• Asia pacific journal of information systems
• /
• v.20 no.4
• /
• pp.81-100
• /
• 2010

This study investigates the impact of website contents on Internet auction success. Based on the marketing concepts of stimuli, consumer behavior, and product involvement, the research model presents the theoretical relationships between the key factors of website contents and Internet auction performance. This study examines particularly four dimensions of website contents including transaction features, auction-specific features, seller's reputation, and information quality, which are deemed to have significant impact on the Internet auction performance, Each dimension of website contents is hypothesized to have a unique impact on a bidder's decision-making, which may vary depending on the bidder's level of involvement in the product. While transaction and auction-specific features serve as necessary components for successful auctions, a seller's reputation and information quality, as parts of satisfactory requirements, acutely affect bidders' decisions, especially those with high involvement to buy the product through a particular auction site. The outcomes of the analysis, in general, support the proposed model. The study results also provide meaningful Implications on ways in which auction websites can be improved for both sellers and auction service providers.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
• /
• 2005.11a
• /
• pp.379-390
• /
• 2005

In this paper, we introduce a new combinatorial auction mechanism - N-Bilateral Optimized Combinatorial Auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers optimized trading for multi-suppliers and multi-purchasers in the supply chain. We design the N-BOCA system from the perspectives of architecture, protocol, and trading strategy. Under the given N-BOCA architecture and protocol, auctioneers and bidders have diverse decision strategies for winner determination. This needs flexible modeling environments. Hence, we propose an optimization modeling agent for bid and auctioneer selection. The agent has the capability to automatic model formulation for Integer Programming modeling. Finally, we show the viability of N-BOCA through prototype and experiments. The results say both higher allocation efficiency and effectiveness compared with I-to-N general combinatorial auction mechanisms.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
• /
• v.23 no.4
• /
• pp.41-53
• /
• 2016

According to the price-decline effect, the art auction prices are known to decrease with the order of auction sale. Our empirical study investigates the presence for the price-decline effect using the data for Korean antique art hosted by the Seoul Auction in September, 2015. We apply the Hedonic price model to the data and examine the relation between the sale order and auction price. Our empirical evidences show that the well-known price decline effect is not present for the case of Korean antique auction in 2015. We confirm our results by estimating the ordered probit model. From the view of the price-decline effect, our results suggest that the Korean antique auction data exhibits different characteristics from most of the foreign art auction data.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.12 no.6
• /
• pp.2196-2207
• /
• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
• /
• v.25 no.2
• /
• pp.89-102
• /
• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
• /
• v.20 no.4
• /
• pp.125-147
• /
• 2010

This paper Introduces an electronic auction service to be provided on Interactive TV (T-auction). This converged service is expected to much enhance the quality of the service to current online auction users through vivid visualization and live Interactive experience. Our study focuses on how the characteristics of the interactive TV-based shopping platform can affect users' attitudes towards the converged service. To develop our proposed research model, we extended the technology acceptance model and integrated it with a hedonic factor, or perceived enjoyment to reflect the dual characteristics of the converged system. We also adopted the variable of intermediary trust In the service as a critical mediating determinant for a successful commutations-mediated commerce. The research model was verified with an empirical study conducted on 970 Korean online auction users. Results show that both trust and perceived usefulness positively affect user adoption of the service. Trust had not only a direct effect on users' attitudes toward T-auction but also an indirect one by mediating the service quality, information quality, perceived enjoyment and ease of use. Meanwhile, the hedonic factor of T-auction contributes to increasing both the level of the intermediary's trust and its perceived usefulness. Users' enjoyment also was found to help form a positive attitude toward T-auction services. Theoretical and practical implications of this study for current e-auction service providers and potential t-auction service providers are also discussed.

• The Journal of Information Systems
• /
• v.15 no.1
• /
• pp.49-71
• /
• 2006

With a rapid diffusion of internet, more peoples are interested in electronic commerce and the various electronic commerce types are being appeared. In these respects, the internet auction being take the more attentions at the present. Since perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use are such a fundamental driver of usage intentions, it is important to understand the determinants of this construct and how their influences change. In these respects, the web site joyfulness, the web site trust and the institutional mechanism are included as the moderating variables in our research model. A better understanding of the interactions of these factors to the usage intention to the auction site would enable us to design the organizational interventions that would increase the user acceptance and the usage of auction systems. Therefore, the goal of the present research is to extend the organizational model of auction system with TAM's perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use and the additional motivating determinants. The result showed that the web site joyfulness and the trust were the significant determinants on the the usage of auction site. However, the direction of the effect was not consistant through the cases. The model suggested in this study need to be extended with including the more sociological factors and the empirical results founded in this study are required to be verified with the extended model.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
• /
• v.13 no.10
• /
• pp.4432-4439
• /
• 2012

Previous studies on art pricing mostly focused on auction data because of the limitation of non-auction market data. This study investigated on both auction and non-auction markets to see the difference in art pricing mechanisms of both markets. Especially, while prior hedonic models included only quantatative variables to predict art prices, we added a qualitative measure, artistic value of a artwork, along with the original hedonic model to develop a more comprehensive model, and tested if his change may make more precise predictions. As a result, when we did not divide our data into auction and non-auction groups, we did not find any significant difference between the original hedonic model and the new model including artistic value. However, when we separated non-auction group from auction group, we found that predicted prices in the new model showed significantly closer values to the actual prices. This study contributes to our knowledge on art pricing by showing that artistic value may have important but differential impacts on different art dealing channels.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
• /
• v.17 no.6
• /
• pp.566-576
• /
• 2016

It is known that the Real Estate Sales Market and Auction Market are closely interrelated with each other in a variety of respects and the media often mention the real estate auction market as a leading indicator of the real estate market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationships between the housing market and auction market before and after macroeconomic fluctuations using VECM. The period from January 2002 to December 2008, which was before the financial crisis, was set as Model 1 and the period from January 2009 to November 2015, which was after the financial crisis, was set as Model 2. The results are as follows. First, the housing auction market is less sensitive to changes in the housing market than it is to fluctuations in the auction market. This means that changes in the auction market precede fluctuations in the housing market, which shows that the auction market as a trading market is activated. In this respect, public institutions need to realize the importance of the housing auction market and check trends in the housing contract price in the auction market. Also, investors need to ensure that they have expertise in the auction market.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
• /
• v.12 no.1
• /
• pp.139-161
• /
• 2006

In this paper, we introduce a new combinatorial auction mechanism - N-Bilateral Optimized Combinatorial Auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers optimized trading for multi-suppliers and multi-purchasers in the supply chain. We design the N-BOCA system from the perspectives of architecture, protocol, and trading strategy. Under the given N-BOCA architecture and protocol, auctioneers and bidders have diverse decision strategies f3r winner determination. This needs flexible modeling environments. Hence, we propose an optimization modeling agent for bid and auctioneer selection. The agent has the capability to automatic model formulation for Integer Programming modeling. Finally, we show the viability of N-BOCA through prototype and experiments. The results say both higher allocation efficiency and effectiveness compared with 1-to-N general combinatorial auction mechanisms.