• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.89-124
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• 2018

평화를 전쟁의 부재라고 정의할 때 현재 전쟁이 없다면 지금 이 시간은 안전하고 평화로워야 한다. 그러나 지금 현 세상은 비록 공식적으로 선포된 전쟁은 없다고는 하지만 그래도 결코 평화롭다곤 할 수 없을 것이다. 흑해의 크림반도가 노골적인 군사적 침략이 없었지만 결과적으로 러시아의 수중에 떨어졌다. 남중국해의 여러 섬이나 암초들이 정규 군사작전 없이 사실상의 중국의 소유로 기정사실화 되고 있다. 전시 군사적 침략을 통해서만이 확보 가능한 전략적 목표들이 전시도 아니고 그렇다고 평시도 아닌 어중간한 시기에 적 또는 상대의 수중에 떨어지고 있다. 즉, 전시와 평시 사이의 회색지대에서 소위 회색지대전략이라고 부르는 공세적 전역을 통해 이러한 전략적 목표들이 달성되어 지고 있다. 소시지가 너무 커 한입에 다 먹을 수 없으면 잘게 썰어 하나씩 먹으면 결국 전체를 다 먹을 수 있듯이 소규모의 절차적 행동을 단계적으로 실행, 대규모 전투를 통해서만이 확보 가능한 거대하고 중대한 목표를 확보하는 게 회색지대전략의 한 특징이다. 이를 전략적 점진주의(strategic gradualism)라고 한다. 또한 단계적 행동은 누구나 인지할 수 있지만 그러한 점진적 행동의 결과에 대해선 쉽게 간파할 수 없기 때문에 대응자의 입장에선 대부분 특별한 대응책을 세우지 못하고 방치하고 만다는 게 이 전략의 또 다른 특성이다. 즉, 회색지대전략은 특성상 반드시 애매모호성(ambiguity)을 띄고 있다는 것이다. 회색지대에서의 도전자의 행위는 일종의 속임수일 수도 있다. 전략의 본질은 위계, 즉 상대로 하여금 오인, 착각, 부지를 일으키도록 하여 소기의 목적을 달성하는 것이다. 그래서 회색지대전략(gray zone strategy)이라고도 한다. 양육강식의 논리가 작용되는 현실 세계에선 힘이 곧 정의이고 국익이 최고의 선이다. 국가이익은 오직 과정보다는 결과만을 놓고서 정당화된다. 이에 회색지대전략에서도 결과에 대한 유용성만 거론되지 과정상 불법성이나 비도덕성 등은 따지지 않는다. 대부분 이 전략의 애매모호성 때문에 과정 자체를 식별하기가 쉽지 않다. 그래서 대응자의 입장에서도 사전에 예방할 수 있는 선제적 대응전략을 구사하기가 어려운 게 사실이다. 한국도 예외가 아니다. 중국이 해상민병을 이용한 회색지대전략을 구사, 이어도에 대한 도발을 감행할 수도 있다. 일본이 민간 극우파 등을 이용한 회색지대 전략을 구사, 독도에 대한 도발을 감행할 수도 있다. 평화는 거저 존재하지 않는다. 확전을 각오한 사전대비차원의 억지책이 마련되어야 상대의 회색지대전략을 단념시킬 수 있다. 그것도 신뢰성 있는 억지력만이 진정한 평화를 담보할 수 있다. 전략이 있어야 대응계획을 세울 수 있고, 상대는 이럴 때 도발을 단념하게 된다. 대응전략이 없다는 것은 대응계획이 없다는 것을 의미하고, 이러한 무계획은 늘 실패만을 계획하고 있다는 것을 명심해야 할 것이다.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.149-173
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• 2020

While the United States and other Western states are in trouble with COVID-19 crisis, China is continuing its aggressive ocean expansion with its Gray-zone strategy. The Gray-zone strategy, which China uses around the South China Sea, refers to a strategy that promotes a change in international politics by creating an unclear state, neither war or peace. China, which is trying to expand its influence across East Asia, will also try to project a Gray zone strategy on the Korean Peninsula. The possible scenarios are as follows: 1) South Korea is accidentally involved in a dispute in the South China Sea, 2) Military conflicts between South Korea and China is caused by illegal fishing of Chinese boats in Yellow Sea, 3) China tries to interfere with Socotra Rock, 4) Unlikely, but possible in the future that China induce the military conflicts between Korea and Japan on the Dokdo issue. In order to cope with these scenarios, Korea should prepare the following measures from a long-term perspective: the creation of an Asian maritime safety fleet, the integ rated operation of the navy and the coast guard in the framework of the national fleet, and strengthening the conflict control system for China's provocations.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.273-310
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• 2020

This study aims at empirically analyzing the overall mechanism of the "Gray Zone Strategy", which has begun to be used as one of Chinese major maritime security strategies in maritime conflicts surrounding the South China Sea and East China Sea since early 2010, and comparing the resulting conflict patterns in those reg ions. To this end, I made the following two hypotheses about Chinese gray zone strategy. The hypotheses that I have argued in this study are the first, "The marine gray zone strategy used by China shows different structures of implementation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, which are major conflict areas.", the second, "Therefore, the patterns of disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea also show a difference." In order to examine this, I will classify Chinese gray zone strategy mechanisms multi-dimensionally in large order, 1) conflict trends and frequency of strategy execution, 2) types and strengths of strategy, 3) actors of strategy execution, and 4) response methods of counterparts. So, I tried to collect data related to this based on quantitative modeling to test these. After that, about 10 years of data pertaining to this topic were processed, and a research model was designed with a new categorization and operational definition of gray zone strategies. Based on this, I was able to successfully test all the hypotheses by successfully comparing the comprehensive mechanisms of the gray zone strategy used by China and the conflict patterns between the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In the conclusion, the verified results were rementioned with emphasizing the need to overcome the security vulnerabilities in East Asia that could be caused by China's marine gray zone strategy. This study, which has never been attempted so far, is of great significance in that it clarified the intrinsic structure in which China's gray zone strategy was implemented using empirical case studies, and the correlation between this and maritime conflict patterns was investigated.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.33-59
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• 2019

There have many research papers to see China's evolution of maritime strategy and naval modernization in terms of its naval mind-set. However, this article focuses on assessing how China uses its all sorts of maritime strength to achieve 'a building maritime great power.' The aim of the article is to introduce a new perspective to this debate by analysing China's diversified ma maritime capabilities and a new way of implementation in maritime security strategy. In recent years, China has been developing not only unpredictable maritime military capabilities but also maritime supporting forces - Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. And recently China adopted up-to-date operational concept aimed at gaining military superiority in Asia-Pacific waters. By taking salami slicing strategy, gray zone strategy and cabbage strategy, China has been trying to exercise surpassing influences in regional maritime area, also in western Pacific region. This article provides a stepping stone to comprehend the aspect of China's recent maritime strategic actions, especially in Yellow Sea. In conclusion, this article suggests some policy recommendations for countering China's coercive maritime strategy. First, Korea should make sure a strategic concept of maritime security, instead of land warfare focused strategic concept. Second, it is needed to set up suitable naval forces for actively responding to neighbor nation's offensive actions.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.1-20
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• 2018

Southeast Asia witnessed a paradox of political stagnation and economic development in 2017. The 'dual order' of security dependence on America and economic dependence on China was sustained in East Asia. In this regard, Southeast Asia of two faces was quite similar to broader East Asia. On one hand, the old socialist group with totalitarian nostalgia lurked in the buffer zone between totalitarianism and authoritarianism, while the original capitalist group under democratic disguise roamed in the gray zone between authoritarianism and democracy. On the other, the old socialist group with the legacy of the planned economy succumbed to the temptation of the Beijing Consensus on state capitalism, while the original capitalist group with the myth of the market economy was exposed to the pressure of the Washington Consensus on liberal capitalism. The ASEAN Community representing the regional integration of Southeast Asia was caught in the strategic predicament of a looming 'new cold war' between the continental and maritime powers.

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.83-113
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• 2022

Although China's maritime militia has not been well known despite its long history, it is recently emerging as a serious threat to maritime security, causing neighboring countries' security concerns due to the growing number of maritime disputes with China. In this regard, it is now time to clearly define the true nature of the Chinese maritime militia. A close look at the organization and roles of the Chinese maritime militia reveals that it is an organization that is systematically managed and operated by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of China. Its role is to serve the purpose of "contributing to the protection and expansion of China's marine interests." In addition, the threat factors of the Chinese maritime militia were analyzed by examining the cases of maritime disputes between the Chinese maritime militia and neighboring countries. First, the Chinese maritime militia has implemented the "Gray Zone Strategy." Second, it is a systematic organization supported by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army. Third, it is a maritime power that cannot be ignored as the world's largest militia organization. Fourth, it has a strategic flexibility that enables the execution of the dual mission of working for a living such as commercial fishing and serving in the maritime militia. The threats of the Chinese maritime militia are not limited to Southeast Asian countries located in the South China Sea. This is also the case in Korea as the country cannot avoid maritime disputes with China such as the Ieodo issue and the boundary delimitation of the West Sea. Accordingly, this study was focused on presenting a predictable scenario and countermeasures based on the analysis through a scenario technique with respect to the two cases that are most likely to occur in Korea-China relations. Finally, beyond identifying the nature of the Chinese maritime militia, this study takes a further step to share considerations as to how the organization may operate and develop in the future and how we can cope with its moves.