Nuclear Engineering and Technology

Korean Nuclear Society (한국원자력학회)
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SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES RAISED BY THE FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT AND IMPROVEMENTS SUGGESTED

  • Received : 2013.08.22
  • Accepted : 2013.11.05
  • Published : 2014.04.25
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Abstract

This paper revisits the Fukushima accident to draw lessons in the aspect of nuclear safety considering the fact that the Fukushima accident resulted in core damage for three nuclear power plants simultaneously and that there is a high possibility of a failure of the integrity of reactor vessel and primary containment vessel. A brief review on the accident progression at Fukushima nuclear power plants is discussed to highlight the nature and characteristic of the event. As the severe accident management measures at the Fukushima Daiich nuclear power plants seem to be not fully effective, limitations of current severe accident management strategy are discussed to identify the areas for the potential improvements including core cooling strategy, containment venting, hydrogen control, depressurization of primary system, and proper indication of event progression. The gap between the Fukushima accident event progression and current understanding of severe accident phenomenology including the core damage, reactor vessel failure, containment failure, and hydrogen explosion are discussed. Adequacy of current safety goals are also discussed in view of the socio-economic impact of the Fukushima accident. As a conclusion, it is suggested that an investigation on a coherent integrated safety principle for the severe accident and development of innovative mitigation features is necessary for robust and resilient nuclear power system.

Keywords

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