• Strategy21
• /
• 통권34호
• /
• pp.58-92
• /
• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권33호
• /
• pp.65-112
• /
• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• 한국과 국제사회
• /
• 제1권1호
• /
• pp.71-96
• /
• 2017

이 연구는 북한 핵위협에 대한 대응과 미래 한반도 통일과정에서 한 미 중 3개국의 공조체제와 협력구상에 관한 것이다. 북핵문제와 한반도 통일문제에서 한 미 중의 공조와 협력 및 역할과 책임에 있어서 한국은 민족분단의 당사자이고, 미국은 국제문제의 책임국가이자 북한과는 적대적 미수교국이라는 점이며, 중국은 전통적 사회주의 우호관계의 당사국이자 북한 후견인 당사국이라는 점을 지적할 수 있다. 북한의 핵무기와 탄도미사일 등의 전략무기는 국제적 문제로서 향후 김정은의 돌발적 행동에 대비하기 위해서는 한 미 중 3국의 적극적인 공조와 협력 등 대응방안이 모색되어져야 할 시점이다. 그러나 북핵문제의 로드맵에 있어서 G2체제의 미국과 중국의 인식과 대응방법은 유엔안 보리결의사항인 대북제재 이행에서 미묘한 차이를 보이고 있다. 미국은 북핵위협에 대해 한미동맹차원에서 공동위협에 기반한 대북제재와 대북군사력 억제정책을 강력히 추진한 반면, 중국은 북핵위협에 대해 미국의 한반도개입에 대한 안보불안 등으로 북핵해결 과정에서 소극적인 입장을 보이고 있다. 북한은 체제생존 차원에서 중동국가들과 전략무기 거래를 지속적으로 해 온 전례국가라는 점에서 세계평화유지 차원에서라도 중단된 6자회담 다자안보 채널가동 등 압박과 외교협상의 현실적 방안으로 전환해야 한다. 한반도 통일문제는 남북한 당사자의 문제가 전제되어야 함에도 남북한은 민족적 문제를 강대국에 논리에 편승하려는 기현상을 보이고 있다. 그럼에도 북핵과 남북통일문제는 민족 당사자문제로서 국제적 지지를 확보하지 못한 북한의 해법보다는 한국주도의 평화적 해법에 더 설득력이 있어 보인다. 하지만 한 미 중은 한반도 평화정착을 위한 북한에 대한 '대북제재'와 '북한과의 대화'라는 투트랙 전략을 전방위적으로 강구해 나갈 필요성이 있으며, 북한자체의 경제적 자생력을 꾸준히 향상시키는 지원노력을 지속적으로 추진해 나가야 한다.

• 해양안보
• /
• 제7권1호
• /
• pp.31-60
• /
• 2023

본 논문은 북한의 SLBM 탑재 신형 잠수함과 핵 무인 수중 공격정 '해일'에 효과적으로 대응하기 위해 자항 기뢰와 초공동 어뢰를 결합한 융복합 무기체계를 제안하고, 그 효과성을 분석하였다. 자항 기뢰와 초공동 어뢰의 융복합 무기체계는 자항 기뢰의 은밀 매복 및 탐지 능력과 초공동 어뢰의 초고속 주행 능력을 결합하여, 각 무기체계의 장점을 극대화하고 단점을 상호 보완한다. 이 무기체계의 효과성을 분석하기 위해 국방전력발전업무훈령의 소요제기서 작성 기준을 참고하여 수중 유도무기의 작전 운용에 요구되는 성능에 적합하게 분석 기준을 선정하고, 기존 무기체계 대비 효과성을 수중 방어 지속성, 전투력 운용 융통성, 생존성, 지휘/통제, 운영 비용 효율성, 기상 영향 요인 등 6가지 측면에서 분석하였다. 또한, 시나리오 구상을 통해 이 무기체계의 실용성을 입증하였다. 자항 기뢰와 초공동 어뢰의 융복합 무기체계가 현실화 된다면 미래의 수중환경에서 한국의 안보에 매우 중요한 역할을 할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.