• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.3-27
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• 2012

Although aviation safety and security have been improving, which has made air transportation more reliable, the international aviation community has witnessed a steady increase in the number of unruly passenger incidents. Under international law, the Tokyo Convention (The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963) is applicable to unruly passenger issues. While the Tokyo Convention has been a successful convention which 185 member states have ratified, it has its shortcomings. Three major shortcomings are related to definition, jurisdiction, and enforcement. Firstly, the Tokyo Convention does not provide for a definition of unruly passengers, thereby resulting in a situation where conduct that may be considered to be a criminal offence in the country of embarkation may not be a criminal offence in the country where the aircraft lands. Having different definitions may lead to ineffective action on the part of air carriers. Secondly, the fact that the state of landing does not bear jurisdiction produces circumstances in which it is impossible to punish an unruly passenger who clearly committed an offence on board. Thirdly, the Tokyo Convention only recognizes the competence of the state of registry to exercise criminal jurisdiction but does not impose the duty to actually use that competence in any specific case. Along with ratifying the Tokyo Convention, Korea enacted the Aviation Navigation Safety Act in 1974 as a domestic legal approach to dealing with the problem of unruly passengers. Partially reflecting the ICAO's model legislation, Circular 288, the Aviation Safety and Security Act was enacted in 2002. Although the Korean Aviation Safety and Security Act is a comprehensive act which has been constantly updated, there is no provision with respect to jurisdiction and only the Korean criminal code is applicable to jurisdiction. The Korean criminal code establishes its jurisdiction in connection with territoriality, nationality and registration, which is essentially the same as the jurisdictional principles of the Tokyo Convention. Thus, the domestic legal regime cannot close the jurisdictional gap either. Similarly, Korean case law would not take an active posture to jurisdiction unless the offence in question is a serious one, such as hijacking. A Special Sub Committee of the ICAO Legal Committee (LCSC) was established to examine the feasibility of introducing amendments to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963 with particular reference to the issue of unruly passengers. The result of the ICAO's findings should lead to the modernization of the Tokyo Convention, thereby reducing the number of incidents caused by unruly passengers and enabling all parties concerned to respond to unruly passengers more effectively.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.10
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• pp.155-164
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• 2022

The review of known decisions showed that currently there are no systems and technologies for supporting the decision about the possibility of concluding the civil law agreements for medical, therapeutic and dental services. The paper models the decision-making support process on the possibility of concluding the civil law agreements for medical, therapeutic and dental services, which is the theoretical basis for the development of rules, methods and system for supporting the decision about the possibility of concluding the civil law agreements for medical, therapeutic and dental services. The paper also developed the system for supporting the decision about the possibility of concluding the civil law agreements for medical, therapeutic and dental services, which automatically and free determines the possibility or impossibility of concluding the corresponding civil law agreement for the provision of a corresponding medical service. In the case of formation of a conclusion about the possibility of concluding the agreement, further conclusion and signing of the corresponding agreement takes place. In the case of forming a conclusion about the impossibility of concluding the agreement, a request is made for finalizing the relevant agreement for the provision of the relevant medical service, indicating the reasons for the impossibility of concluding the agreement - missing essential conditions in the agreement. After finalization, the agreement can be analyzed again by the developed system for supporting the decision.

• Journal of Astronomy and Space Sciences
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• v.39 no.2
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• pp.51-57
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• 2022

Cosmic radiation exposure of the flight crews in Korea has been managed by Radiation Safety Management around Living Life Act under Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. However, the domestic flight crews are excluded from the Act because of relatively low route dose exposure compared to that of international flight crews. But we found that the accumulated total annual dose of domestic flight crews is far from negligible because of relatively long total flight time and too many flights. In this study, to suggest the necessity of management of domestic flight crews' radiation exposure, we statistically analyzed domestic flight crew's accumulative annual dose by using cosmic radiation estimation models of the Civil Aviation Research Institute (CARI)-6M, Nowcast of Atmospheric Ionizing Radiation for Aviation Safety (NAIRAS), and Korean Radiation Exposure Assessment Model (KREAM) and compared with in-situ measurements of Liulin-6K LET spectrometer. As a result, the average exposure dose of domestic flight crews was found to be 0.5-0.8 mSv. We also expect that our result might provide the basis to include the domestic flight crews as radiation workers, not just international flight attendants.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.491-499
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• 2020

There are policies that foster the drone industry, which either put a legal precedent on drones through the "Drone Act" or grant a delay or exemption in applying the safety measures of "the Aviation Safety Act". Yet, the definition of a drone is unclear, requiring further discussion on commercial usage. Therefore, we have studied cases domestically and abroad, and also analyzed issues with the current aviation legislation. It was found that a drone is defined as "an unmanned aircraft where a pilot is not on board, and its net weight is 150 kg or less". However, there are several issues, such as that a drone taxi requires a pilot on board, and its weight is 150 kg or more. Thus, we propose to define a drone as "an unmanned aerial vehicle (provided, that its own net weight should be 300 kg or under, or not be limited to weight) under Article 2 (3) of the "Aviation Security Act" as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, which operates either by remote, automatically, or autonomously; or an unmanned aircraft under Article 2 (6) of the "Aviation Security Act".

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.109-139
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• 2004

The first successful sustained powered flight by Wright Brothers was further extended to the rapid development of aviation technology, that led to transpacific flights, the invention of supersonic planes, and enabled hundreds of people to travel in the space, in addition to the fact that around 10 people had stepped on the moon, all of which were made possible within the very same century. However, on the back side of this most wondrous human technology, the vulnerableness to the aviation accident has been constantly accompanied with, right from the very beginning stage of the aircraft development. Moreover, the development of future aircraft is being focused on the aircraft performance, the increment of the number of passengers aboard and also its speed. In proportion to these phenomena of mega sizing the aircraft, the development of new technology and the increment of air traffic volume, the number of aviation accident is expected to augment, resulting in the enormous loss of human lives and properties. In order to prevent the disastrous aviation accident as such, it is essential to conduct the accident investigation in a specialized, systematic and scientific manner. In search for the method to attain the effective function of the aviation accident investigation organization, in this study, issues were examined as follows: The full-time Board Members and the establishment of an integrated investigation agency, The systematized security of status as an accident investigator, Inclusion of a human factors specialist in the investigator group organization, liability limit of an accident investigator Stipulation of the definition and the investigation scope of an accident and serious incident, along with the main body of conducting the investigation into the accident involving both civil and public aircraft, in the regulations related to the accident investigation.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.367-418
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• 2018

Just as safety is the most important thing in aviation, safety is the most important in the operation of unmanned aircraft (RPA), and safety operation is the most important in the legal responsibility of the operator of the unmanned aircraft. In this thesis, the legal responsibility of the operator of the unmanned aircraft, focusing on the responsibility of the operator of the unmanned aircraft, was discussed in depth with the issue of insurance, which compensates for damages in the event of an accident First of all, the legal responsibility of the operator of the unmanned aircraft was reviewed for the most basic : definition, scope and qualification of the operator of the unmanned aircraft, and the liability of the operator of the Convention On International Civil Aviation, the ICAO Annex, the RPAS Manual, the Rome Convention, other major international treaties and Domestic law such as the Aviation Safety Act. The ICAO requires that unmanned aircraft be operated in such a manner as to minimize hazards to persons, property or other aircraft as a major principle of the operation of unmanned aircraft, which is ultimately equivalent to manned aircraft Considering that most accidents involving unmanned aircrafts fall to the ground, causing damage to third parties' lives or property, this thesis focused on the responsibility of operators under the international treaty, and the responsibility of third parties for air transport by Domestic Commercial Act, as well as the liability for compensation. In relation to the Rome Convention, the Rome Convention 1952 detailed the responsibilities of the operator. Although it has yet to come into effect regarding liability, some EU countries are following the limit of responsibility under the Rome Convention 2009. Korea has yet to sign any Rome Convention, but Commercial Act Part VI Carriage by Air is modeled on the Rome Convention 1978 in terms of compensation. This thesis also looked at security-related responsibilities and the responsibility for privacy infringement. which are most problematic due to the legal responsibilities of operating unmanned aircraft. Concerning insurance, this thesis looked at the trends of mandatory aviation insurance coverage around the world and the corresponding regulatory status of major countries to see the applicability of unmanned aircraft. It also looked at the current clauses of the Domestic Aviation Business Act that make insurance mandatory, and the ultra-light flight equipment insurance policy and problems. In sum, the operator of an unmanned aircraft will be legally responsible for operating the unmanned aircraft safely so that it does not pose a risk to people, property or other aircraft, and there will be adequate compensation in the event of an accident, and legal systems such as insurance systems should be prepared to do so.

• Electronics and Telecommunications Trends
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• v.36 no.6
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• pp.46-54
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• 2021

Drone remote identification (ID) capability is essential to ensure public safety, help law enforcement, and secure the safety and efficiency of the national airspace. Remote ID technology can be used to differentiate compliant drones from illegal drones that pose a potential security risk by providing airspace awareness to the civil aviation agency and law enforcement entities. In addition, the increased safety and efficiency obtained by mandating remote ID will make it possible to operate drones over populated areas and beyond visual lines of sight. In addition, remote ID will allow drones to be safely integrated into unmanned traffic management systems and the national airspace. Remote ID devices can be categorized by type, i.e., broadcast remote ID or network remote ID. The broadcast remote ID, which has high technical maturity and will be applied in the near future, is primarily considered to ensure the security of drones. The network remote ID, which is being developed and tested and will be applied in the distant future, can be used additionally to ensure the safety and the efficiency of the national airspace. In this paper, we analyze the trends on regulation and standardization activities for drone remote ID primarily in the United State and Europe.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.297-303
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• 2022

The main purpose of the study is to determine the main aspects of the problem of socio-economic development in the conditions of the digital economy. The post-industrial era is characterized by the development of the electronic environment and the transition to an information civilization. In this regard, the developed countries of the world pay considerable attention to the development of the digital economy. However, there are a significant number of problems associated with this process. The country cannot be successful in the development of the digital economy in the absence of the necessary legal framework, an economic development strategy based on digital technologies. The research methodology involves the use of several theoretical methods for analyzing and synthesizing information. As a result of the study, the key problems of socio-economic development in the digital economy were characterized.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.