• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.11
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• pp.492-497
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• 2006

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is essential to investigate a participant's bidding strategy in a competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the NE due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The competition among multi-participants is modeled by a two-level hierarchical optimization problem. A mathematical programming approach is widely used in finding this equilibrium. However, there are difficulties to solving a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents two propositions to add heuristics to the mathematical programming method. The propositions are based on empirical studies on mixed strategies in numerous sample systems. Based on the propositions a new formulation is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the prepositions and the newly-formulated equations.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.23-30
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• 2014

Overseas construction orders of domestic companies had been increased significantly in a short period from $10.9 billion in 2005 to $64.9 billion in 2012. However experts are concerned that quality of growth will not support quantitative growth. This study suggest concentrate competencies for not only winning in bid but also successful execution of domestic companies. 4 Steps which are Pre-Marketing, Bid-Preparation, Bidding, Contract Phase are defined for competency assessment. After drawing specific tasks by phase, survey asking importance and capability of the tasks to the person in charge of bidding and site was conducted by utilizing Likert 7 point scale. According to the result of IPA analysis, domestic construction companies need to ensure internal competencies; Project risk review, Bid team organization, and external competencies; Client needs grasp, Localization strategy, Cooperation establishment. Hearafter domestic construction companies will be able to utilize the result of the study for setting bidding strategy for winning in bid and improving earning rate.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.7
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• pp.1226-1231
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• 2010

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. In addition, it analyzes the influence of holding of FTRs by generation company on SW and it proposes the SW at NE is influenced by Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) where holder of FTRs are located. The assertion is verified by calculating the mixed strategy utilizing the Cournot model widely used for studies on FTRs.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.39 no.6
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• pp.562-576
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• 2013

Power TAC (Power Trading Agent Competition) is an agent-based simulation for competitions between electricity brokering agents on the smart grid. To win the competition, agents obtain electricity from the electricity wholesale market among the power plants. In this operation, a key to success is balancing the demand of the customer and the supply from the plants because any imbalance results in a significant penalty to the brokering agent. Given the bidding on the wholesale market requires the price and the quantity on the electricity, this paper proposes four different price estimation strategies: exponentially moving average, linear regression, fuzzy logic, and support vector regression. Our evaluations with the competition simulation show which strategy is better than which, and which strategy wins in the free-for-all situations. This result is a crucial component in designing an electricity brokering agent in both Power TAC and the real world.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.9
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• pp.461-466
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power. Simulation results show some parameters have an influence on the market power of an electricity market including a hydro generator.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.07a
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• pp.807-809
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• 2005

This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a hydro generator in an electricity market, and their effect on the electricity market in accordance with some parameters: the water volume, the demand elasticity, and the hydro unit performance. The competition of a hydro generator is formulated as a hi-level optimization problem, and the solving scheme for the equilibrium condition is proposed as a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations. The equilibrium of the oligopolistic model is evaluated by comparison with that of a perfect competition model from the viewpoint of a market power.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.475-478
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• 2003

본 논문에서는 쿠르노 모형을 적용한 양방향입찰 전력 풀시장에서 입찰에 참여하는 발전기가 최대 이익을 얻기 위한 입찰전략으로서 신경회로망의 오차 역전파 알고리즘을 이용하여 최적 입찰발전량과 입찰가격을 수립하는 기법에 관하여 연구한다. 전력시장 환경은 n 개의 발전기들이 참여하는 비협조적 불완전정보 시장으로 설정하고 Bayesian의 조건부 확률이론을 적용하여 상대 발전기들의 발전비용함수와 시장의 수요함수를 추정하여 발전기 상호간 쿠르노-내쉬균형점을 이루는 최적 입찰발전량을 예측한다. 그리고 이익을 극대화시키기 위해 오차 역전파 알고리즘을 이용하여 시장의 가격 탄력성과 쿠르노 시장균형가격에 연결가중치를 조절함으로써 입찰가격이 계통한계가격에 근접하도록 최적 입찰전략을 수립한다.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.57 no.1
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• pp.34-39
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• 2008

Nash Equilibrium(NE) is essential to investigate a participant's bidding strategy in a competitive electricity market. Congestion on a transmission line makes it difficult to compute the NE due to causing a mixed strategy. In order to compute the NE of a multi-player game, some heuristics are proposed with concepts of a key player and power transfer distribution factor in other studies. However, generation capacity constraints are not considered and make it more difficult to compute the NE in the heuristics approach. This paper addresses an effect of generation capacity limits on the NE, and suggest a solution technique for the mixed strategy NE including generation capacity constraints as two heuristic rules. It is reported in this paper that a role of the key player who controls congestion in a NE can be transferred to other player depending on the generation capacity of the key player. The suggested heuristic rules are verified to compute the mixed strategy NE with a consideration of generation capacity constraints, and the effect of the generation constraints on the mixed strategy NE is analyzed in simulations of IEEE 30 bus systems.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.114-121
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• 2010

In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes' dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.