insurance pay of packed medical herbs. However, in the priority order of the insurance pay, it hold the 5th position between 2 target research groups which was less than medical examination, charges for hospital accommodation and taking MRI. 3) According to the result of analysis about the cost of packed medical herbs, current practice price is 115,000 won and the average prime cost of a packed medical herb is 73,000 to 106,000 won. It's examined that the herb doctors regard that 95,000 won will be reasonable when the packed medical herb is payed in insurance. However, it was found out that the public generally thinks that the price would be appropriate on the level of 30,000 to 40,000 won and the percentage of the answers of 20,000 won to 30,000 was fairly high. 4) the central system of a prescription should be change into the central system of demonstration and the sick and wounded. 5) To solve this problem, the government should regulate it to pass by the circulation gradation of [importer, $peasantry{\rightarrow}manufacturer{\rightarrow}wholesaler{\rightarrow}distributor$(Chinese medical hospital, pharmacy dispensary of Chinese medicine)]And it should intervene into the quality and the circulation steps of Chinese medicine through 'the office or organization which is in charge of certification of Chinese medicine' and 'the office or organization which is in charge of the circulation of Chinese medicine.' And some actions such as simple severance, lavation, drying should be included into the conception of manufacture and the boundary between food and medical supplies should be made at a manufactory. And the regulation of standardized goods at one's own house should be improved so that, the peasantry can sell the materials of Chinese medicine only to the manufacturer. 6) In company with the insurance pay of packed medical herbs, the study about the separation of dispensary from medical practice in the Chinese medicine should be accomplished.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.24 no.2 s.88
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• pp.65-78
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• 2006

This paper investigates the cost structure ot the Korea and Japan railroad industry with respect to density, scale and scope economies as well as productivity growth rate using a generalized trans)og multiproduct cost function model. The paper then assumes that the Korea and Japan railway companies pi·educe three outputs (incumbent railway passenger-kilometers. Shinkansen passenger-kilometers, ton-kilometers of freight) using four input factors (labor, fuel, maintenance, rolling stock and capital). The specified cost function includes foul other independent variables: track lengths to reflect network effects, two dummies to reflect nation and ownership effects, and time trend as a proxy for technical change. The simultaneous equation system consisting of a cost function and three input share equations is estimated with the Zellner's iterative seemingly unrelated regression. The unbalanced panel data used in the paper, a total of 154 observations. are collected from the annual records of the Korea National Railroad (KNR) for the yews $1977{\sim}2003$, Japan National Railways (JNR) for the years $1977{\sim}1984$. seven Japan Railways (JR's) for the years $1987{\sim}2003$. The findings show that the Korean and Japanese railways exhibit product-specific and overall economies of density but product-specific diseconomies of scale with respect to incumbent railway passenger-kilometers, Shinkansen-kilometers and ton-kilometers. However, the railways experience mild overall economies of scale which result from economies of scope associated with the joint production of incumbent railway/Shinkansen and feight, freight/incumbent railway and Shinkansen except Shinkansen/incumbent railway and freight. In addition, the economies of density and scale in the KNR, JR east, JR central, and JR west companies at the point of the years $1990{\sim}2003$ average is generally analogous to the above results at the point of sample average. There also appear to be economies of ssope associated with the joint Production of the incumbent railway and Shinkansen in JR central but diseconomies of scope in JR East and JR West. The findings also indicate that the productivity growth rate of the privately-owned JR's is larger than that of the government-owned KNR.

• The Korean Journal of Archival Studies
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• no.21
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• pp.323-353
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• 2009

This study examines current states of Professionals of records management after "Records Management of public instituition Act(공공기관의 기록물 관리에 관한 법률)" was enacted in 1999. The law forced to arrange records manager in Records Center. However the hire of Professionals of records management became in earnest in 2005. Records Manager among the research officials was established in 2005 February in the Participatory Government. Because of this regulation, in 2005 July, Professionals of records management were arranged in each of 45 central department for the first time. Going through many trial and error, Professionals of records management contributed to systemizing record management of center department and office. According to "Public Records Management Act(공공기록물 관리에 관한 법률)" totally revised in 2007, sixteen major cities and its public office of education decided to employ Professionals of records management until the end of 2007. In addition, minor cities which consists of people over 150,000 and public office of education which consist of the number of students over 70,000 are supposed to have Professionals of records management until 2008, but it is not accomplished yet. Furthermore, when recruiting professionalists of records management, it is necessary to employ not as a contract or a part-time employee or but as a regular or a full-time worker. Especially, if the specialists of record management were employed as a part-time employee, they would not concentrate on their work because of their unstable social positions. It means that changes from a contract worker to a regular employee are needed without further delay. At first, records managers who were recruited at the Central Department in May 2007 had various kinds of difficulties and experienced trial and error. These days, however, they show their expertise with finding their own works. Someday in Korea, the records manager is expected to be a professional career with their know-hows and active movements.

• The Korean Journal of Archival Studies
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• no.36
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• pp.35-67
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• 2013

As the office of crown properties expanded to financial structure having jurisdiction over various nation's purse in the Great Han Empire, its official document form has been changed. Unlike the early days, they had used official paper stamped with the words 'the Office of Crown Properties' eliminating 'Department of the Royal Household'. Also, the title on stamp of government position changed to 'Recipient of the Official of Crown Properties'. As the office of crown properties expanded as a great financial structure, it has grown in stature as an independent structure, and it was reflected in official document form. Such change was shown in document distribution system. The recipient of report from each district was the First Lord of Department of the Royal Household until 1897; however, the recipients of reports were mostly the office of Crown Properties from 1899. The Office of Crown Properties could not issue an official order before Aug 1899, since then the Office of Crown Properties had issued official orders to each district. However, the Office of Crown Properties could not handle the document in an equal position to the central organization yet. However, from Sep. 1900, the Office of Crown Properties handle the document with district organizations in equal position to the central organization, and a records office had been established in the Office of Crown Properties. Also, the Office of Crown Properties had handled official documents as an independent organization getting out of belonging organization to the department of Royal Household. Since the records office was established in Sep. 1900, the Office of Crown Properties had written receipt book autonomously. Comparing the receipt books in 1901 to the receipt books in 1905 and 1906, receipt numbers had been appeared from the book in 1905 and the organization in charge of the documents was recorded on some documents. Since no receipt book was found in 1902~1904, it is unknown when receipt number had been started indicating on the book. Seeing that the receipt number on the book of 1905 matched with contents on the receipt stamp, the receipt number has started indicating from around July, 1902; the period the receipt stamp has been started to use. Unlike the receipt stamp, the department in charge was indicated on the receipt book. It is because that the Office of Crown Properties changed writing system. Instead of classifying divisions, the Office of Crown Properties recorded in a book by order to receive, provided serial number, and wrote the department on the bottom of receipt book to classify by department in charge. Since establishment of the records office in Sep. 1900, the Office of Crown Properties had confirmed the receipt of document by stamping 'receipt of the Office of Crown Properties' and made receipt books as the office had started handled documents independently. Also, the Office of Crown Properties changed its system integrating division and recording in one book from the intial system classifying the book by division then receipt number and department in charge were indicated on the book. Also, receipt system has stabilized by stamping the receipt date and number on the received document.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.109-130
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• 2022

The Vietnamese government has proposed contract farming through a new type of cooperative as an institutional innovation which aims to restructure the agricultural sector. However, policy changes often impact farmers, who bear the primary effects of the transition process. Understanding households' strategies for land use and livelihood is crucial for policymaking in the agricultural development field. This study was conducted in the rural Binh Dao commune in Central Vietnam. We analyzed household members' labor force changes and their livelihood behaviors after their participation in a contract farming scheme using qualitative analysis methods combined with geographic information system (GIS) support, based on secondary data and in-depth interviews of 190 farmers. Simultaneously, we created a digital map of the cooperative's production area to investigate changes in land use and production activities. The findings show that contract farming shaped the vertical coordination of the value chain from the farmers to the cooperative and agricultural product trading companies. Subsequently, it encouraged land use and labor efficiency due to mechanical support. In addition, it also increased productivity and protected farmers from market risks. However, despite its positive effects on agricultural productivity in this case, the contract farming scheme could not achieve the restructuring of the rural labor force toward non-agricultural sectors. Ironically, farmers in the Binh Dao commune tended to increase cultivable land during the agricultural restructuring program, rather than switching their labor forces to non-agricultural sectors. The lack of stable non-farming job opportunities in rural Vietnam results in challenges to the efficiency of agricultural restructuring programs. Consequently, farmers in the Binh Dao commune are still smallholder farmers, depending on the family labor force.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.312-323
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• 2003

This writer absolutely agrees with the government that regional disequilibrium is severe enough to consider moving the administrative capital. Pursuing this course solely to establish a balanced development, however, is not a convincing enough reason. The capital city is directly related to not only the social and economic situation but, much more importantly, to the domestic political situation as well. In the mid-1970s, the proposal by the Third Republic to move the capital city temporarily was based completely on security reasons. At e time, the then opposition leader Kim, Dae-jung said that establishing a safe distance from the demilitarized zone(DMZ) reflected a typically military decision. His view was that retaining the capital city close to the DMZ would show more consideration for the will of the people to defend their own country. In fact, independent Pakistan moved its capital city from Karachi to Islamabad, situated dose to Kashmir the subject of hot territorial dispute with India. It is regrettable that no consideration has been given to the urgent political situation in the Korean peninsula, which is presently enveloped in a dense nuclear fog. As a person requires health to pursue his/her dream, a country must have security to implement a balanced territorial development. According to current urban theories, the fate of a country depends on its major cities. A negligently guarded capital city runs the risk of becoming hostage and bringing ruin to the whole country. In this vein, North Koreas undoubted main target of attack in the armed communist reunification of Korea is Seoul. For the preservation of our state, therefore, it is only right that Seoul must be shielded to prevent becoming hostage to North Korea. The location of the US Armed Forces to the north of the capital city is based on the judgment that defense of Seoul is of absolute importance. At the same time, regardless of their different standpoints, South and North Korea agree that division of the Korean people into two separate countries is abnormal. Reunification, which so far has defied all predictions, may be realized earlier than anyone expects. The day of reunification seems to be the best day for the relocation of the capital city. Building a proper capital city would take at least twenty years, and a capital city cannot be dragged from one place to another. On the day of a free and democratic reunification, a national agreement will be reached naturally to find a nationally symbolic city as in Brazil or Australia. Even if security does not pose a problem, the governments way of thinking would not greatly contribute to the balanced development of the country. The Chungcheon region, which is earmarked as the new location of the capital city, has been the greatest beneficiary of its proximity to the capital region. Not being a disadvantaged region, locating the capital city there would not help alleviate regional disparity. If it is absolutely necessary to find a candidate region at present, considering security, balanced regional development and post-reunification scenario of the future, Cheolwon area located in the middle of the Korean peninsula may be a plausible choice. Even if the transfer of capital is delayed in consideration of the present political conflict between the South and the North Koreas, there is a definite shortcut to realizing a balanced regional development. It can be found not in the geographical dispersal of the central government, but in the decentralization of power to the provinces. If the government has surplus money to build a new symbolic capital city, it is only right that it should improve, for instance, the quality of drinking water which now everyone eschews, and to help the regional subway authority whose chronic deficit state resoled in a recent disastrous accident. And it is proper to time the transfer of capital city to coincide with that of the reunification of Korea whenever Providence intends.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.17-27
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• 2011

As the world becomes more globalized, business competition becomes fiercer, while consumers' needs for less expensive quality products are on the increase. Business operations make an effort to secure a competitive edge in costs and services, and the logistics industry, that is, the industry operating the storing and transporting of goods, once thought to be an expense, begins to be considered as the third cash cow, a source of new income. Logistics centers are central to storage, loading and unloading of deliveries, packaging operations, and dispensing goods' information. As hubs for various deliveries, they also serve as a core infrastructure to smoothly coordinate manufacturing and selling, using varied information and operation systems. Logistics centers are increasingly on the rise as centers of business supply activities, growing beyond their previous role of primarily storing goods. They are no longer just facilities; they have become logistics strongholds that encompass various features from demand forecast to the regulation of supply, manufacturing, and sales by realizing SCM, taking into account marketability and the operation of service and products. However, despite these changes in logistics operations, some centers have been unable to shed their past roles as warehouses. For the continuous development of logistics centers, various measures would be needed, including a revision of current supporting policies, formulating effective management plans, and establishing systematic standards for founding, managing, and controlling logistics centers. To this end, the research explored previous studies on the use and effectiveness of logistics centers. From a theoretical perspective, an evaluation of the overall introduction, purposes, and transitions in the use of logistics centers found issues to ponder and suggested measures to promote and further advance logistics centers. First, a fact-finding survey to establish demand forecast and standardization is needed. As logistics newspapers predicted that after 2012 supply would exceed demand, causing rents to fall, the business environment for logistics centers has faltered. However, since there is a shortage of fact-finding surveys regarding actual demand for domestic logistic centers, it is hard to predict what the future holds for this industry. Accordingly, the first priority should be to get to the essence of the current market situation by conducting accurate domestic and international fact-finding surveys. Based on those, management and evaluation indicators should be developed to build the foundation for the consistent advancement of logistics centers. Second, many policies for logistics centers should be revised or developed. Above all, a guideline for fair trade between a shipper and a commercial logistics center should be enacted. Since there are no standards for fair trade between them, rampant unfair trades according to market practices have brought chaos to market orders, and now the logistics industry is confronting its own difficulties. Therefore, unfair trade cases that currently plague logistics centers should be gathered by the industry and fair trade guidelines should be established and implemented. In addition, restrictive employment regulations for foreign workers should be eased, and logistics centers should be charged industry rates for the use of electricity. Third, various measures should be taken to improve the management environment. First, we need to find out how to activate value-added logistics. Because the traditional purpose of logistics centers was storage and loading/unloading of goods, their profitability had a limit, and the need arose to find a new angle to create a value added service. Logistic centers have been perceived as support for a company's storage, manufacturing, and sales needs, not as creators of profits. The center's role in the company's economics has been lowering costs. However, as the logistics' management environment spiraled, along with its storage purpose, developing a new feature of profit creation should be a desirable goal, and to achieve that, value added logistics should be promoted. Logistics centers can also be improved through cost estimation. In the meantime, they have achieved some strides in facility development but have still fallen behind in others, particularly in management functioning. Lax management has been rampant because the industry has not developed a concept of cost estimation. The centers have since made an effort toward unification, standardization, and informatization while realizing cost reductions by establishing systems for effective management, but it has been hard to produce profits. Thus, there is an urgent need to estimate costs by determining a basic cost range for each division of work at logistics centers. This undertaking can be the first step to improving the ineffective aspects of how they operate. Ongoing research and constant efforts have been made to improve the level of effectiveness in the manufacturing industry, but studies on resource management in logistics centers are hardly enough. Thus, a plan to calculate the optimal level of resources necessary to operate a logistics center should be developed and implemented in management behavior, for example, by standardizing the hours of operation. If logistics centers, shippers, related trade groups, academic figures, and other experts could launch a committee to work with the government and maintain an ongoing relationship, the constraint and cooperation among members would help lead to coherent development plans for logistics centers. If the government continues its efforts to provide financial support, nurture professional workers, and maintain safety management, we can anticipate the continuous advancement of logistics centers.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.166-182
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• 1994

Kyonggi Province in the late Chosun dynasty was a center of superior government offices including 'Han' River water-road transportation and was located in the middle of an 'X'-shaped arterial road network. Because of these reasons, Kyonggi Province had a faster inflow of commodities, informations and technics compared with the other province. At this period of time, every local 'Eup' (name of administrative district) had not been affected by their above administrative districts and had their own autonomy. For this reason, every 'Eup' could be developed as a town, even if its size was small when it had sufficient internal growing conditions. Moreover, the markets ('Si-Jon') in big towns and periodical markets which were spread over the Kyonggi Province played role of commercial functions of town. And because military bases for the defence of the royal capital in Kyonggi Province also took parts of a non-agricultural city role, Xyonggi Provinc had much more possibilities of growing as a town rather than the other provinces. The towns of the late Chosun Dynasty were, except the capital and superior administrative districts which were governed by the 'You-Su', small towns which had only about 3, 000-5, 000 people. Most of the town dewellers were local officials, nobles, merchants, craftmen and slaves. And the farmers who lived near town became a pseudo-towner through suburb agriculture. Among these people, the merchants were leaders of townization. The downtowns were affected by the landform and traffic roads. The most fundamental function of towns were administrative. The opcial's grade, which was dispatched to the local administrative district ('Kun' or 'Hyun'), was decided by the size of population and agricultural land of each county. Large county which was governed by a high ranking opcial had more possibilities to develop as a large town. Because they supervised other opcials of lower rank and obtained more land and population for the town. The phonomena of farm abandonment after the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592-1598 stimulated the development of towns for commercial function. The commercial functions of towns were evident in the Si-Jon or Nan-Jon (names of markets) in the big cities such as Hansung and Kaesung, meanffwhile in the local areas it was emerged in the shape of periodical market networks as allied with near markets (which were called as Jang-Si) or permanent markets which were grown up from periodical markets. These facts of commercial development induced the birth of commercial town. Kyonggi Province showed the weak points of its defense system during both wars (Japanese Invasion in 1592 and Manchu's Invasion in 1636). The government reinforced its defense system by adding 4 'You-Su-Bus' and several military bases. Each local districts ('Eup'), where Geo-Jins were established, were stimulated to be a town while Jin-Kwan system were, adjusted and enforced. Among Dok-Jins(name of solitary military bases), Youngjongjin was grown up as a large garrison town which only played a role of defense. The number of towns that took roles of non-agricultural functions in Kyonggi Province was 52. Among these towns, 29 were developed as big towns which had above 3, 000 people and most of these towns were located on the northwest-southeast axes of 'X'-shaped arterial trafic network in the Chosn Dynasty, This fact points out that the traffic road is one of the important causes of the development of towns. When we make hierarchy of the towns of Kyonggi Province according to its population and how many functions it had, we can make it as 6 grades. The virst grade town 'Hansung' was the biggest central town of administration, commerce and defdnse. The 2nd grade town includes 'Kaesung' which had historical inertia that it had been the capital of the Koryo Dynesty. The 3rd grade towns include some 'You- Su-Bus' such as Soowon, Kanghwa, Kwangju and also include Mapo, Yongsan and from this we can imagine that the commercial development in the late Chosun Dynasty extremely affected the townization. The 4th-6th grade towns had smiliar population but it can be discriminated by how many town functions it had. So the 4th grade towns were the core of administration, commerce and defense function. 5th grade towns had administrative functions and one of commercial and defense functions. 6th grade towns had only one of these functions. When we research and town conditions of each grades as the ratio of non-agricultural population, we can find out that the towns from the 1st grade to 4th grade show difference by degree of townization but from the 4th grade to 6th grade towns do not show big difference in general.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.69
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• pp.83-114
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• 2017

The purpose of this article is to analyze the standings of working-level officials belonging to Jongbusi (Court of the Royal Clan) holding the rank of "jeong" and below between the 18th and mid-19th Century. Jongbusi, which was headed by a Grade-3 official, was in charge of the compilation of royal genealogy and supervision of royal relatives. During the late Joseon Period, its officials were composed of its chief, jeong, jubu (Grade-6 official), and jikjang (Grade-7 official). By 1864, it was incorporated into Jongchinbu (Office of the Royal Relatives). Jongbusi nangcheong seonsaengan (Register of Staff Officials at the Court of the Royal Clan), which is preserved at the Jangseogak Archives of the Academy of Korean Studies, lists the officials who served at the office between 1794 and its incorporation into Jongchinbu in 1864. The register also includes the officials' ranks, names, DOBs, family clans, their ranks in the offices they were transferred from, their ranks in the office they were transferred to, etc. Those interested view it as a precious relic that provides valuable information on the officialdom of the dynasty. A majority of the officials who served at Jongbusi were those who passed the higher civil service examination. Many of them at the level of jikjang were those who passed the licentiate examination. Their designation as an official was part of the "muneum" system, which granted official posts to descendants of those who accomplished a distinguished service for the country or served as a high-ranking official. They were those transferred from equal or lower positions in another office. Many of jubu-level officials of Jongbusi were those transferred from honorable and important posts of other offices or local administrative offices. Many of jikjang-level officials of Jongbusi were those who previously served as dosa (assistant officials) at Uigeumbu (Bureau of Crime Investigation) headed by a Grade-1 official. The officials' transfer to an office with a lower position like Jongbusi appears to have been for the provision of placing them in working-level positions rather than letting them remain in positions only carrying an honorary title. As for the transfer of officials of Jongbusi to other offices, many of those with the rank of jeong were transferred to lower positions. Supposedly it was because not many Grade-3 positions were vacant. Many of them were transferred to honorable and important posts. Some of them were also transferred to positions at local government offices, supposedly to avoid an excess of personnel at the central government. Those at the level of jubu or jikjang of Jongbusi were transferred to equal or higher posts in other offices. Particularly, most of those holding the position of jikjang (Grade-7) were transferred to higher posts. The family clan that produced the largest number (10%) of Jongbusi officials was the Jeonju Yi Clan, which produced the largest number of those who passed the higher civil service examination. It was also found that the top 20 family clans produced about half of the entirety of Jongbusi officials. According to the aforesaid Jongbusi nangcheong seonsaengan, about 90% of the cases of promotion of Jongbusi officials occurred after the revision of Seonwon boryak (Royal Genealogy of the Joseon Dynasty). It is speculated that the supervision of royal family members, one of the two leading functions assigned to Jongbusi, was suspended in the late Joseon Period. The relevant function does not appear even in chronicles pertaining to the Joseon Dynasty. The reason being had something to do with the sharp decrease in the number of royal family members during the reign of King Injo (r. 1623-1649). Their number was decreased to the extent that royal ceremonies could not be adequately carried out. Naturally, the meaning of supervising royal family members faded. Witnessing such a sorry state of the royal family, Heungseon Daewongun, King Gojong's father who served as the regent, incorporated Jongbusi into Jongchinbu in an effort to enhance the status and authority of the royal family.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.45-68
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• 2022

The central and local governments of the Republic of Korea provided information necessary for disaster response through wireless emergency alerts (WEAs) in order to overcome the pandemic situation in which COVID-19 rapidly spreads. Among all channels for delivering disaster information, wireless emergency alert is the most efficient, and since it adopts the CBS(Cell Broadcast Service) method that broadcasts directly to the mobile phone, it has the advantage of being able to easily access disaster information through the mobile phone without the effort of searching. In this study, the characteristics of wireless emergency alerts sent to Seoul during the past year and one month (January 2020 to January 2021) were derived through various text mining methodologies, and various types of information contained in wireless emergency alerts were analyzed. In addition, it was confirmed through the population mobility by age in the districts of Seoul that what kind of influence it had on the movement behavior of people. After going through the process of classifying key words and information included in each character, text analysis was performed so that individual sent characters can be used as an analysis unit by applying a document cluster analysis technique based on the included words. The number of WEAs sent to the Seoul has grown dramatically since the spread of Covid-19. In January 2020, only 10 WEAs were sent to the Seoul, but the number of the WEAs increased 5 times in March, and 7.7 times over the previous months. Since the basic, regional local government were authorized to send wireless emergency alerts independently, the sending behavior of related to wireless emergency alerts are different for each local government. Although most of the basic local governments increased the transmission of WEAs as the number of confirmed cases of Covid-19 increases, the trend of the increase in WEAs according to the increase in the number of confirmed cases of Covid-19 was different by region. By using structured econometric model, the effect of disaster information included in wireless emergency alerts on population mobility was measured by dividing it into baseline effect and accumulating effect. Six types of disaster information, including date, order, online URL, symptom, location, normative guidance, were identified in WEAs and analyzed through econometric modelling. It was confirmed that the types of information that significantly change population mobility by age are different. Population mobility of people in their 60s and 70s decreased when wireless emergency alerts included information related to date and order. As date and order information is appeared in WEAs when they intend to give information about Covid-19 confirmed cases, these results show that the population mobility of higher ages decreased as they reacted to the messages reporting of confirmed cases of Covid-19. Online information (URL) decreased the population mobility of in their 20s, and information related to symptoms reduced the population mobility of people in their 30s. On the other hand, it was confirmed that normative words that including the meaning of encouraging compliance with quarantine policies did not cause significant changes in the population mobility of all ages. This means that only meaningful information which is useful for disaster response should be included in the wireless emergency alerts. Repeated sending of wireless emergency alerts reduces the magnitude of the impact of disaster information on population mobility. It proves indirectly that under the prolonged pandemic, people started to feel tired of getting repetitive WEAs with similar content and started to react less. In order to effectively use WEAs for quarantine and overcoming disaster situations, it is necessary to reduce the fatigue of the people who receive WEA by sending them only in necessary situations, and to raise awareness of WEAs.