• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.11
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• pp.2511-2521
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• 2020

The Fukushima accident is characterized by the fact that three reactors at the same site experienced reactor vessel failure and the accident resulted in significant radiological release to the environment, which was about 1/10 of the Chernobyl releases. The safe removal of fuel debris in the reactor vessel and Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) and treatment of huge amount of contaminated water are the major issues for the decommissioning in coming decades. Discussions on the new researches efforts being carried out in the area of investigation of the end state of fuel debris and Boling Water reactor (BWR) specific core melt progression, development of technologies for the mitigation of radiological releases to comply with the strengthened safety requirement set after the Fukushima accident are discussed.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.46 no.2
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• pp.207-216
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• 2014

This paper revisits the Fukushima accident to draw lessons in the aspect of nuclear safety considering the fact that the Fukushima accident resulted in core damage for three nuclear power plants simultaneously and that there is a high possibility of a failure of the integrity of reactor vessel and primary containment vessel. A brief review on the accident progression at Fukushima nuclear power plants is discussed to highlight the nature and characteristic of the event. As the severe accident management measures at the Fukushima Daiich nuclear power plants seem to be not fully effective, limitations of current severe accident management strategy are discussed to identify the areas for the potential improvements including core cooling strategy, containment venting, hydrogen control, depressurization of primary system, and proper indication of event progression. The gap between the Fukushima accident event progression and current understanding of severe accident phenomenology including the core damage, reactor vessel failure, containment failure, and hydrogen explosion are discussed. Adequacy of current safety goals are also discussed in view of the socio-economic impact of the Fukushima accident. As a conclusion, it is suggested that an investigation on a coherent integrated safety principle for the severe accident and development of innovative mitigation features is necessary for robust and resilient nuclear power system.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.48 no.2
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• pp.545-553
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• 2016

The failure probabilities of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) for low temperature over-pressurization (LTOP) and cool-down transients are calculated in this study. For the cool-down transient, a pressure-temperature limit curve is generated in accordance with Section XI, Appendix G of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code, from which safety margin factors are deliberately removed for the probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis. Then, sensitivity analyses are conducted to understand the effects of some input parameters. For the LTOP transient, the failure of the RPV mostly occurs during the period of the abrupt pressure rise. For the cool-down transient, the decrease of the fracture toughness with temperature and time plays a main role in RPV failure at the end of the cool-down process. As expected, the failure probability increases with increasing fluence, Cu and Ni contents, and initial reference temperature-nil ductility transition ($RT_{NDT}$). The effect of warm prestressing on the vessel failure probability for LTOP is not significant because most of the failures happen before the stress intensity factor reaches the peak value while its effect reduces the failure probability by more than one order of magnitude for the cool-down transient.