• Journal of agriculture & life science
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• v.46 no.6
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• pp.185-195
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• 2012

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how strategically the bilaterally monopolistic firms, only-one-seller and only-one-buyer, behave in a situation in which each firm has uncertain information on its opponent firm's cost. Even though the two firms know that seeking integrated profit leads to the optimized profit for both firms, each firm has an incentive to opportunistically behave to increase its share of the integrated profit. These opportunistic behaviors of the firms are analyzed through a game theoretic approach especially finding Nash equilibrium mixed strategies for the strategic profiles such as true-report or not and monitoring or not. The comparative statics to the Nash equilibrium mixed strategies shows that as the profit share increases the probability of monitoring an opponent firm is decreased while the probability increases as the size of the overstated production cost increases. This study also shows that high penalty and low monitoring cost lead to high probability to tell the truth of the production cost.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Library and Information Science
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.151-170
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• 2001

Pricing for e-journals has become more complex than before-certainly much more complex than print pricing has ever been. E-journals charge either a fiat fee based on print, user, library size, usage, and combination. A survey of publisher's pricing structure found that print based model is popular followed by user based model. The current pricing situation is far from equitable and can be improved if publishers can be coerced to change their pricing practices. This study focus on a number of possible pricing models that may supplement and/or possibly replace the current print based model. With the possibility that its pricing will eventually be based strictly according to usage, may lead to the most equitable pricing model as well as the most efficient use of society's resources. Libraries can alleviate the pricing problem by encouraging library organizations and university consortia to exploit their potential monopoly power into a bilateral monopoly situation.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1999.07c
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• pp.1101-1103
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• 1999

Deregulation and restructuring of electric industry change the fundamental nature of electric business which will be coordinated by the evolved market structures such as spot market with pool and bilateral transaction structure, forward market and future market. Introduction of competition can significantly change the system operation in near-terms as well as long-run generation expansion planning Previous centralized planning by monopoly utilities which was guided for the public service purpose will be replaced by decentralized investments plan by individual generation companies in response to commercial incentives. This paper reviews WASP model as a centralized planning tool and presents a methodological analysis of generation expansion planning in deregulated power systems. It stresses how affects the process of planning new generation investments by the introduction of competition and how maintains proper fuel mix and continuously sustains system reliability under deregulated environments.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.93-125
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• 2011

The International Civil Aviation Convention (Chicago Convention) has been a backbone of international air transport system whereby air transport between States should be based on bilateral agreements, and in particular, international airfares, which are set up through IATA(International Air Transport Association) rate-fixing machinery could be approved by the governments concerned. International airfares are fares for transporting passenger and freight and their conditions between two or more countries. However, since U.S. pursued th deregulation policy in 1978 whereby routes, capacity and fares could be freely determined by airlines, many States have been following so called open-skies agreements. In many cases, aeronautical and competent authorities have been reviewing whether airlines' commercial activities including air fares could possibly conflict with free competition rules envisaged in relevant laws and regulations. As competition among airlines gets intense, airlines often resort to cooperation with other airlines in the forms such as equity exchange, M&A, code-sharing, fares consultation and resource pooling, mainly with a view to effectively use resources available and to avoid monopoly situation resulting from excessive and destructive competition among players. Whereas bearing in mind that application of competition laws is important to secure consumers' interests by preventing airlines's malpractices such as bargaining exorbitant fares, it is also important to comprehensively consider as many factors as possible, from that unilateral measure by governments may bring about retaliatory measures by the governments affected, to that airlines' cooperative practices may rather increase consumers' benefits by lowering air fares.