• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.41 no.3
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• pp.11-20
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• 2018

Recently companies have increased the new projects to improve and innovate the business process in order to adopt the advanced technologies such as IoT (Internet of Things), Big Data Analysis, Cloud Computing, mobile and artificial intelligence technologies for sustainable competitive advantages under rapid technological and socioeconomic external environmental changes. However, there are obstacles to achieve the project goals, corporate's strategy and objectives due to various kind of risks based on characteristics of projects and conflicts of stakeholders participated on projects. Hence, the solutions are required to resolve the various kind of risks and conflicts of stakeholders. The objectives of this study are to investigate the impact of the project governance, agency conflicts on the project success based on agency theory by using the statistical hypothesis testing the relationship among those variables. As a result of hypothesis testing, we could find that the project governance impacts positively on project success and negatively on the agency conflicts. Further, the agency conflicts impacts negatively on the project success. Finally, we could find that the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and team members impact negatively on the project success. Meanwhile, the project governance impact positively on the project success, negatively impact on the agency conflicts such as goal conflict, different risk attitude and information asymmetry between project manager and project team members. In order to increase the project success rate, the project governance institutions such as PGB (Project Governance Board), EPMO (Enterprise Project Management Office), PSC (Project Steering Committee) are needed to prevent or reduce the agency conflicts between project manager and team members.

• The International Journal of Costume Culture
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.41-52
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• 2000

The Purposes of this study ar (1) to identify types and levels of channel conflicts between an apparel manufacturer and a franchised agency, (2) to investigate the effect of economic dependence on conflicts, and (3) to examine the effect of conflicts on satisfaction in a franchised agency's perspective in distributive channel of Korean apparel industry. For this study, questionnaires were administered to the owner or manager of 300 franchised agencies. Employing a sample of 209, data were analyzed by using means, factor analysis, pearson correlation and multi-regression analysis. Major findings are as follows: 1) Types of conflicts between apparel manufacturers and franchised agencies are identified as goal divergence, difference in perception, ineffective communication and lack of role clarity. The highest level of conflicts are lack of role clarity, followed by goal divergence, difference in perception and ineffective communication. 2) Economic dependence leads to channel conflicts in part. Greater levels of economic dependence foster greater conflicts such as lack of role clarity and lower conflicts such as ineffective communication. 3) With respect to effect of conflict on satisfaction, the greater the levels of conflict, the lower the degree of satisfaction with ole performance and with business decision and overall satisfaction.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.249-269
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• 2004

Free cash flow is known as a typical type of agency conflict between managers and shareholders in a firm. The insurance industry, which is not growing, is particularly susceptible to such excessive cash flow. We herein investigate the effects of stock ownership plans on reducing agency conflicts. We adopt undistributed cash flow to proxy free cash flow, and size, default risk, group membership, leverage, investment opportunity, and stock options are selected as explanatory variables. We find that stock option plans are effective(at a 10% level) in reducing free cash flow.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.5-16
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• 2016

Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.67-79
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• 2016

Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.13-22
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• 2016

Purpose - We examine the marginal value of cash in Korean retail firms, largely unexamined in literature. The marginal value of cash plays pivotal role in cash management policy; especially, a significantly low marginal cash value indicates substantial manager-shareholder conflicts. Research design, data, and methodology - We estimate marginal cash values by adopting the approach of Faulkender & Wang (2006). The sample of retail firms traded in Korean Stock Exchange from 1991 to 2013 is analyzed. Results - We estimate the marginal value of cash for the retail firms as 0.75, implying significant manager-shareholder conflicts. We find a lower marginal value of cash for financially constrained retail firms, contradicting existing theories. The marginal value of cash increases substantially after 2000s, suggesting severe agency conflicts in 1990s as a key reason behind our findings. Conclusions - Our findings support the substantial resource diversion problem in Korean firms and the agency theory of cash management policy. Our results argue against the widely accepted view focusing on implications of financial constraints, which highlights a need of new cash management theory.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.135-158
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• 2013

There have been many conflicts in Pyeongtaek-Dangjin Port among central government, metropolitan council, and cities over the jurisdiction of reclaimed port area, an international passenger terminal construction and a bridge between the port and Dangjin area. This study found out two causes for the conflicts in terms of governance. First, the current governance structure of Pyeongtaek-Dangjin port has high levels of conflict and disputes among stakeholder. Second, there is no leading agency which is responsible for the future development of the port. It is very important to decrease the possibility of conflict and to establish leading agency. Measures to decrease the likelihood of conflict include establishment of conflict resolution mechanism, the clarification of the facts and applicable law, mutual exchanges between stakeholder. Measures to establish a leading agency include the introduction of a single governance, establishment of Pyeongtaek-Dangjin Port Authority, central-local combined governance, and empowering PA to do all port management.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.18 no.36
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• pp.365-370
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• 1995

In recent years, there have been attempts to explain firms' capital structure based upon the agency theory which considers agency problems arising due to ownership structure. Agency theory starts from the coctractual relationship (explicit or implicit) between principals and agents. Since uncertainty exists in real world and information is distributed asymmetrically, there are conflicts between principals and agents. The objectives of this study are to analyze, based upon agency theory, factors which are expected to affect firms' capital structure and to test empirically the relevance of agency cost hypothesis about the determination of capital structure, For these purposes, this paper carried out multiple regression in order to examine whether the factors of agency costs affect significantly the determination of capital structure. The results of empirical analysis are summarrized as follows; First, insider-equity ration has been negatively correlated with capital structure. Second, growth opportunity variabless has been insignificant coefficients with capital structure.

• Informatization Policy
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.27-45
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• 2012

Smart grid, which is a sort of convergence of numerous technologies, can be deployed only with cooperation and fair competition among various stakeholders. If the interest conflicts were not coordinated properly, related business and investment would become delayed and inactive. Therefore, this study analyzes the causes of interest conflicts and related issues in smart grid sector and suggests policy directions by issue. As the result of AHP analysis, the majority of respondents surveyed said that ambiguity of the role and authority is the key problem causing conflicts of interest in smart grid deployment process. Differences in values, communications problems, etc. are pointed as additional main reasons of the interest conflicts. To resolve interest conflicts in smart grids, the Korean government should enhance its leadership in the coordination of stakeholders' interests. Government should make efforts to coordinate the various interests in terms of the development of the smart grid market and win stakeholders' sympathy of their desirable roles in the smart grid market.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.9
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• pp.51-61
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• 2020

This research investigates the consequences of the increase in corporate use of short-term debt in China over the past decades. Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2007 to 2018, we empirically explore the effect of corporate use of short-term debt for long-term investment (SFLI) on audit pricing. We first examine the relationship between SFLI and audit pricing for different groups of firms. Then, we investigate the role of the increase in short-term debt in alleviating principal-agent conflicts and reducing agency costs. We have four primary empirical findings. First, auditors tend to charge SFLI clients higher fees. Second, the negative relationship between SFLI and audit fee is found in private firms, firms audited by Chinese domestic auditors, and firms with higher information asymmetry. Third, the time auditors spent on SFLI clients is significantly more than that spent on non-SFLI clients, suggesting that the decrease in audit fee is not due to the decrease in cost. Fourth, SFLI significantly reduces the agency costs of the firm, which auditors regard as a low risk signal and grant an audit fee discount. Our findings suggest that the decrease in debt maturity, not only influences managerial behaviors, but also influences auditors' risk assessment and pricing decisions.