• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
• /
• v.25 no.7
• /
• pp.159-165
• /
• 2020

With respect to the cause of asymmetric cost behavior, there are two streams of the literature. One stream focused on effect of managerial expectation and the other explained using agency system. In this study, we aim to investigate the determinants of asymmetric cost behavior in these streams. We first examine the impact of managerial overconfidence and optimistic bias on asymmetric cost. We also examine ownership ratio as a proxy of the quality of corporate governance effects on asymmetric cost. The results are as follows. First, firms have the anti-sticky asymmetric cost behavior. Second, we find that the firms with managerial optimistic bias mitigate the degree of asymmetric cost. This finding implies that managerial optimism is a factor that alters asymmetric cost behavior. Third, the degree of asymmetric cost is weaker in case of firms with higher manager's ownership. This result provides an important empirical evidence for understanding the role of corporate governance in cost behavior.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.9 no.7
• /
• pp.185-196
• /
• 2022

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of split ratings on earnings management through cost adjustments based on asymmetric cost behaviors. Using a sample of 2,027 Korean firm-year observations over the 2002-2019 period, we analyze whether a firm deliberately reduces discretionary costs, such as selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses, to improve profits when it receives multiple ratings from credit rating agencies (CRAs). While examining earnings management incentives in the presence of split ratings, we also investigate the moderating effects of Chaebols, Korea's unique corporate governance structure. We find that split-rating firms show less stickiness in SG&A costs compared to non-split-rating firms when sales decrease. This result implies the deliberate reduction of discretionary costs to improve earnings in the presence of split ratings, which are more likely to change in future credit assessments. We also find that the incentives for earnings management of split-rating firms are limited in Chaebol firms, which have high levels of socio-economic surveillance and support affiliated firms through the internal market of corporate groups. This study contributes to existing research by identifying new determinants of cost behavior by using the framework of asymmetric cost behavior in relation to earnings management incentives.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.20 no.4
• /
• pp.215-224
• /
• 2022

This study tried to examine the effect of cost asymmetry on food service companies and what characteristics affect such cost behavior. This study analyses cost behavior for cost of good sold, selling, general and administrative cost over the 2019-2020 period. Also, the rate of change in activity level was measured using change in sales. This study measures the behavior of cost using the research model of [1]. As a result of the analysis, it was found that food service companies exhibited cost asymmetric behavior as their sales level decreased. In addition, the cost asymmetric behavior has been strengthened since the corona virus, and the shorter the operating cycle. Lastly, the shorter the inventory holding period and the collection period of accounts receivable, which are components of the operating cycle, more strengthen asymmetric behavior of costs. These results seem to be meaningful in examining the cost structure and factors that may affect the structure for food service industry. This has approached the cost aspect of the situation faced by service food companies due to COVID-19, and it can be suggested that this pandemic can lead to cost reduction due to a decrease in corporate sales.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
• /
• v.11 no.1
• /
• pp.17-26
• /
• 2020

Purpose - This paper studies the welfare impacts of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) when firms are asymmetric in quality improvement costs. Design/methodology/approach - To this end, we consider a differentiated duopoly model with an inherited market share, where firms first make quality decisions and then compete in prices according to the pricing scheme, namely, uniform pricing or BBPD. Findings - We show that BBPD increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing if the firms' cost gap is large enough. This is because BBPD induces more consumers to buy a high-quality product than under uniform pricing, and because a low-cost firm's profit loss from BBPD decreases as the cost difference increases. Research implications or Originality - Our analysis offers policy implications for markets where BBPD raises antitrust concerns, and quality competition prevails.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
• /
• v.11 no.1
• /
• pp.259-266
• /
• 2020

This study analyzes the effects of the obsolescence assets on the asymmetry of costs. Cost asymmetry refers to a lower percentage of costs when sales fall than increases in costs when sales increase. the obsolescence asset induces various decisions, including high maintenance costs and management improvements and replacement of facilities. This study is to analyze the cost behavior according to those decisions. The analysis showed that the higher the obsolescence of assets rate, we found cost elasticity, with a greater reduction in costs when sales decrease than the increase in costs when sales increase. Second, the lower the cost will not appear as the obsolescence of assets rate increases in case that the concentration of an item of property, plant and equipment is high, and when sales decrease. The above result means that the obsolescence of assets rate acts as operating risk and thus operates resources flexibly according to changes in sales, but when the concentration of property, plant and equipment is high, the decision-making constraint make it difficult for the flexible operation.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
• /
• v.20 no.10
• /
• pp.452-458
• /
• 2019

The purpose of this study is to analyze how managers' reporting choices affect asymmetric cost behaviors in manufacturing firms in Korea and Japan. In order to analyze the contents, SG&A, COGS, and operating expenses (OE), which were the targets of the previous studies, were analyzed using the operating costs paid in cash (OC) and the operating expenses before depreciation (OEBD) proposed by Shust and Weiss (2014). The differentiation of cost behavior was analyzed. The analysis revealed, first, that both Korea and Japan showed the difference between cost behavior of OE and OC. Specifically, the cost stickiness of OC was higher than that of OE. In particular, it showed that Korea firms have a higher intensity of tangible fixed assets that are weakening the cost stickiness compared to Japanese firms. Second, the occurrence of depreciation costs weakens the cost stickiness in both countries. Lastly, the higher the debt ratio, the more aggressively the cost reduction of Japanese companies. We hope that this study will help to improve the relationship between the two countries at the academic level when the Korea-Japan relationship cools down.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
• /
• v.13 no.1
• /
• pp.11-21
• /
• 2022

Purpose: This study predicted cost asymmetry as a determinant of investment efficiency, and empirically analyzed the relationship between cost stickiness and investment efficiency. Research design, data and methodology: Using a sample of 4,382 Korean firm-year observations over 2011-2017 period, I examined the relationship between cost stickiness and investment efficiency. Asymmetrical cost behavior is measured as model of Homburg and Nasev (2008) and model of Park, Koo, and Pae (2012). Investment efficiency is measured as Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang (2011)'s model. Results: Firms with cost stickiness are less efficient in their investment than firms with non-cost stickiness. In other words, cost stickiness is an empirical result that supports the previous research on cost decision-making from perspective of managers pursuing private benefits due to information asymmetry. Conclusions: By showing that the manager's decision-making on the cost behavior affects the investment efficiency corresponding to capital management, the implications for the mechanism for efficient capital management are provided. Through the empirical results, it was shown that the cost stickiness is a product of opportunistic cost decision-making due to information asymmetry, and it is to present evidence that expands the meaning of the causes of asymmetric cost behavior.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.17 no.12
• /
• pp.109-115
• /
• 2019

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of Prior Sales change on R&D Costs and each detail item, and to analyze what decision managers make when changing sales. In order to conduct a more in-depth analysis as well as a one-period model of Anderson et al. (2003), which was used in previous studies, the two-period model of Banker et al.(2014) And analyzed the detailed items. As a result of the analysis, it is possible to confirm cost stickiness behavior only in the depreciation cost and others due to the limit of the model in the one period model. For a more in-depth analysis, the analysis of two-period model showed that labor costs and other items showed cost stickiness behavior when prior sales increased, but total R&D costs showed a anti-cost stickiness behavior. When prior sales decline, consigned service costs showed a cost stickiness behavior. This study is meaningful because it analyzed the effect of prior sales change on R&D cost behavior which were not performed in previous studies. Furthermore, we expect to be able to conduct more detailed research by sales and industry in future studies.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.18 no.5
• /
• pp.145-155
• /
• 2020

The purpose of this study investigates the relationship between business strategy and cost behavior according to the corporate life cycle. To do so, I first examine the relationship between cost behavior and business strategy. And then, I analyze the effect of the business strategy on cost behavior conditional upon corporate life cycle based on listed Korean firms from 2000 to 2019. Specifically, the business strategy index is calculated by using the six continuous financial factors and the Prospector and Defender was defined on the score. Also, the corporate life cycle is distinguished based on the cash flow pattern. I find the evidence that the Prospector firms are likely to strengthen the asymmetry of cost behavior (cost stickiness), and examined that such a relationship was most strongly represented in the Introduction. This study is meaningful in that this is a more comprehensive analysis by examining business strategy and cost strategy according to the corporate life cycle and expand the application of financial information by using financial indicators to distinguish business strategies.

• Journal of Distribution Science
• /
• v.14 no.8
• /
• pp.51-57
• /
• 2016

Purpose - If control-ownership disparity is large, managers will not actively reduce costs; rather, they will maintain unutilized resources or possess surplus resources even when sales decrease with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige. These managers' utility maximizing tendencies cause cost stickiness. We examine whether asymmetric behavior related to costs becomes stronger when there is a large disparity between ownership and control rights. Research design, data, and methodology - We construct a regression model to examine the relationship between control-ownership disparity and cost stickiness. STICKY, a dependent variable representing cost stickiness is a value found using the method of Weiss (2010), and Disparity is an interest variable that shows control-ownership disparity. Results - This study is based from the unique situations in Korea, in which high control-ownership disparity is common in firms. Large control-ownership disparity was found to increase cost stickiness of corporations. Conclusions - The results of this study imply that controlling shareholders may be regarded as a threat to the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values especially when controlling shareholders have significant influence over managers or the power to make managerial decisions as owners of a corporation.