• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제41권3호
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• pp.11-20
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• 2018

Recently companies have increased the new projects to improve and innovate the business process in order to adopt the advanced technologies such as IoT (Internet of Things), Big Data Analysis, Cloud Computing, mobile and artificial intelligence technologies for sustainable competitive advantages under rapid technological and socioeconomic external environmental changes. However, there are obstacles to achieve the project goals, corporate's strategy and objectives due to various kind of risks based on characteristics of projects and conflicts of stakeholders participated on projects. Hence, the solutions are required to resolve the various kind of risks and conflicts of stakeholders. The objectives of this study are to investigate the impact of the project governance, agency conflicts on the project success based on agency theory by using the statistical hypothesis testing the relationship among those variables. As a result of hypothesis testing, we could find that the project governance impacts positively on project success and negatively on the agency conflicts. Further, the agency conflicts impacts negatively on the project success. Finally, we could find that the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and team members impact negatively on the project success. Meanwhile, the project governance impact positively on the project success, negatively impact on the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and project team members. In order to increase the project success rate, the project governance institutions such as PGB (Project Governance Board), EPMO (Enterprise Project Management Office), PSC (Project Steering Committee) are needed to prevent or reduce the agency conflicts between project manager and team members.

• The International Journal of Costume Culture
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.41-52
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• 2000

The Purposes of this study ar (1) to identify types and levels of channel conflicts between an apparel manufacturer and a franchised agency, (2) to investigate the effect of economic dependence on conflicts, and (3) to examine the effect of conflicts on satisfaction in a franchised agency's perspective in distributive channel of Korean apparel industry. For this study, questionnaires were administered to the owner or manager of 300 franchised agencies. Employing a sample of 209, data were analyzed by using means, factor analysis, pearson correlation and multi-regression analysis. Major findings are as follows: 1) Types of conflicts between apparel manufacturers and franchised agencies are identified as goal divergence, difference in perception, ineffective communication and lack of role clarity. The highest level of conflicts are lack of role clarity, followed by goal divergence, difference in perception and ineffective communication. 2) Economic dependence leads to channel conflicts in part. Greater levels of economic dependence foster greater conflicts such as lack of role clarity and lower conflicts such as ineffective communication. 3) With respect to effect of conflict on satisfaction, the greater the levels of conflict, the lower the degree of satisfaction with ole performance and with business decision and overall satisfaction.

• 재무관리논총
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.249-269
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• 2004

Free cash flow is known as a typical type of agency conflict between managers and shareholders in a firm. The insurance industry, which is not growing, is particularly susceptible to such excessive cash flow. We herein investigate the effects of stock ownership plans on reducing agency conflicts. We adopt undistributed cash flow to proxy free cash flow, and size, default risk, group membership, leverage, investment opportunity, and stock options are selected as explanatory variables. We find that stock option plans are effective(at a 10% level) in reducing free cash flow.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제3권4호
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• pp.5-16
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• 2016

Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제3권4호
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• pp.67-79
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• 2016

Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

• 유통과학연구
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• 제14권2호
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• pp.13-22
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• 2016

Purpose - We examine the marginal value of cash in Korean retail firms, largely unexamined in literature. The marginal value of cash plays pivotal role in cash management policy; especially, a significantly low marginal cash value indicates substantial manager-shareholder conflicts. Research design, data, and methodology - We estimate marginal cash values by adopting the approach of Faulkender & Wang (2006). The sample of retail firms traded in Korean Stock Exchange from 1991 to 2013 is analyzed. Results - We estimate the marginal value of cash for the retail firms as 0.75, implying significant manager-shareholder conflicts. We find a lower marginal value of cash for financially constrained retail firms, contradicting existing theories. The marginal value of cash increases substantially after 2000s, suggesting severe agency conflicts in 1990s as a key reason behind our findings. Conclusions - Our findings support the substantial resource diversion problem in Korean firms and the agency theory of cash management policy. Our results argue against the widely accepted view focusing on implications of financial constraints, which highlights a need of new cash management theory.

• 한국항만경제학회지
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• 제29권3호
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• pp.135-158
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• 2013

평택당진항은 매립지 관할권, 국제여객터미널 건립, 연육교 건설 등 주요 사안에서 해양수산부, 경기도, 충청남도, 평택시, 당진시, 아산시 등의 의견이 갈려 갈등이 일어나고, 심각한 경우에는 법적 분쟁으로까지 이어지고 있다. 이와 같은 갈등의 원인을 거버넌스 차원에서 해석하면 2가지 문제점이 지적될 수 있다. 첫째, 현행 평택당진항의 거버넌스 구조는 참여주체 간, 이해관계자 간 충돌 및 분쟁 가능성이 높은 구조로 되어 있다. 둘째, 현행 평택 당진항의 거버넌스 구조는 평택당진항의 미래 발전을 책임지고 이끌어갈 수 있는 주도기관의 부재가 중요한 문제점으로 거론된다. 이에 따라 충돌가능성을 저하하고, 주도기관이 존재하는 거버넌스를 설립하는 것이 무엇보다 중요하다. 충돌가능성을 저하하는 방안으로는 갈등조정기구의 설치, 항만개발 및 운영에 관한 사실관계 및 관련 법규의 명확화, 이해관계자 간 교류의 활성화 등이 제시되었다. 주도기관을 설립하기 위한 거버넌스 도입 방안은 단일 거버넌스의 도입, 평택당진항 항만공사(PA)의 신설, 중앙-지방 연합형 거버넌스의 도입, PA에 대한 실질적인 권한의 전면 부여 등이 검토되었다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제18권36호
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• pp.365-370
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• 1995

In recent years, there have been attempts to explain firms' capital structure based upon the agency theory which considers agency problems arising due to ownership structure. Agency theory starts from the coctractual relationship (explicit or implicit) between principals and agents. Since uncertainty exists in real world and information is distributed asymmetrically, there are conflicts between principals and agents. The objectives of this study are to analyze, based upon agency theory, factors which are expected to affect firms' capital structure and to test empirically the relevance of agency cost hypothesis about the determination of capital structure, For these purposes, this paper carried out multiple regression in order to examine whether the factors of agency costs affect significantly the determination of capital structure. The results of empirical analysis are summarrized as follows; First, insider-equity ration has been negatively correlated with capital structure. Second, growth opportunity variabless has been insignificant coefficients with capital structure.

• 정보화정책
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• 제19권4호
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• pp.27-45
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• 2012

다양한 기술의 융합 형태인 스마트그리드는 결국 다양한 기술부문 산업주체의 협력과 공정한 경쟁을 통해 구축 가능하다. 산업 및 기업 간 갈등이 조정되지 않고 심각하게 유지된다면 사업 추진이 지연되고 투자가 미흡할 수밖에 없다. 이에 본 연구는 스마트그리드 사업이 추진되면서 발생하는 갈등 원인과 관련 사안을 살펴보며, 주요 이슈별 정책방안을 제시한다. 스마트그리드 부문의 주요 갈등원인을 파악하기 위해 AHP 분석을 실시한 결과, 설문 응답자들은 스마트그리드 분야에서 갈등을 유발하는 주요 원인 중 '역할과 권한의 모호성'에 가장 높은 우선순위를 두었다. '역할과 권한의 모호성' 다음으로는 '가치의 차이'와 '의사소통 장애'를 주요 갈등원인으로 지적하였다. 스마트그리드 갈등 조정과 관련해서는 현 시점에서는 특히, 스마트그리드 이해관계자 간 이해 조율에서 정부의 리더십을 강화해 나가야 한다. 정부는 스마트그리드 시장 활성화 차원에서 법제도 개선과 함께 이해관계자 간 이해 조율에 주력하고, 국가적 차원에서 이해관계자간 바람직한 역할에 대한 공감대 형성의 장을 제공해야 한다.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제7권9호
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• pp.51-61
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• 2020

This research investigates the consequences of the increase in corporate use of short-term debt in China over the past decades. Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2007 to 2018, we empirically explore the effect of corporate use of short-term debt for long-term investment (SFLI) on audit pricing. We first examine the relationship between SFLI and audit pricing for different groups of firms. Then, we investigate the role of the increase in short-term debt in alleviating principal-agent conflicts and reducing agency costs. We have four primary empirical findings. First, auditors tend to charge SFLI clients higher fees. Second, the negative relationship between SFLI and audit fee is found in private firms, firms audited by Chinese domestic auditors, and firms with higher information asymmetry. Third, the time auditors spent on SFLI clients is significantly more than that spent on non-SFLI clients, suggesting that the decrease in audit fee is not due to the decrease in cost. Fourth, SFLI significantly reduces the agency costs of the firm, which auditors regard as a low risk signal and grant an audit fee discount. Our findings suggest that the decrease in debt maturity, not only influences managerial behaviors, but also influences auditors' risk assessment and pricing decisions.