• Asian Journal of Business Environment
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• 제7권2호
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• pp.5-16
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• 2017

Purpose - The purpose of this research study is to make a comparative analysis between corporate governance guidelines 2016 and 2012 and area of further improvement to ensure better governance, accountability and transparency. Research design, data and methodology - This research study is mainly based on the corporate governance guidelines 2016 and 2012 issued by the regulatory authority known as Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC). Results - This study finds that corporate governance guideline 2012 include some new issues such as criteria and qualification of independent director; some additional statements in the directors' report; mandatory requirement of separation of chairman and CEO; constitution of audit committee; chairman of audit committee; role of audit committee, duties of CEO and CFO on financial statements; and collection of compliance certificate from professional accountant or secretary in compare to corporate governance guidelines 2016. Conclusions - This study suggests that the regulatory authority should include more issues such as tax management and reporting, risk management and reporting; individual and overall performance analysis of the board and independent directors; separate nomination and compensation committee; assessment of true independence of the board and its supporting committees to ensure higher quality of corporate governance and transparency.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제9권4호
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• pp.213-228
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• 2022

This paper investigates the association between key corporate governance characteristics and the performance of general insurance businesses listed on the Saudi stock exchange (TADAWUL). The methodology for the study is based on a pooled data collection for 11 Saudi general insurance companies from 2011 to 20. The linear regression model and the logarithm regression model are suggested to assess the relationship between performance and corporate governance characteristics. The dependent variable is firm performance measured using ROA, ROE, and Tobin's Q. The independent variables are corporate governance variables consisting of a complete set of board and audit committee characteristics. Insurer-specific control variables are introduced. The empirical results reveal that the characteristics of corporate governance influence the performance of insurance companies. In particular, the board size, board's tenure, the proportion of independent directors in the board, audit committee size, audit committee meeting frequency, and proportion of health insurance premiums have a positive impact. However, audit committee independence, size of the company, and proportion of reinsurance premiums have a negative impact on the performance of the Saudi general insurance companies. Finally, the empirical results indicated also that there is an unclear relationship between the performance and board meeting frequency, compensations of the Board, and the average age of the Board.

• 경영과정보연구
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• 제35권3호
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• pp.231-247
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• 2016

본 연구는 2014년도 회계감사보고서부터 주식회사의 외부감사에 관한 법률(외감법)의 개정에 따라 추가자료인 외부감사 참여인원 수, 감사내용 및 투입시간 등을 기초로 자산규모 천억원의 상장기업을 표본으로 평균을 산출한다. 그러나 실제 천억원 자산규모를 가지는 대상기업은 소수이기에 이를 기준으로 도출하는데 한계가 있다. 따라서 천억원을 중심으로 -10%의 기업 50개와 +10%의 기업 50개까지 표본을 확장하여 100개의 기업을 선정하고 이를 표본으로 하였다. 등급별 투입인원 및 투입시간의 평균을 산출하기 위해 두 집단의 t-검정을 실시, 두 집단간 차이를 분석한 결과 집단간 차이가 없다는 것을 확인하였다. t-검정의 분석결과에 따라 100개의 표본으로 하는 회계감사 투입 인원 및 투입시간의 평균값을 산출하였다. 그리고 선행연구인 문태형(2016)의 연구에서 산정한 예정원가계산에 의한 감사보수 산정에 사용된 대상기업의 투입인원 및 투입시간의 견적값과 본 연구의 산출값과 비교한다. 본 연구의 결과가 최적의 적정치는 아니다 할지라도 기준이 없는 감사시장에서 회계감사 투입인원 및 투입시간을 비교할 수 있는 기본 척도로 사용할 수 있을 것이다. 그리고 이러한 외감법의 개정은 이전의 총 투입 감사시간만을 공시한 것보다 항목별 자세한 공시로 감사인의 독립성과 회계제도의 투명성을 제고할 수 있을 것이다.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제7권8호
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• pp.233-246
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• 2020

This paper investigates the effect of the involvement of the board chairman in the audit committee (AC) on earnings management (EM). It examines Bursa Malaysia-listed companies with the lowest positive earnings for the years 2013 to 2015. The Modified Jones Model by Kasznik (1999) was used to determine discretionary accruals. An AC that includes its board chairman as an ordinary member is associated with greater discretionary accruals. However, a board chairman who is also the chairman of the AC does not seem to influence discretionary accruals. This paper supports the agency theory and policy-makers' efforts to prevent board chairmen from sitting on ACs. It is the first study that uses the agency theory to describe the association between the board chairman's involvement in the both AC and EM. This study alerts policy-makers, stakeholders and researchers to the influence of a board chairman serving on the AC in curbing EM. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence that the majority of Malaysian companies whose board chairmen are involved in the AC appoint the chairman as an ordinary member of the AC. This indicates that executive directors may affect such actions. Hence, more policies are needed to improve AC independence.

• 한국융합학회논문지
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• 제9권5호
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• pp.171-177
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• 2018

본 연구의 목적은 비관련다각화가 이익조정에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 살펴보고, 이러한 관계가 감사위원회의 효율성에 따라 달라지는지를 검증하는 것이다. 분석을 위한 표본자료는 2000년에서 2009년까지 한국거래소에 상장되어있는 제조기업 중 264개 기업, 1924개의 기업-연(firm-year)자료를 이용하였다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 엔트로피지수로 측정한 비관련다각화는 이익조정에 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 비관련다각화가 이익조정에 미치는 양(+)의 영향에 대한 감사위원회의 상호조절효과를 검증한 결과, 비관련다각화수준이 높은 기업에서 감사위원회의 설치 및 독립성이 높은 경우 이익조정이 감소하는 음(-)의 관련성이 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 연구결과는 비관련다각화지수가 보다 높은 기업의 경우, 경영자를 감시하는 감사위원회의 효율성을 강화하는 것이 중요함을 시사한다.

• 대한수학회보
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• 제50권2호
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• pp.611-626
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• 2013

In the paper we study the finite-time ruin probability in a general risk model with constant interest force, in which the claim sizes are pairwise quasi-asymptotically independent and arrive according to an arbitrary counting process, and the premium process is a general stochastic process. For the case that the claim-size distribution belongs to the consistent variation class, we obtain an asymptotic formula for the finite-time ruin probability, which holds uniformly for all time horizons varying in a relevant infinite interval. The obtained result also includes an asymptotic formula for the infinite-time ruin probability.

• 한국발생생물학회지:발생과생식
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.477-482
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• 2013

Science in the 21st century does not consider participants' welfare, safety and human rights in clinical studies, but modern science puts economic profits in its priority. This leads to a growing concern about social responsibility and professionalism ethics of companies, sponsors and scientists. Specifically, there is no way to control conflicts of participants' welfare with economic profits, leading to simply relying on individual ethics, social responsibilities and audit. This paper helps relevant agencies and people involved understand conflict of interest. Also this study presents the guidelines as well as independence, autonomy, ethical imagination and phronesis required for scientists.

• 경영과정보연구
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• 제35권1호
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• pp.189-206
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• 2016

2014년도 회계감사보고서부터 외감법의 개정에 따라 감사보고서에 관한 7조의 2의 외부감사 참여인원 수, 감사내용 및 소요시간 등 외부감사 실시내용을 적은 서류를 첨부하도록 되었다. 본 연구에서는 개정된 외부감사 실시내용을 반영하여 정부출연기관의 용역예정원가계산에 의하여 감사보수를 산정한다. 본 연구에서는 대상기업(전기 적정의견, 직전년도 자산총액 1,000억원, 제조업, 사전의 의뢰인 수임에서 내부통제위험 및 유의적인 감사위험이 없는 것으로 가정한 상장기업)을 국가계약법의 용역원가계산 체계에 따라 인건비, 경비, 일반관리비, 이윤의 4가지 비목을 합계하여 감사보수를 산출한다. 그리고 회계감사의 참여자와 감사투입시간을 확인하기 위하여 Big-4 회계법인에 예정원가 산정 대상기업에 대한 견적을 의뢰하여 계정된 외부감사 실시내용을 적은 서류에 따라 수집한 결과를 이용하였다. 인건비는 2014년 학술연구용역비 인건비기준단가의 참여율 150% 적용, 경비는 한국은행의 기업경영분석(2013년)의 회계법인등의 평균을 사용, 일반관리비는 국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에 관한 법률 시행규칙 7조1항 용역업의 일반관리비율 5%를 적용, 이윤은 국가를 당사자로 하는 계약에 관한 법률 시행규칙 7조2항 용역업의 이윤율 10%가 적용되었다. 이를 적용한 예정원가 계산에 의한 감사보수는 50,617,769원이 산출되었다. 본 연구의 결과가 최적의 적정감사보수는 아니다 할지라도 기준이 없는 기업의 감사보수를 비교할 수 있는 기본 척도로 사용 할 수 있을 것이다. 그리고 이러한 외감법의 개정은 이전의 총 투입 감사시간만을 공시한 것보다 감사인의 독립성과 회계제도의 투명성을 제고할 수 있을 것이다.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제8권1호
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• pp.851-861
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• 2021

The main objective of this study is to examine the government ownership effect on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR). Government ownership is assumed to affect the CSR either directly or indirectly. That is by moderating the association between corporate governance and CSR. Publicly listed companies on the UAE capital markets (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) from 2010-2013 constituted the study sample. Panel data regression analyses and random effect model is used to examine the effects of board size, board independence, and audit committee characteristics on CSR. Government ownership is used as a moderator variable. The result showed that the existence of government ownership has a moderator effect on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the CSR. Precisely, the research revealed that the audit committee characteristics become more effective in improving the firm's CSR when the government owns shares in the organization. The main contribution of this study is to examine how firm ownership structure influences good corporate governance and CSR in the UAE. The study contributes to the CSR literature by merging between the existence of governmental ownership and the power to enforce the implementation of corporate governance in an emerging country.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제9권3호
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• pp.135-147
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• 2022

This study was conducted to determine whether there is a significant relationship between board structure and board committee qualities and corporate cash holdings in Pakistan. For this objective, 168 listed enterprises on the PSX for the period 2016 to 2020 were chosen as a sample from a population of 436 non-financial firms. Multiple regression analysis was used in the study to discover a relationship between board structure and board committee features and cash holdings. The study's findings revealed that board size, executive directors, and board independence have no significant impact on the firm's cash holding because they play no important part in the firm's cash holding. Auditors, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and the compensation committee, on the other hand, have no major impact on the firm's cash holdings because they are not relevant indicators to compare with cash holdings. While board meeting frequency and leadership structure both have a negative influence on cash holding, board meeting frequency increases firm costs, whereas leadership structure causes agency problems. Results were supported by the pecking order theory, cash flow theory, and agency theory.