• Title/Summary/Keyword: BREACH

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Liabilities of Air Carrier Who Sponsored Financially Troubled Affiliate Shipping Company (항공사(航空社)의 부실 계열 해운사(海運社) 지원에 따른 법적 책임문제)

  • Choi, June-Sun
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.32 no.1
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    • pp.177-200
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    • 2017
  • This writer have thus far reviewed the civil and criminal obligations of the directors of a parent company that sponsored financially troubled affiliates. What was discussed here applies to logistics companies in the same manner. Hanjin Shipping cannot expect its parent company, Korean Air to prop it up financially. If such financial aid is offered without any collateral, under Korean criminal law, the directors of the parent company bears the burden of civil and criminal responsibility. One way to get around this is to secure fairness in terms of the process and the content of aid. Fairness in terms of process refers to the board of directors making public all information and approving such aid. Fairness in terms of content refers to impartial transactions that block out any possibilities of the chairman of the corporate group acting in his private interest. In the case of Korean Air bailing out Hanjin, the meeting of board of directors were held five times and a thorough review was conducted on the risks involved in the loans being repaid or not. After the review, measures to guard against undesirable scenarios were established before finally deciding on bailing out Hanjin. As such, there are no issues. In terms of the fairness of content, too, there were practically no room for the majority shareholder or controlling shareholder to pocket profits at the expense of the company. This is because the continued aid offered to a financially troubled company (i.e. Hanjin Shipping) was a posing a burden to even the controlling shareholder. This writer argues that the concept of the interest of the entire corporate group needs to be recognized. That is, it must be recognized that the relationship of control and being controlled between parent company and affiliate company, or between affiliate companies serves a practical benefit to the ongoing concern and growth of the group and is therefore just. Moreover, the corporate group and its affiliates, as well as their directors and management must recognize that they have an obligation to prioritize the interests of the corporate group ahead of the interests of the company that they are directly associated with. As such, even if Korean Air offered a loan to Hanjin Shipping without collateral, the act cannot be treated as an offense to law, nor can the directors be accused of damages that they bear the responsibility of compensating under civil law.

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A Study on Air Operator Certification and Safety Oversight Audit Program in light of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (시카고협약체계에서의 항공안전평가제도에 관한 연구)

  • Lee, Koo-Hee;Park, Won-Hwa
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.28 no.1
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    • pp.115-157
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    • 2013
  • Some contracting States of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (commonly known as the Chicago Convention) issue FAOC(Foreign AOC and/or Operations Specifications) and conduct various safety audits for the foreign operators. These FAOC and safety audits on the foreign operators are being expanded to other parts of the world. While this trend is the strengthening measure of aviation safety resulting in the reduction of aircraft accident, it is the source of concern from the legal as well as economic perspectives. FAOC of the USA doubly burdens the other contracting States to the Chicago Convention because it is the requirement other than that prescribed by the Chicago Convention of which provisions are faithfully observed by almost all the contracting States. The Chicago Convention in its Article 33 stipulates that each contracting State recognize the validity of the certificates of airworthiness and licenses issued by other contracting States as long as they meet the minimum standards of the ICAO. Consequently, it is submitted that the unilateral action of the USA, China, Mongolia, Australia, and the Philippines issuing the FOAC to the aircraft of other States is against the Convention. It is worry some that this breach of international law is likely to be followed by the European Union which is believed to be in preparation for its own unilateral application. The ICAO established by the Chicago Convention to be in charge of safe and orderly development of the international civil aviation has been in hard work to both upgrade and emphasize the safe operation of aircraft. As the result of these endeavors, it prepared a new Annex 19 to the Chicago Convention with the title of "Safety Management" and with the applicable date 14 November 2013. It is this Annex and other ICAO documents relevant to the safety that the contracting States to the Chicago Convention have to observe. Otherwise, it is the economical burden due to probable delay in issuing the FOAC and bureaucracies combined with many different paperworks and regulations depending on where the aircraft is flown. It is exactly to avoid this type of confusion and waste that the Chicago Convention aimed at when it was adopted in 1944. The State of the operator shall establish a system for both the certification and the continued surveillance of the operator in accordance with ICAO SARPs to ensure that the required standards of operations are maintained. Certainly the operator shall meet and maintain the requirements established by the States in which it operate. The authority of a State stops where the authority of another State intervenes or where the former has yielded its power by an international agreement for the sake of international cooperation. Hence, it is not within the realm of the State to issue FAOC towards foreign operators for the reason that these foreign operators are flying in and out of the State. Furthermore, there are other safety audits such as ICAO USOAP, IATA IOSA, FAA IASA, and EU SAFA that assure the safe operation of the aircraft, but within the limit of their power and in compliance with the ICAO SARPs. If the safety level of any operator is not satisfactory, the operator could be banned to operate in the contracting States with watchful eyes until the ICAO SARPs are met. This time-honoured practice has been applied without any serious problems. Besides, we have the new Annex 19 to strengthen and upgrade with easy reference for contracting States. We don't have no reason to introduce additional burden to the States by unilateral actions of some States. These actions have to be corrected. On the other hand, when it comes to the carriage of the Personal or Pilot Log Book, the Korean regulation requiring it is in contrast with other relevant provisions of USA, USOAP, IOSA, and SAFA. The Chicago Convention requires in its Articles 29 and 34 only the carriage of the Journey Log Book and some other certificates, but do not mention the Personal Log Book at all. Paragraph 5.1.1.1 of Annex 1 to the Chicago Convention even makes it clear that the carriage in the aircraft of the Personal Log Book is not required on international flights. The unique Korean regulation in this regards giving the unnecessary burden to the national flag air carriers has to be lifted at once.

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A Study on Jurisdiction under the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions (국제항공테러협약의 관할권 연구)

  • Kim, Han-Taek
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.24 no.1
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    • pp.59-89
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    • 2009
  • The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

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