• Journal of agriculture & life science
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• 제44권4호
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• pp.45-55
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• 2010

In this study, the acetylcholinesterase (AChE) inhibition and neuronal cell protective effects of water, 100% methanol and dichlromethane extracts from garlic were investigated. We found that dichloromethane extract of garlic resulted in a dose-dependent manner on AChE inhibition ($IC_{50}$: $36.1{\mu}g/mL$). In cell viability assay using 3-(4,5-dimethylthiazol-2-yl)-2,5-diphenyl-tetrazoliumbromide (MTT), cell viabilities of water, 100% methanol and dichlromethane extracts were lower (almost under 40%) than amyloid ${\beta}$ protein ($A{\beta}$)-induced neurotoxicity. Because $A{\beta}$ is also known to increase neuronal cell membrane breakdown, neuronal apoptosis was further confirmed by lactate dehydrogenase (LDH) and neutral red uptake (NRU) assay. Water extract presented relative protection against $A{\beta}$-induced membrane damage in LDH assay. However all garlic extracts showed significant problem with decrease of cell viability in NRU assay, especially at dichloromethan extract. To determine active compounds in column fractions (98:2 fraction) from dichloromethane extract which showed significant AChE inhibitory effect, we performed HPLC and LC-MS analysis. It was supposed that garlic may contain allyl methyl disulfide, diallyl monosulfide, and diallyl disulfide as active compounds.

• Journal of the Society of Cosmetic Scientists of Korea
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• 제49권1호
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• pp.87-96
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• 2023

This study was conducted to discover substances that regulate skin surface acidification using human epidermal keratinocyte cell lines, and to investigate their effects on the moisturizing ability and skin barrier function of the stratum corneum. Prunella vulgaris (P. vulgaris) is an herb widely distributed in Northwest Africa and North America that has been studied for its anti-apoptotic, antioxidant, and anti-inflammatory effects. However, research on the regulation of NHE1 expression and the restoration of skin barrier function has not been conducted. Analysis of P. vulgaris revealed the presence of rosmarinic acid and caffeic acid as active ingredients, which were tested for toxicity in human epidermal keratinocyte cell lines (HaCaT), and showed no toxic effects were observed at high concentarion (100 ㎍/mL or 100 µM). It is known that sodium-hydrogen ion exchange pumps (NHE1) decrease in expression in aging skin to maintain the acidic pH of the stratum corneum, and it is hypothesized that this decrease plays an important role in the impaired restoration of skin barrier function in aging skin. P. vulgaris extract and caffeic acid increased the expression of NHE1 in keratinocytes, increased the expression of natural moisturizing factor (NMF) precursor filaggrin and ceramide synthesis enzyme serine palmitoyl transferase (SPT). In addition, P. vulgaris and caffeic acid decreased the extracellular pH of keratinocytes, indicating a direct effect on skin pH regulation. Taken together, these results suggest that P. vulgaris and caffeic acid can regulate skin pH through NHE1 modulation, and may help to restore skin barrier function by increasing NMF and ceramide synthesis. These results show the possibility that honeysuckle and caffeic acid can have a positive effect on skin health, and can be the basis for the development of new skin protection products using them.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• 제57권2호
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• pp.144-166
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• 2024

The Cultural Heritage Committee is an important organization that has been deliberating on important matters related to the preservation of cultural properties in the Republic of Korea for more than 60 years since 1962. The Cultural Heritage Preservation Committee was active in 1961, which was a short period of about a year, but the minutes prepared at the time confirmed that it had the following meanings. First of all, legally, it was meaningful in that the concept of cultural property or intangible cultural property was used for the first time in Korea in laws and regulations on the term of office of professional members. These matters became the basis for the operation of the current Cultural Heritage Protection Act and the Cultural Heritage Committee. The following confirms that, unlike previously known activities, they were active despite political upheaval at the time. In spite of rapid regime change at the time, the committee had no change in its members, and the meetings continued without interruption. At that time, there was an exclusive relationship between different groups in relation to the preservation of cultural heritage, and this relationship was confirmed by the minutes that disappeared with the establishment of the Cultural Heritage Management Bureau, which integrated these groups. Finally, the form of the minutes prepared then shows the form of documentation at the time, where it is confirmed that the traditional documentation format is changing into a new form. It can be good research material in terms of modern and contemporary bibliography. As discussed earlier, the Cultural Heritage Conservation Committee of 1961 has historical significance in terms of legal and actual activities. The reason why the committee's activities were low valued is presumed to be that the minutes and related documents prepared at the time were not organized well due to the lack of a related administrative system. The minutes of the Cultural Heritage Conservation Committee record various facts about cultural heritage policies and decisions at that time. Therefore, analysis and research on these contents can reveal more facts about the cultural heritage policies and perceptions of that time.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture
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• 제38권3호
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• pp.25-34
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• 2020

This study examined the definition and major values, the designated procedures and types, and the designation trend in Korean scenic sites and national parks in the United States. Based on this, the analysis of the characteristics of the designation of the two natural heritages. The results are as follows; First, Scenic Sites has characteristics of complex heritage that includes academic, historical, and humanities values on the basis of landscape. As a natural heritage based on public nature, the U.S. National Park aims to contribute to the people's natural heritage and satisfy both ecological and historical values through the protection of the landscape. Second, the designation of a scenic sites are decided through deliberation by the Cultural Heritage Committee after the request of the owner, manager, or local government or by the authority of the head of the Cultural Heritage Administration. The designated survey is divided into basic resource surveys and resource surveys by type. Since the initial designation of the Sogeumgang Mountain in Cheonghakdong, Myeongju in 1970, the number of designated scenic sites was low until the 2000s, but the number of designated scenic sites has increased rapidly since 2006 due to the policy to promote the scenic site, and the proportion of natural and historical and cultural scenic sites has been balanced. The designation of the U.S. national park is decided by the Congress or the president, and the National Park Service makes a series of decisions on whether to conduct a special resource study of provisional resources through a preliminary inspection survey, whether to satisfy the criteria for designation of national parks based on the results of special resource research, and to prioritize them. The U.S. National Parks have been expanded not only by Congress but also by the president's empowerment to designate them as national monuments. With the integrated operation of the National Park Service, the number of designated cases increased as the national park included the heritage sites under the control of various ministries. In addition, a number of historical areas were designated by the enactment of the Historical Site Act, and recreational areas were designated to provide leisure space and classified and managed in a total of 18 units. Third, the comparison of the designation characteristics of the two heritage properties confirmed that the designation of natural heritage with complex value, the classification of types according to complementary designation system and resource characteristics, the establishment of the competent ministry and the balancing of the heritage according to the designation policy. The two heritages had the characteristics of complex natural heritages that met ecological, historical and academic values at the same time based on landscape and public nature. In addition, both countries have identified a system for deliberating the designation of heritage through a basic resource survey and an in-depth designation survey, and classified each type according to the characteristics of the resource. In addition, the policies for promoting scenic sites in Korea and the integrated operation of the National Park Service in the U.S. influenced the designated aspects of the two heritage sites, balancing natural heritage with historical and cultural heritage. Fourth, the resource types and conservation management methods of Scenic site and National Park were largely related. The natural areas of the U.S. National Park include types of natural monuments in Korea as major resources, and have characteristics similar to natural scenic sites. In addition, historical resources were similar to the criteria for designation of historical and cultural scenic sites in terms of landscape, and the aspects of war and celebrity-related relics were related to the types of historic sites. In terms of conservation management, the natural area of the U.S. national park has a way of keeping the original ecosystem intact, but the Korean natural heritage protection system is likely to be useful for focusing on the resource of viscosity. Meanwhile, historical resources include historical sites and historical and cultural scenic sites in the traditional era, but historical relics in the U.S. National Parks have set a time limit to modern times for war history and celebrity-related relics, and the active provision of entertainment programs based on existing resources was derived as a difference.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• 제24권1호
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• 통권8호
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• Korean Journal of Environment and Ecology
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• 제22권6호
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• pp.679-690
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• 2008

The objectives of this study are to investigate and analyze the vegetation structure and population dynamics of Berchemia racemosa habitats in the Weolmyung park in Gunsan city, and base on that to seek the ecological habitat conservation plan for the Berchemia racemosa. In results, the Berchemia racemosa habitats are located at $81{\sim}93$ meters above the sea level, in steep seaside slope of a mountain. The soil texture are silt loam mainly and soil pH were $4.1{\sim}5$. The vascular plants in the Berchemia racemosa habitats has been analyzed as 61 taxa; 33 families, 51 genera, 54 species, 6 varieties, and 1 forms. Berchemia racemosa as a Specific plant species by floral region was the class V. Berchemia racemosa habitats were classified into 7 vegetation communities of Quercus serrata community(A1), Alnus firm a community(A2), Platycarya strobilacea community(A3), Robinia pseudoacacia community(A4) and 3 Pinus densiflora communities(B1, B2, B3). The importance value of Berchemia racemosa were 30%(A1), 15%(A2), 27%(A3), 65%(A4), 18%(B1), 45%(B2) and 35%(B3) on shrubs layer and 12, 27, 20, 18, 11, 18, 21 % on herb layer. The constant companion species with Berchemia racemosa were Stephanandra incisa and Ligustrum obtusifolium. Total 103 populations appear in the 7 Berchemia racemosa habitats. Their spatial distribution pattern were clumped for the most part. The average height was 133cm, the root color diameter was 4.4cm and the ramification branch number was 9.4. From the results of this study, it is suggested the continued monitoring and the active protection measures for the Berchemia racemosa habitats.

• Korean Journal of Ecology and Environment
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• 제40권2호
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• pp.318-326
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• 2007

Characteristics of organophoshhorus pesticides (OPs) distribution were investigated in Shingu Reservoir, as a shallow eutrophic agriculture reservoir in Korea. In August 2006, IBP, DDVP and dyfonate were detected in the water column of Singu Reservoir, ranging from 1340.7 to 16030.1 ng $L^{-1}$, 58.7 to 127.6 ng $L^{-1}$ and N.D. to 20.3 ng $L^{-1}$, respectively, However, in September 2006, mevinfos, ethoprofos, phorate, chlorfenvinfos, and methidathion were also found in addition to IBP (202.5${\sim}$213.2 ng $L^{-1}$), DDVP (100.7${\sim}$340.6 ng $L^{-1}$) and dyfonate (N.D.${\sim}$25.0 ng $L^{-1})$. Maximum concentrations of OPs were observed at the middle depth in August, which might be related with photo-oxidation. On the other hand, IBP and DDVP among the OPs were detected in suspended particles, suggesting the relatively active adsorption reactivity. The composition of OPs varied temporally on account of the influence of inflow water from its surrounding areas. In the present study, the observed OPs concentrations seem to be not acute toBic levels to aquatic organisms in Shingu Reservoir, considering the standard monitoring levels of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Japan Ministry of Environment.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Food Science and Nutrition
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• 제26권2호
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• pp.186-192
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• 1997

Increased activities of phase 2 enzymes including quinone reductase(QR) have been reported to be associated with protection of animals from neoplastic, mutagenic, and other toxic effects of many carcinogens. In previous study, we found that methanol extract of roasted and defatted perilla meal induced the activity of quinone reductase, an anticarcinogenic marker enzyme, in murine hepalc1c7 cells. Current study showed that unroasted perilla had a limited QR-inducing activity, suggesting that roasting cause the generation of active component(s). Thus we hypothesized that QR inducer in perilla might be covalently linked to sugar moiety and released during roasting process. Methanol extract of defatted raw perilla was subject to acid treatment in order to hydrolyze the potential sugar moiety. Prolonged hydrolysis of methanol extract of defatted raw perilla at $98{\sim}100^{\circ}C$ increased the ability to induce cytosolic QR activity of hepalclc7 cells. Furthermore roasting at 180 and $200^{\circ}C$ resulted in significant induction of QR activity. The result strongly support the idea that QR inducer(s) is present in bound form in raw perilla and released during roasting. Cellular QR activity was induced proportionately with the increase of concentration of methanol extract of roasted perilla. The induction of QR by defatted perilla was also examined in the cytosols of liver, small intestine, stomach, lung and kidney of male ICR mice. Induction patterns showed specificity with respect to target tissue and roasting of perilla. Unroasted perilla meal (defatted) significantly induced QR in liver and lung, while roasted perilla meal induced QR in liver and stomach. The observation that raw perilla showed similar QR induction patterns to roasted perilla is consistent with our proposal that QR inducer(s) is present in bound form and released by physical and chemical treatments as digestive or microbial enzymes could release the inducers from inactive glycoside forms in gastrointestinal tract of mice. In conclusion, perilla could exert protective effect against chemically induced carcinogenesis by inducing phase 2 enzymes in biological systems regardless of chemical and physical process such as roasting.

• Korean Security Journal
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• 제7호
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• pp.95-124
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• 2004

It can be said that 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' in 2001 were not only the indiscriminate attacks on innocent people but also the whole - political, economical and military - attacks on human life. Also, 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' can be regarded as the significant events in the history of world, which were on the peak of the super-terrorism or new-terrorism that had emerged from the 1980s. However, if one would have analysed the developments of terrorism from the 1970s, they could have been foreknown without difficulty. The finding from this study can be summarized as the followings, First, in spite that the USA responsive system against terrorism had been assessed as perfect before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks', the fragilities were found in the aspects of the response on the new-terrorism or super-terrorism. The previous responsive system before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' had the following defects as the followings: (1) it was impossible to establish the integrated strategy, because the organizations related to the response against terrorism had not integrated; (2) there were some weakness to collect and diffuse the informations related to terrorism; (3) the security system for the domestic airline service in USA and the responsive system of air defense against terrors on aircraft were very fragile. For these reasons, USA government established the 'Department of Homeland Security' of which the President is the head so that the many organizations related to terrorism were integrated into a single management system. And, it legislated a new act to protect security from terrors, which legalized of the wiretapping in spite of the risk of encroachment upon personal rights, increased the jail terms upon terrorists, froze the bank related to terrorist organization, and could censor e-mails. Second, it seem that Korean responsive system against terrors more fragile than that of USA. One of the reasons is that people have some perception that Korea is a safe zone from terrors, because there were little attacks from international terrorists in Korea. This can be found from the fact that the legal arrangement against terrorism is only the President's instruction No. 47. Under this responsive system against terrorism dependent on only the President's instruction, it is expected that there would be a poor response against terrors due to the lack of unified and integrated responsive agency as like the case of USA before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks'. And, where there is no legal countermeasure, it is impossible to expect the binding force on the outside of administrative agencies and the performances to prevent and hinder the terrorist actions can not but be limited. That is to say, the current responsive system can not counteract effectively against the new-terrorism and super-terrorism. Third, although there were some changes in Korean government's policies against terrorism. there still are problems. One of the most important problems is that the new responsive system against terrorism in Korea, different from that of USA, is not a permanent agency but a meeting body that is organized by a commission. This commission is controled by the Prime Minister and the substantial tasks are under the National Intelligence Service. Under this configuration, there can be the lack of strong leadership and control. Additionally, because there is no statute to response against terrorism, it is impossible to prevent and counteract effectively against terrorism. The above summarized suggests that, because the contemporary super-terrorism or new-terrorism makes numerous casualties of unspecified persons and enormous nationwide damages, the thorough prevention against terrorism is the most important challenge, and that the full range of legal and institutional arrangements for the ex post counteraction should be established. In order to do so, it is necessary for the government to make legal and institutional arrangements such as the permanent agency for protection from terrorism in which the related departments cooperates with together and the development of efficient anti-terror programs, and to show its willingness and ability that it can counteract upon any type of domestic and foreign terrorism so that obtain the active supports and confidence from citizens.