• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2196-2207
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• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.6
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• pp.566-576
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• 2016

It is known that the Real Estate Sales Market and Auction Market are closely interrelated with each other in a variety of respects and the media often mention the real estate auction market as a leading indicator of the real estate market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationships between the housing market and auction market before and after macroeconomic fluctuations using VECM. The period from January 2002 to December 2008, which was before the financial crisis, was set as Model 1 and the period from January 2009 to November 2015, which was after the financial crisis, was set as Model 2. The results are as follows. First, the housing auction market is less sensitive to changes in the housing market than it is to fluctuations in the auction market. This means that changes in the auction market precede fluctuations in the housing market, which shows that the auction market as a trading market is activated. In this respect, public institutions need to realize the importance of the housing auction market and check trends in the housing contract price in the auction market. Also, investors need to ensure that they have expertise in the auction market.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.19-33
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• 2008

In the previous double auction research for the market optimization, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, and (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, the flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because traders can properly change utilities in each round. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a flexible synchronous double auction mechanism in which traders can express diverse utility functions for the price and quantity of the goods, and optimal total market utility is guaranteed. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a several simulation experiments.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.1-7
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• 2006

In an electricity market, the spot market is normally integrated with a forward or future market. The advantage of the forward market is to allow the market participants to deal in a part or the whole trading portfolio at a fix price in advance and to avoid risk associated to the uncertain price of the spot market. Japan has introduced a continuous auction base forward market from April 2005. This paper analyzes the Japanese forward market rules and operations, and introduces a new algorithm that may improve the efficiency of the market itself. The proposed algorithm enables us to give consideration to the specific characteristics of the power system and to integrate them in the auction mechanism. The benefits of the proposed algorithm are verified on an electronic simulation platform and the results described in this paper.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.535-545
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• 2019

If the real estate auction market indicators are relevant and meaningful, they can be meaningful information to the real estate market in connection with general real estate. The purpose of this study is to examine whether time-supply logic is applied in auction market by identifying time series correlations for the number of auctions, the auction rate, and the auction price rate, which are major indicators of real estate auction market. The real estate types were classified into three categories: residential real estate, land, and commercial real estate. The monthly time series of auctions in the metropolitan real estate were compiled for 96 months. Based on this data, the auction market model for each type was established and the mutual influences between the indicators were analyzed. As a result, the supply and demand indicators, the number of auctions and the auction rate, showed the nature of supply and demand according to the supply and demand logic of the market. However, the correlation was high for residential real estate and relatively low for commercial real estate. the auction rate has a long-term impact on price indicators, especially residential real estate, which is quantitatively explanatory and significant. The three auction-related indicators differ in degree, but there is a correlation, especially for residential real estate, which can be useful information for policy making.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• Journal of Institute of Control, Robotics and Systems
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• v.5 no.7
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• pp.855-861
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• 1999

In this paper, we present new application for the auction method which has been based on one-chip microprocessors. We develop the portable wired terminal for market blocker. And, using that, the recommended price of products is able to push into and show the information of action status. Through our research, using EAS(Electronic Auction System), we can prevent supplier from blocker's rigging the market, because anyone who have a qualification for the action blocker is able to participate in action.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.103-117
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• 2006

As the interest in the combinatorial auction has increased, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed. Although there have been several studies on the combinatorial auction design, the studies covered some factors or partial dimensions of combinatorial auction design. Given the potential practical value of combinatorial auctions, it is necessary to approach it with an integrated and systematic design methodology for supporting a comprehensive range of combinatorial auction models. Thus, we present a systematic framework for combinatorial auction design methodology. In particular, we classified the combinatorial auction architecture types, process types, and mechanism types. This framework characterizes the different combinatorial auction models, and lead to a useful taxonomy of the combinatorial auction design factors and taxonomy of the market types by coordination among the design factors. In addition, we illustrate an n-bilateral combinatorial auction market, derived from our design methodology, to show the viability of our study.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.200-209
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• 2006

Load building is an important step to make the delivery supply chain efficient. We present a family of load makeup algorithms using market based control strategy, named LoadMarket, in order to build efficient loads where each load consists of a certain number of finished products having destinations. LoadMarket adopts Clark-Wright algorithm for generating initial endowment for Load Traders who cooperate to minimize either total travel distance or the variance with respect to the travel distances of loads by means of the spot market or double-sided auction market mechanism. The efficiency of the LoadMarket algorithms is illustrated using simulation based experiments.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.592-601
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• 2007

In the conventional double auction approaches, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, these assumptions are unrealisitc. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. We propose a double auction mechanism with resource allocation based on nonlinear utility functions, namely a flexible synchronous double auction system where each participant can express a diverse utility function on the price and quantity. In order to optimize the total market utility consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders, our study proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through several simulation experiments.