• 한국IT서비스학회지
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.81-96
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• 2016

This study analyzes how breach fee under long-term contract and/or cap regulation on the breach fee can affect the impacts of "Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act" on handset bundle price, average revenue per unit (ARPU), and social welfare. We conduct comparative analysis with an economic model of duopoly competition in price when users are under long-term contract and the breach fee can be regulated. The results show that the Act lowers the equilibrium prices, lower than incumbent price without the Act. Price of non-dominant Mobile Network Operator (MNO) can be lower than poaching price without the Act if significant portion of switching cost is breach fee or the market is significantly asymmetric. Under the significant circumstances, the Act can raise ARPU even though it improves social welfare. By contrast, the Act increases consumer surplus without affecting social welfare if breach fee is the only source of user's switching cost and is capped by the regulation, and more symmetric market and the stronger cap leads to higher consumer surplus.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제51권
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• pp.133-158
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• 2011

The purpose of this study is to analyze one of CIETEC(China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission) Award on the dispute arising from Cotton Sale Contact which deals with damages and reduction of the price. Especially this case focused on the effect of reduction of the price to damages. The purpose of damages is to place the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other party had properly performed the contract. So court costs and attorney's fee should be regarded as the loss, because these are caused by consequence of the breach which is recoverable. With the same reason, overpaid taxes should also regard as the loss. It is not impossible, however, to claim both damages and reduction of the price for same loss at the same time. It means buyer could not claim damages for the same loss, once he already claimed reduction of the price. So Korean companies should consider which remedy is proper to himself under the circumstances. He should choose reduction of the price when market price is down. In case of rising market price, he should consider follows: first, it is better to choose damages based on current price(Art.76), if upswing of non-conformity price is higher then upswing of market price. Second, it is better to choose general rule for measuring damages(Art.74), if upswing of market price is higher then upswing of non-conformity price.

• 의료법학
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• 제15권2호
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• pp.227-251
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• 2014

In current law, the premium medical treatment system gives patients the right of choice between normal medical treatment service and premium medical treatment service. Only the doctors having a career more than a certain period of time fixed in the law are eligible for providing the premium medical treatment service. So, the premium medical treatment system is highly related to the patients' right to know and the right of self-determination. The system is also relevant to the so-called 'economic explanation' notion because patients should pay additional fee when they want to use this system. Meanwhile, the situation as follows is problematic as to this system. Although a patient applied for using the premium medical treatment system and the patient also chose his or her own doctor specifically, another doctor who was not selected as premium doctor could make a medical accident. Then, is the another doctor liable for damages because the accident was a medical malpractice or a breach of medical contract? In this study, we are going to examine the problems related with the premium medical treatment system. First, we examine the current law related to the system. Second, we look into the economic explanation duty and its application to the premium medical treatment system. Finally, we examine a real judgment case about a medical practice against the premium medical treatment system and we propose our solution to this case.