• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.1-27
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• 2007

When banks prefer securities holding to lending, bank-dependent borrowers would be rationed in bank loan markets. This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, the incentive of banks to hold securities rather than loans. When banks are in trouble due to an external shock and subsequent drain of deposit, they cannot reduce their loans quickly because loans are illiquid and are not easy to sell. Therefore, banks should respond to insured deposit drain by raising uninsured CDs or debentures. However, they cannot raise enough money through uninsured CDs or debentures when there is costly external finance premium. Meanwhile, if banks hold securities which are highly liquid, they can sell those securities and thus endure deposit drain without costly external financing. This explains why banks hold liquid securities of which yields to maturity are lower than those of loans. Banks' preference for securities comes from the existence of costly external finance premium, which is inversely related with bank net worth. After all, if bank net worth is kept high enough or capital market incompleteness is not severe, the preference for securities should be weakened.