• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• (The) Research of the performance art and culture
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• no.22
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• pp.287-325
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• 2011

This paper studies the time-space and appreciation of the performance culture of Gwanseo region, which is considered to have formed a characteristic culture in late Joseon period. For this purpose, 4 gasa written in hangeul (Korean alphabet), as well as 4 yeonhaeng gasa, 108 articles of Gwanseoakbu were examined. Plus, among the 9 types of yeonhaengrok (Documents of Performance culture) written in Chinese character, those parts which describe the performance traits have been analyzed. Then, 'main list of terminology' has been deduced based on the categorization according to the following points : 1) subjects of performance and appreciation 2) time and period of performance 3) space of performance 4) contents of performance 5) background and motive for performance and 6) method of performance. Through this process, various 'nouns' and 'predicate verbs' in relation to performance culture emerged, which were systemized according to types of performance elements and categories. Major terminology includes predicate verbs and symbolic verbs such as nokuihongsang,' 'baekdaehongjang,' 'jeolsaekgeumga,' 'cheonga,' 'hwaryu,' 'gamuja,' and 'tongsoja,' as well as the terms already known such as gisaeng, iwon, yangbang, akgong, and jeonak, which refer to musicians and dancers. Subjects of performance were divided into performers and listeners, categorized into concert, music, and dance, according to performance form. In the case for music, it was divided into instrumental or vocal, solo or accompanied (byeongju, self-accompaniment). In the case for vocal music, noteworthy was the inclusion of profesional artist's singing (called gwangdae or uchang). The record of 23 names of popular artists from Gwanseo region, with mention of special talents for each person, reflects the degree of activeness and artistic level of the province. Depending on the appreciating patrons, the audience were indicated as the terms including 'yugaek (party guest),' jwasang,' 'on jwaseok,' and 'sonnim (guests).' It seems that appraisal for a certain performance was very much affected by the tastes, views, and disposition of the appreciating patrons. Therefore it is interesting to observe different comparative reviews of concerts of different regions given by literary figures, offering various criticism on identical performance. In terms of performance space, it has been divided into natural or architectural space, doing justice to special performance sites such as a famous pavilion or an on-the-boat performance. Specific terms related to the scale and brightness of stage, as well as stage props and cast, based on descriptions of performance space were found. The performance space, including famous pavilions; Yeongwangjeong, Bubyeokru, Baeksangru, Wolparu, and Uigeomjeong, which are all well-known tourist sites of Gwanseo province, have been often visited by viceroys. governors, and envoys during a tour or trip. This, and the fact that full-scale performances were regularly held here, and that more than 15 different kinds of boats which were used for boat concert are mentioned, all confirm the general popularity of boat concerts at the time. Performance time, categorized by season or time of day (am/pm/night) and analyzed in terms of time of occurrence and duration, there were no special limitation as to when to have a performance. Most morning concerts were held as part of official duties for the envoys, after their meeting session, whereas evening concerts were more lengthy in duration, with a greater number of people in the audience. In the case of boat concert, samples include day-time concert and performances that began during the day and which lasted till later in the evening. Major terminology related to performance time and season includes descriptions of time of day (morning, evening, night) and mention of sunset, twilight, moonlight, stars, candles, and lamps. Such terms which reflect the flow of time contributed in making a concert more lively. Terminology for the contents of performance was mostly words like 'instrumental,' 'pungak,' or 'pungnyu.' Besides, contextual expressions gave hints as to whether there were dance, singing, ensemble, solo, and duets. Words for dance and singing used in Gwanseo province were almost identical to those used for gasa and jeongjae in the capital, Hanyang. However, many sentences reveal that performances of 'hangjangmu' of hongmunyeon, sword dance, and baettaragi were on a top-quality level. Moreover, chants in hanmun Chinese character and folk songs, which are characteristic for this region, show unique features of local musical performance. It is judged that understanding the purpose and background of a performance is important in grasping the foundation and continuity of local culture. Concerts were usually either related to official protocol for 'greeting,' 'sending-off,' 'reports,' and 'patrols' or for private enjoyment. The rituals for Gwanseo province characteristically features river crossing ceremony on the Daedong river, which has been closely documented by many. What is more, the Gwanseo region featured continued coming and goings of Pyeongan envoys and local officers, as well as ambassadors to and fro China, which required an organized and full-scale performance of music and dance. The method of performance varied from a large-scale, official ones, for which female entertainers and a great banquet in addition to musicians were required, to private gatherings that are more intimate. A performance may take the form of 'taking turns' or 'a competition,' reflecting the dynamic nature of the musical culture at the time. This study, which is deduction of terminology in relation to the time-space and appreciation culture of musical performances of Gwanseo region in late Joseon period, should be expanded in the future into research on 'the performance culture unique to Gwanseo region,' in relation to the financial and administrative aspects of the province, as well as everyday lifestyle. Furthermore, it could proceed to a more intensive research by a comparative study with related literary documents and pictorial data, which could serve as the foundation for understanding the use of space and stage, as well as the performance format characteristic to Korean traditional performing arts.