• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.277-302
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• 2014

This paper aims at providing a critical review of Alva Noe's enactive theory of perception. The discussion will be organized around the three issues: (i) Does the body make an ineliminable contribution to shaping the mind? (ii) Does Noe succeed in providing effective arguments against the brain-centrism? (iii) Does Noe's theory give a satisfactory explanation of how we can perceive external objects? In the sections 2 and 3 of the paper, I discuss possible criticisms that can be raised against Noe with regard to (i) and (ii). Although these are serious criticisms, they apply to the embodied cognition in general. That is, those criticisms are not restricted to Noe's theory. In order to understand the core aspect of Noe's theory, we need to pay attention to "the problem of perceptual presence" that is brought up in (iii). It is here that Noe's theory is supposed to make a distinct contribution to the discussion about the nature of perception. I argue, however, in the section 4 that Noe's theory fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of perceptual presence.