• Fire Science and Engineering
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.76-85
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• 2003

In this study, we write down the definitions, their causes and the techniques of analysis as a theoretical consideration of common cause failures, and investigate the limitation and the importance of the common cause failures by applying to the analysis on the fire protection as a representative safety facility. As you can know in the reliability analysis, most impressive cause is the malfunctions of pumping operations; especially the common cause failure of two pumps is dominant. In other words, it is possible to assess system-reliability as twice as actual without CCF From these, CCF is extraordinarily important and the results are highly dependent on the CCF factor. And although it would increase with multiple installations, the reliability are not defined as linear with those multiplications. In addition, the differences in results due to the models for analysis are not significant, whereas the various sources of data produce highly different results. Therefore, we conclude that the reliabilities are dependent on the quality of the usable data much better than the variety of models. As a result, the basic and engineering device for the preventions of CCF of the multiple facilities is to design it as reliably as to design the fire-water pump. That is to say, we must assess those reliabilities using PFD whether they are appropriate to SIL (Safety Integrity Level) which is required for the reliability in SIS (Safety Instrumented System). The result of the analysis on the reliability of the fire-water supply with CCF shows that PFD is 3.80E-3, so that it cannot be said to be designed as safely as in the level of SIL5. However, without CCF, PFD is 1.82E-3 which means that they are designed as unsafely as before.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.92-99
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• 2002

Safety-related motor operated valve(MOV) safety significance for Ulchin Unit 3 was categorized. The safety evaluation of MOV of domestic nuclear power plants affects the generic data used for the quantification of MOV common cause failure(CCF) events in Ulchin Units 3&4 PSA. Therefore, in this paper, MGL(multiple greek letter)parameter ${\beta}$, used for the evaluation of MOV CCF probabilities in Ulchin Units 3&4 probabilistic safety assessment(PSA), was re-estimated and the MOV safety significance was categorized. The re-estimation results of MGL parameter show that the value of(is decreased by 30% compared with the current value used in Ulchin Unit 3&4 PSA. The categorization results of MOV safety significance using the changed value of MGL parameter(show that the number of HSSCs(high safety significant components) is decreased by 54.5% compared with those using the current value of it used in Ulchin Units 3&4 PSA.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Mechanical Engineers A
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.373-378
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• 2012

The objective of this research is to examine the probabilistic approach to evaluating turbine ejection frequency considering common-cause failure. This paper identifies basic turbine ejection mechanisms under high and low speeds and presents a detailed probabilistic methodology (fault tree) for assessing ejection frequency. The alpha factor methodology is applied to common-cause failure evaluations. The frequencies under different test schemes are compared and the propagation of uncertainty through the fault tree model is evaluated. The following conclusions were reached: (1) the turbine blade ejection frequency due to ductile failure under high speed is around 8.005E-7/yr; (2) if common-cause failure is considered, the frequency will be increased by 11% and 33% depending on the test scheme; and (3) if the parameter uncertainties are considered, the frequency is estimated to be in the range of 9.35E-7 to 1.13E 6, with 90% confidence.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.5
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• pp.471-482
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• 2012

To assess the risk of nuclear power plant operation and to determine the risk impact of digital systems, there is a need to quantitatively assess the reliability of the digital systems in a justifiable manner. The Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) is a tool which can reveal shortcomings of the NPP design in general and PRA analysts have not had sufficient guiding principles in modelling particular digital components malfunctions. Currently digital I&C systems are mostly analyzed simply and conventionally in PRA, based on failure mode and effects analysis and fault tree modelling. More dynamic approaches are still in the trial stage and can be difficult to apply in full scale PRA-models. As basic events CPU failures, application software failures and common cause failures (CCF) between identical components are modelled.The primary goal is to model dependencies. However, it is not clear which failure modes or system parts CCF:s should be postulated for. A clear distinction can be made between the treatment of protection and control systems. There is a general consensus that protection systems shall be included in PRA, while control systems can be treated in a limited manner. OECD/NEA CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) has set up a task group, called DIGREL, to develop taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of PRA. The taxonomy is aimed to be the basis of future modelling and quantification efforts. It will also help to define a structure for data collection and to review PRA studies.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Systems Engineering
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.49-60
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• 2021

The Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS) is vital for plant safety as it ensures the required Specified Acceptance Fuel Design Limit (SAFDL) are not exceeded. The CPCS generates trip signals when Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) and Local Power Density (LPD) exceeds their predetermined setpoints. These setpoints are established based on the operating margin from the analysis that produces the SAFDL values. The goal of this research is to create a simplified CPCS that optimizes operating margin for I-SMRs. Because the I-SMR is compact in design, instrumentation placement is a challenge, as it is with Ex-core detectors and RCP instrumentation. The proposed CPCS addresses the issue of power flux measurement with In-Core Instrumentation (ICI), while flow measurement is handled with differential pressure transmitters between Steam Generators (SG). Simplification of CPCS is based on a Look-Up-Table (LUT) for determining the CEA groups' position. However, simplification brings approximations that result in a loss of operational margin, which necessitates compensation. Appropriate compensation is performed based on the result of analysis. FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) are presented as a way to compensate for the inadequacies of current systems by providing faster execution speeds and a lower Common Cause Failure rate (CCF).