• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.92-107
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• 1996

Based on the act.ivity report for the coastal fisheries resources conducted from 1982 to 1989 by West, East Research Institute of Fisheries, some other reports from Korea Rural Economics Institute and etc., and the questionnaire results for the senses of fishermen, the fishing efficiency and conditions of by - catch of small fish in winged stow net were analized, and then some ways to prevent from by - catch of small fishes were suggested in this paper. The nationwide conditions of Permission and Disposal in winged stow net fishery arc that number of cases of coastal winged stow net fishery has dropped to 757 by 1994 while it was 961 in 1991 and that the number of cases of a sectional winged stow net fishery on the contrary has increased to 302 by 1994 while it was 11 in 1991. Regardless of region, catch per net by year in general has been on gradual increase in 1982 through 1989, but that showed decrease in 1994. From the view of region, the proportion of by - catch of shrimps and blenny is higher in Kyonggi, Chungnam with West Sea and that of anchovy and blenny is higher in Chonbuk, Chonnam, Kyongnam with South Sea. The average proportions of by - catch of small fish for 5 years from 1985 to 1989 are 86.9% for sand lance, 69% for anchovy, 63% for big eyed herring, 51% for blenny, 22% for Southern rough shrimp and 19% for akiami paste shrimp, hence sand lance and anchovy are highly by - catch effective while shrimps is not. Ways to prevent the over fishing of small fish in winged stow net fishery includes reduction of fishing frequency during April and August through November, the very season for small fish, use of meshes large enough for small fish to go through and assignment of fishing area to other than habitats of stationary fish.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.190-219
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• 2013

Since Korea and Japan established diplomatic relationship, Relationship between Korea and Japan has not been easygoing. There are two most explosive, and noticeable ones among topics which have affected the relationship ; Dokdo and Historical Distortion. Without these issues, relationship between two countries will take a turn for the better. However, unfortunately, it seems that it is almost never going to happen. There is the Japanese conservative right-wing who has an influence on those two issues. The right-wing takes regard getting negative view or finding out dark past as an action from Self-torture view of history, and tries to dilute the Japanese sense of guilt on past invasions to neighbor countries. Moreover, to become a "normal country", they are trying to revise Constitution of the Japan so that Japan can possess the military and re-arm, dispatch troops abroad, and get the right to break the war. In other words, they expect Japan to become a powerful nation with great influence on Asia and world, as the period in which Japan conquered Korean peninsula, China, and South-Eastern nations. Japan still harbours secret romanticism for bygone days of imperialist glory. That is why neighbors want to never make the painful history happen again. In order to deal with this effort, most of all, it is required to assert better argument with a careful, thorough analysis on Japanese opinion about Dokdo. There might be a hidden card which can be accepted in the international society considering Japanese persistent effort to make Dokdo disputed area, and that is why we have to know that it is. In addition, it is needed to secure a high-quality professional manpower because the issues of Dokdo and Historical Distortion are primarily the matter of logic and references. The professional manpower should have open-minded to break down walls of their own majors. We have to introduce our achievements and stances to the international society vigorously. As a definite way to solve these problems, we have to develop national power. We have to possess naval forces and coast guard to protect our territory and Koreans overseas. There are not many options Korea can do to Japan, except protesting denunciation, and pressing a joint efforts. Most of the suggestions stated before are what have to be conducted domestically. It is a miserable condition, because two problems are Japanese domestic issues, but they become international issues and we have to seek a solution for ourselves.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.142-163
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• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.265-276
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• 2005

In order to grasp the structure and dynamics of phytoplankton communities, chlorophyll-a (Chl-a) and cell abundance were measured at 20 stations during the period from August 9 to August 21, 2003 in the southeastern Barents Sea on surface and subsurface chlorophyll maximum depth (SCM). Surface temperatures were varied from minimum $-0.7^{\circ}C(st. 18)$ to maximum $10.4^{\circ}C(st.1)$. Salinities were varied from minimum 29.9 psu(st. 18) to maximum 35.8 psu(st.2). The maximum nutrient(phosphate, nitrate, silicate) concentrations were $0.12{\mu}M,\;0.11{\mu}M,\;7.53{\mu}M$ and minimum concentrations were $0.01{\mu}M,\;0.03{\mu}M,\;1.43{\mu}M$, respectively. On SCM physical environmental factor were almost similar. Chl-a concentrations ranged from 0.23 to $2.13{\mu}g\;chi-a\;l^{-1}$ at SCM. Nano- and pico phytoplankton were the important contributors for increase of the Chl-a. It was about seven times difference between highest concentration to lowest. Phytoplankton communities were composed of diatoms, dinoflagellates, cryptophyceae, silicoflagellate, and prymnesiophyceae showing 37 taxa at surface and 38 taxa at SCM. Picophytoplankton was the most dominant in all stations and all layers, but the second groups were 2 and/or 3 taxa. Phytoplankton abundance ranged from minimum $4.3{\times}10^5\;cells\;l^{-1}$ (st. 20) to maximum $2.4{\times}10^6\;cells\;l^{\-1}$. (st. 17) at surface water. As a result, phytoplankton might be controlled by physical factors such as North Atlantic ocean currents and northern melt water among environmental factors in Barents Set h addition the dominant species were nano- and pico phytoplankton such as Phaeocystis, Cryptomonas and Dinobryon in the study area.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.55-68
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• 2011

The distribution and inter-annual variation of nutrients (N, P, Si) and dissolved/particulate organic carbon were investigated in the equatorial thermocline ridge ($7^{\circ}{\sim}11.5^{\circ}N$, $131.5^{\circ}W$) of the northeast Pacific. From the Oceanic Nino Index and Multivariate ENSO Index provided by NOAA, normal condition was observed in July 2003 and August 2005 on the aspect of global climate/ocean change. However, La Ni$\~{n}$a and El Ni$\~{n}$o episodes occurred in July 2007 and August 2009, respectively. Thermocline ridge in the study area was located at $9^{\circ}N$ in July 2003, $8^{\circ}N$ in August 2005, $10^{\circ}N$ in July 2007, and $10.5^{\circ}N$ in August 2009 under the influence of global climate/ocean change and surface current system (North Equatorial Counter Current and North Equatorial Current) of the northeast Pacific. Maximum depth integrated values (DIV) of nutrients in the upper layer (0~100 m depth range) were shown in July 2007 (mean 21.12 gN/$m^2$, 4.27 gP/$m^2$, 33.72 gSi/$m^2$) and higher variability of DIV in the equatorial thermocline ridge was observed at $10^{\circ}N$ during the study periods. Also, maximum concentration of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) in the upper 50 m depth layer was observed in July 2007 (mean $107.48{\pm}14.58\;{\mu}M$), and particulate organic carbon (POC, mean $9.42{\pm}3.02\;{\mu}M$) was similar to that of DOC. Nutrient concentration in the surface layer increased with effect of upwelling phenomenon in the equatorial thermocline ridge and La Ni$\~{n}$a episode, which had formed in the central Pacific. This process also resulted in the increasing of organic carbon concentration (DOC and POC) in the surface layer. From these results, it is suggested that spatial and temporal variation of chemical and biological factors were generated by physical processes in the equatorial thermocline ridge.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.21-34
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• 2011

We determined potential meso-scale benthic-pelagic ecosystem coupling in the north equatorial Pacific by comparing surface chl-a concentration with sediment bacterial abundance and adenosine triphosphate (ATP) concentration (indication of active biomass). Water and sediment samples were latitudinally collected between 5 and $11^{\circ}N$ along $131.5^{\circ}W$. Physical water properties of this area are characterized with three major currents: North Equatorial Current (NEC), North Equatorial Count Current (NECC), and South Equatorial Current (SEC). The divergence and convergence of the surface water occur at the boundaries where these currents anti-flow. This low latitude area ($5{\sim}7^{\circ}N$) appears to show high pelagic productivity (mean phytoplankton biomass=$1266.0\;mgC\;m^{-2}$) due to the supplement of high nutrients from nutrient-enriched deep-water via vertical mixing. But the high latitude area ($9{\sim}11^{\circ}N$) with the strong stratification exhibits low surface productivity (mean phytoplankton biomass=$603.1\;mgC\;m^{-2}$). Bacterial cell number (BCN) and ATP appeared to be the highest at the superficial layer and reduced with depth of sediment. Latitudinally, sediment BCN from low latitude ($5{\sim}7^{\circ}N$) was $9.8{\times}10^8\;cells\;cm^{-2}$, which appeared to be 3-times higher than that from high latitude ($9{\sim}11^{\circ}N$; $2.9{\times}10^8\;cells\;cm^{-2}$). Furthermore, sedimentary ATP at the low latitude ($56.2\;ng\;cm^{-2}$) appeared to be much higher than that of the high latitude ($3.3\;ng\;cm^{-2}$). According to regression analysis of these data, more than 85% of the spatial variation of benthic microbial biomass was significantly explained by the phytoplankton biomass in surface water. Therefore, the results of this study suggest that benthic productivity in this area is strongly coupled with pelagic productivity.

• Korean Journal of Environmental Biology
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.18-25
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• 2003

Effects of tributyltin chloride (TBTC) in vitro on mixed function oxygenase (MFO) system on liver microsome of eight marine fish species were investigated. To determine the effects on MFO system, cytochrome P45O (CYP) and cytochrome b5 con-tents, activities of two reductases (NADH-cytochrome b5 reductase and NADPH-cy-tochrome P450 reductase) and four dealkylation enzymes (EROD, PROD, MROD and ECOD) were measured in fish microsoms exposed to TBTC for 20 min. The WP content was reduced to 10% of the control group in 6 out of 8 species exposed to TBTC, whereas there was no significant change in the cytochrome bs content. the response of NAD(P)H dependant reductases depended on fish species. The dealkylation enzyme activities in microsome were also apparently inhibited by TBTC. The degree of inhibition was different among fish species and four enzymes. The EROD activities in eight species were decreased to the range of 1∼65% of control group.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.265-280
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• 2011

The temporal dynamics of the meiofauna community in Marian Cove, King George Island, Antarctica were observed from March 7 to December 21 2007. Nine meiofauna taxa were found, with nematodes the most dominant group, making up 92.97% of the total meiofauna density, followed by harpacticoid copepods (3.18%). Meiofauna abundance ranged from 123 to 874 individuals per 10 $cm^2$ (mean 464 inds.10 $cm^{-2}$), which is lower than that found in some polar and temperate regions. The lowest meiofauna abundance was found in the 26th April sample (III) and the highest meiofauna abundance was found in the March 23rd sample (II). There was no correlation between meiofauna abundance and season. The seasonal changes were likely caused by meltwater runoff, and there were the physical disturbances on the bottom sediment by huge iceberg. Biomass of meiofauna varied between 20.36 and 101.02 ${\mu}gC{\cdot}10\;cm^{-2}$, and overall mean biomass was 54.17 ${\mu}gC{\cdot}10\;cm^{-2}$ during the study periods. More than 80% of meiofauna was concentrated in the upper 2 cm of the sediment, and density decreased with depth. The mean diversity index was 0.37, and the ratio between the abundance of nematodes: and harpacticoids (N/C) ratio ranged from 7.31 to 95.04 (mean 26.39). NMDS analysis divided the community into three groups: A (III, IV, V, VII, VIII), B (II, IX, XI, XII) and C (I, V, X). The results of ANOSIM and SIMPER analysis revealed significant differences in community structure among three groups and major contributed meiofauna taxon in grouping were nematodes and copepods. No significant correlations were observed between major meiofauna taxon and environmental factors. Thirteen species in 12 genera representing nine families of harpacicoids were recorded. Ancorabolidae was the most diverse family, and Heteropsyllidae was the most abundant. The correlation analysis between benthic harpacticoid copepods and environmental factors showed that some species were affected by water temperature, sediment temperature, salinity, chlorophyll a concentration, grain size of the sediments and heavy metal contents of the sediments. These data describe the usefulness of benthic harpacticoid copepods as biological indicator species in Antarctic regions.