• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.87-107
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• 2005

Land Remote Sensing' is defined as the science (and to some extent, art) of acquiring information about the Earth's surface without actually being in contact with it. Narrowly speaking, this is done by sensing and recording reflected or emitted energy and processing, analyzing, and applying that information. Remote sensing technology was initially developed with certain purposes in mind ie. military and environmental observation. However, after 1970s, as these high-technologies were taught to private industries, remote sensing began to be more commercialized. Recently, we are witnessing a 0.61-meter high-resolution satellite image on a free market. While privatization of land remote sensing has enabled one to use this information for disaster prevention, map creation, resource exploration and more, it can also create serious threat to a sensed nation's national security, if such high resolution images fall into a hostile group ie. terrorists. The United States, a leading nation for land remote sensing technology, has been preparing and developing legislative control measures against the remote sensing industry, and has successfully created various policies to do so. Through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's authority under the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, the US can restrict sensing and recording of resolution of 0.5 meter or better, and prohibit distributing/circulating any images for the first 24 hours. In 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 23 ordered a 'Shutter Control' policy that details heightened level of restriction from sensing to commercializing such sensitive data. The Directive 23 was even more strengthened in 2003 when the Congress passed US Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. These policies allow Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to set up guidelines in authorizing land remote sensing, and to limit sensing and distributing satellite images in the name of the national security - US government can use the civilian remote sensing systems when needed for the national security purpose. The fact that the world's leading aerospace technology country acknowledged the magnitude of land remote sensing in the context of national security, and it has made and is making much effort to create necessary legislative measures to control the powerful technology gives much suggestions to our divided Korean peninsula. We, too, must continue working on the Korea National Space Development Act and laws to develop the necessary policies to ensure not only the development of space industry, but also to ensure the national security.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.205-237
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• 2014

Last 50 years there were a lot of space subjects launched by space activities of many states and these activities also had created tremendous, significant space debris contaminating the environment of outer space. The large number of space debris which are surrounding the earth have the serious possibilities of destroying a satellite or causing huge threat to the space vehicles. For example, Chinese anti-satellite missile test was conducted by China on January 11, 2007. As a consequence a Chinese weather satellite was destroyed by a kinetic kill vehicle traveling with a speed of 8 km/s in the opposite direction. Anti-satellite missile tests like this,contribute to the formation of enormous orbital space debris which can remain in orbit for many years and could interfere with future space activity (Kessler Syndrome). The test is the largest recorded creation of space debris in history with at least 2,317 pieces of trackable size (golf ball size and larger) and an estimated 150,000 debris particles and more. Several nations responded negatively to the test and highlighted the serious consequences of engaging in the militarization of space. The timing and occasion aroused the suspicion of its demonstration of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities following the Chinese test of an ASAT system in 2007 destroying a satellite but creating significant space debris. Therefore this breakup seemed to serve as a momentum of the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and the background of the EU initiatives for the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines thus adopted contain many technical elements that all the States involved in the outer space activities are expected to observe to produce least space debris from the moment of design of their launchers and satellites until the end of satellite life. Although the norms are on the voluntary basis which is normal in the current international space law environment where any attempt to formulate binding international rules has to face opposition and sometimes unnecessary screening from many corners of numerous countries. Nevertheless, because of common concerns of space-faring countries, the Guidelines could be adopted smoothly and are believed faithfully followed by most countries. It is a rare success story of international cooperation in the area of outer space. The EU has proposed an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities as a transparency and confidence-building measure. It is designed to enhance the safety, security and sustainability of activities in outer space. The purpose of the Code to reduce the space debris, to allow exchange of the information on the space activities, and to protect the space objects through safety and security. Of the space issues, the space debris reduction and the space traffic management require some urgent attention. But the current legal instruments of the outer space do not have any binding rules to be applied thereto despite the incresing activities on the outer space. We need to start somewhere sometime soon before it's too late with the chaotic situation. In this article, with a view point of this problem, focused on the the Chinese test of an ASAT system in 2007 destroying a satellite but creating significant space debris and tried to analyse the issues of space debris reduction.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.261-284
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• 2018

The current international legal system does not provide a safeguard against the militarization and the weaponization of outer space. Although the term "peaceful use of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty(OST) appears in official government statements or in multilateral space treaties, it is still without an authoritative definition in reviewing national practices. The ambiguous ban on weapons in Article IV of the OST allows countries to loophole on the deployment of other weapons other than nuclear weapons. Meanwhile "Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT)" to Conference on Disarmament (CD) commissioned by the UN General Assembly's Special Session jointly submitted by China and Russia in 2008 and later revised in 2014, attempting to define and prohibit the proliferation of weapons in outer space and provided definitions of prohibited weapons, are opposed by the US on the grounds that currently there is no arms race in outer space. Some experts support a hard law approach in which binding laws aimed at ultimately creating integrated and binding legal instruments in all aspects of the use of outer space should be adopted to regulate the military use of space. However as a temporary measure the soft law guidelines should be developed for the non liquiet, a situation where there is no applicable law. The soft law could be used to create support for the declaration of the treaties and to create international customary law. For example, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space that regulates the activities of the state in the exploration and use of the universe, and the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space will illustrated. While substantial portions of the former was codified later in the 1967 OST, the latter which, although written in somewhat mandatory terms, have been consistently complied with by states, have arguably become part of customary international law. On November 12, 1974, the General Assembly reaffirmed that the development of international law may be reflected inter alia, by declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly which may to that extent be taken into consideration by the International Court of Justice.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.247-276
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• 2017

The protection of space asset has been new major cause of space militarization. For such purpose, it has been officially announced that a policy of deterring and denying any adversaries from accessing the outer space. Space militarization is to be conversed into a new concept of space weaponization. The USA has announced its policy of space weaponization, while China and Russia have not revealed their plan or policy. Latter States, however, have proposed a draft treaty limiting the deployment of warfare in the outer space. The terms of the Outer Space Treaty, reflecting three significant United Nations General Assembly resolutions from the 1960s, support the position that ground rules must be observed in the exploration and the use of outer space, particularly in the absence of specific space law rules. Yet the combination (and culmination) of these two approaches to the legal regulation of outer space-specific rules as and when agreed by the international community and the translation of principles developed for terrestrial regulation to outer space-still leaves much room for uncertainty and exploitation for military and strategic purposes. As space weaponization may contribute to deterring the use of weapon, it may be not against the UN Charter Article 2(4). If space weaponization might generate the space debris such that the outer space is no more available for exploration and use, it is against the proportionality principle and discrimination principle enshrined in the laws of the war. But, if the limitation upon the kind and use of space weaponization is agreed among the States, then the space weaponization may not be against the laws of the war, and be considered permissible within the rationale of limited war.

• Atmosphere
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.489-497
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• 2012

Recently released a top secret document explicitly shows that the early development plan for an earth observation satellite in the USA has a hidden and more important purpose for a concept of 'free space' than the scientific purpose. At that time, the hidden and secret concept imbedded within the early space development plan prevail other national policies of the USA government for purpose of the national security. Under these circumstances, it is quite reasonable to accept a possibility that the meteorological satellites which play a key role in the every area of meteorology and climatology was also born for the hidden purposes. Even it is so, it is quite amazing that the first meteorological satellite is launched in the USA despite of the facts that the major users of the meteorological satellites were not very enthusiastic with the meteorological satellite and the program was not started as a formal meteorological satellite project. This was only possible because of the external socio-political impact caused by the successful launch of the Russian Sputnik satellite and a few key policy developers who favored the meteorological satellite program. It is also interesting to note that the beginning of the first Korean meteorological satellite program was initiated by a similar socio-political influence occurred by the launch of a North Korean satellite.